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ABSTRACT
This paper – based on a report by a Task Force 
established  by  the  International  Relations 
Committee (IRC) of the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) – reviews macroeconomic 
and financial stability challenges for acceding 
(Bulgaria and Romania) and candidate countries 
(Croatia  and  Turkey).  In  an  environment 
characterised  by  strong  growth  and  capital 
inflows,  the  main  macroeconomic  challenges 
relate to the recent pick-up of inflation and the 
large  and  widening  current  account  deficits. 
Moreover, rapid credit growth has been a recent 
feature of financial development in all countries 
and thus constitutes the main financial stability 
challenge.  In  general,  monetary  authorities 
have responded to these challenges by tightening 
monetary conditions and prudential standards, 
with  concrete  measures  also  reflecting  the 
different monetary and exchange rate regimes 
in the region. The paper also highlights four 
specific features of financial development in 
the  countries  under  review,  namely  the 
dominance of banks in financial intermediation, 
the strong participation of foreign-owned banks, 
the widespread use of foreign currencies and 
the strengthening of supervisory frameworks.
Key words: South-East Europe, macroeconomic 
performance, credit growth, financial stability
JEL classification: E65, G21, G38, O16, P275
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Over the last years, acceding countries (Bulgaria 
and Romania) and candidate countries (Croatia 
and Turkey)1 have seen strong economic growth, 
coupled  with  disinflation  or  low  inflation2. 
Domestic  demand,  fostered  partly  by  rapid 
credit growth and strong capital inflows, has 
been the main engine of growth. In addition, 
given the increasing integration with the euro 
area and the EU, export performance has been 
buoyant, but outpaced by even stronger import 
growth.
Recently, however, inflation has picked up or 
disinflation has slowed down, as the expansion 
of domestic demand has been accompanied by 
several  negative  supply  shocks,  including  a 
significant rise in energy prices, adjustments in 
regulated  prices,  exogenous  shocks,  such  as 
floods, and increasing wage pressures. Current 
account deficits have remained high or increased 
from already high levels. External private debt 
has  grown  rapidly,  as  banks  and  enterprises 
have  substantially  increased  their  borrowing 
abroad. 
Against this background, monetary authorities 
have tightened monetary conditions. Monetary 
and  exchange  rate  regimes  vary  between  the 
countries under review, eliciting different policy 
responses.  Countries  with  a  peg  or  tightly 
managed float have mainly relied on tightening 
prudential measures, raising minimum reserve 
requirements and introducing limits on credit 
growth. By contrast, countries with a floating 
exchange  rate  regime  and  inflation  targeting 
have also allowed for nominal exchange rate 
appreciation and have either raised or curbed 
the decline in interest rates. Moreover, in all 
countries, fiscal policy has lent some support to 
monetary policy in safeguarding macroeconomic 
stability, as fiscal deficits have either declined 
or turned into surpluses. 
Turning to country-specific developments, the 
findings are as follows.
BULGARIA
Bulgaria’s macroeconomic challenges relate to 
the recent pick-up in headline inflation, which 
has been driven by strong demand and exogenous 
factors (oil price developments, adjustments in 
administered prices, impact of the 2005 flooding 
on agricultural output), as well as to the increase 
in  its  current  account  deficit  and  the  rise  in 
private external debt in a context of intermediately 
high  total  foreign  debt  levels.  Positive  fiscal 
outcomes have resulted in a fall in public external 
debt, compensating for the rise in private external 
debt.  In  the  light  of  strong  credit  growth,  the 
Bulgarian  National  Bank  (BNB)  has  adopted 
restrictive administrative and prudential measures 
to curb credit expansion. However, with an open 
capital  account,  experience  suggests  that  any 
dampening effect may only be temporary, as such 
measures tend to be circumvented over time. 
Bulgaria’s  financial  sector  is  largely  bank-
based, private and foreign-owned, and profitable. 
Banks are predominantly deposit financed and 
have relatively high capital reserves. The change 
in the ownership structure has helped to enhance 
competition.  Rapid  credit  growth  has  been 
associated with a substantial change in the net 
asset positions of the banking sector vis-à-vis 
those of the real sector, including the foreign 
sector. Consequently, banks’ net foreign assets 
have  changed  from  a  strongly  positive  to  a 
slightly negative position. On the asset side of 
the balance sheet, there has been a shift from 
foreign assets towards domestic claims. Owing 
to  the  relatively  small  size  of  the  domestic 
interbank market, claims on other banks have 
been modest.
Given the rapid rise in loans, in particular to 
households and for housing, Bulgaria’s banking 
sector is exposed primarily to credit risk. Its 
exposure to interest rate risk, however, appears 
limited, although it could lead to an increase in   
1  The  report  does  not  cover  the  former Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia which has been recently granted candidate status by 
the  European  Council  on  17  December  2005,  following  the 
Commission’s recommendation. 
2  The cut-off date for the information included in this report was 
30 April 2006. 6
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credit risk if the costs associated with adverse 
interest  rate  developments  are  passed  on  to 
customers.
ROMANIA
The main challenge for the Romanian authorities 
is  to  keep  disinflation  on  track,  as  domestic 
demand (fostered partly by strong credit growth) 
is expanding rapidly, wage pressures have been 
increasing, adjustments in administered prices 
have been ongoing and energy prices have been 
persistently high. Formally operating under an 
inflation targeting regime since August 2005, 
monetary policy faces the issue of tightening 
monetary  conditions  within  the  constraints 
posed  by  the  need  to  prevent  unsustainable 
exchange rate appreciation pressures stemming 
from large and volatile capital inflows. Fiscal 
policy  therefore  remains  key  to  supporting 
macroeconomic  stabilisation.  To  minimise 
external  vulnerabilities,  the  main  policy 
challenge  is  to  reduce  the  current  account 
deficit – albeit largely financed by FDI inflows 
– that has resulted from strong domestic demand, 
rising real unit labour costs and appreciation 
pressures on the leu. 
Banking  sector  development  in  Romania  has 
been characterised by fast private credit growth, 
in  particular  to  households  (e.g.  consumer 
lending, mortgages). However, expressed as a 
share  of  GDP,  intermediation  is  still  low. 
Moreover,  the  Romanian  banking  sector  is 
generally  composed  of  well  capitalised, 
profitable and mostly foreign-owned banks.
Credit risk remains the main risk to financial 
stability in Romania. Private credit growth has 
been driven by improved consumer confidence, 
high  economic  growth  and  macroeconomic 
stabilisation. As a substantial share of lending 
is  denominated  in  foreign  currencies,  end-
borrowers  face  significant  foreign  exchange 
rate risk, which could transform into a higher 
credit  risk  for  banks.  Banca  Naţională  a 
României (BNR) has taken restrictive measures 
to  limit  credit  growth,  in  particular  foreign 
currency  borrowing,  which  has  been  partly 
induced  by  spreads  between  domestic  and 
foreign interest rates. To date, there have been 
no  signs  of  a  deterioration  in  credit  quality. 
Interest rate risk is also increasing, but is still 
at a low level. 
CROATIA
Croatia’s  main  macroeconomic  challenge 
relates to external factors. Export performance 
is highly dependent on tourism, and Croatian 
exports have been relatively slow in penetrating 
major  export  markets.  This  raises  concerns 
about medium-term competitiveness and may 
have  an  impact  on  the  current  account.  It  is 
therefore important to reverse the trend of rising 
external debt levels (including those of banks), 
which is associated with rapid capital inflows. 
However, monetary policy has little room for 
manoeuvre, given the tightly managed floating 
exchange rate regime and the high degree to 
which  financial  assets  and  liabilities  are 
denominated in foreign currency, particularly 
in euro. Against this background, the Croatian 
National Bank (CNB) has adopted a series of 
restrictive  administrative  and  prudential 
measures  to  curb  both  foreign  borrowing  by 
banks and domestic credit growth. Since such 
measures tend to be circumvented in the medium 
term, fiscal policy ought to play a greater role 
in the macroeconomic adjustment process, in 
order to moderate the impact of the sizeable 
capital inflows. 
The Croatian financial sector is largely bank-
based,  private  and  foreign-owned,  relatively 
concentrated  and  generally  profitable.  Banks 
are  predominantly  deposit  financed.  Rapid 
credit  growth  has  been  associated  with  a 
substantial  decrease  in  the  net  foreign  asset 
position  of  private  banks.  Claims  on  the 
corporate sector are high, but have been falling 
vis-à-vis the household sector, partly due to the 
non-bank  and  cross-border  financing  of 
enterprises. Banking sector assets and liabilities 
are mainly denominated in or indexed to foreign 
currencies, mostly the euro. 7
ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 48
July 2006
Croatia’s banking sector is exposed primarily   
to  credit  risk.  The  common  indicators  of   
asset quality are still positive, but credit risk 
may be rising again due to high credit growth. 
Despite the restrictive measures taken by the 
CNB,  persistently  high  credit  growth  to  the 
household sector has led to rapidly rising debt 
levels and an increasing debt service burden. 
This is indicative of a considerable rise in credit 
risk, as most of the exchange and interest rate 
risk  has  been  passed  on  to  borrowers. 
Consequently,  market  risks  are  likely  to 
resurface  through  credit  risk  in  the  event  of 
large shocks. 
TURKEY
A  key  challenge  for Turkey  is  to  reduce  the 
current account deficit that has resulted from 
strong  domestic  demand,  capital  inflows  and 
the  (real)  appreciation  of  the  lira.  This  is 
particularly important given the unfavourable 
maturity structure of private external debt. In 
addition,  the  level  and  structure  of  public   
debt still constitute a source of vulnerability, 
highlighting the importance of continued strict 
adherence to sound fiscal policies.
The Turkish financial sector is showing signs of 
increasing confidence: the portion of assets and 
liabilities in local currency is rising, and there 
is growing foreign interest in Turkish banks, 
although the share of assets held by foreign-
owned  banks  is  still  comparatively  small.  In 
addition, banks are increasingly shifting from 
simply transforming deposits into government 
security holdings to “core” banking activities, 
i.e.  lending  to  the  corporate  and  household 
sectors. Consequently, credit has been growing 
rapidly  and  the  maturity  of  assets  has  been 
lengthening. 
Credit risk is rising due to strong credit growth, 
particularly in consumer lending and credit cards. 
Moreover, the proliferation of new products may 
create  the  potential  for  a  build-up  of  non-
performing loans. Interest rate risk is also rising, 
as declining interest rates are giving banks an 
incentive  to  continue  borrowing  short-term, 
exacerbating maturity mismatches. In addition, 
market risk, in particular interest rate risk, related 
to Treasury bill holdings is still significant.
SPECIAL FEATURES
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND NON-BANK FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
Compared with the EU and the new Member 
States, bond markets, stock markets and non-
bank financial institutions in the acceding and 
candidate  countries  are  relatively  small  (as  a 
share of GDP) and underdeveloped – with the 
exception of securities markets in Turkey. This 
underdevelopment can, inter alia, be attributed 
to  the  relatively  short  history  of  financial 
markets  and  the  importance  of  foreign  direct 
investment  (FDI)  as  an  alternative  source  of 
capital. However, these markets have experienced 
rapid development in recent years, driven by a 
favourable interest rate and external environment, 
as  well  as  sovereign  rating  upgrades. 
Furthermore, there is potential for significant 
further  financial  market  growth  due  to  a 
widening demand for financial assets in these 
countries  partly  driven  by  the  EU  accession 
process. 
Whilst  non-bank  financial  institutions  still 
make up a relatively small share of the financial 
sector in the acceding and candidate countries, 
they are growing rapidly and, as a whole, their 
share has nearly doubled since 2001. The limited 
size  of  the  non-bank  financial  institutions 
indicates  that  this  sector  is  not  likely  to 
significantly affect the stability of the financial 
system,  but  as  this  sector  is  generally  less 
regulated than the banking sector it warrants 
vigilance from the policy makers. 
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN BANKS
Over the past five years, the number of foreign-
owned  banks  successfully  penetrating  the 
banking sectors of the acceding and candidate 
SPECIAL   
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countries has increased substantially. Initially, 
this was due mainly to greenfield investment, 
while  more  recently  it  has  been  largely  the 
result of acquisitions related to the privatisation 
of  state-owned  banks.  Foreign-owned  banks, 
primarily  through  local  branches  and 
subsidiaries, are currently the most important 
players  in  the  financial  sectors  in  all  four 
countries  except  Turkey,  where  foreign 
involvement  is  largely  in  the  form  of  cross-
border lending. 
The presence of foreign-owned banks yields a 
number  of  benefits,  including  better  risk 
management,  greater  efficiency  through 
enhanced  competition,  improved  access  to 
finance and a more stable lending environment. 
Nevertheless,  it  also  entails  a  number  of 
potential  risks. The  most  important  of  these 
include  a  sudden  withdrawal  of  capital  from 
subsidiaries  due  to  changing  financial  and 
economic conditions in home and host countries, 
as  well  as  the  potential  for  contagion  via 
common creditor effects. Foreign bank presence 
may have also contributed to the very fast rates 
of  credit  growth,  as  foreign-owned  banks 
compete for market share. 
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES
Foreign currencies, in particular the euro, play 
a significant role in the banking sectors of the 
acceding and candidate countries. Traditionally, 
deposits were in foreign currencies, reflecting 
a lack of confidence in the domestic currency 
due to periods of (hyper) inflation and strong 
depreciations.  While  the  share  of  foreign 
currency deposits rose further in the run-up to 
the euro cash changeover, it has since gradually 
declined, albeit remaining at a comparatively 
high  level.  By  contrast,  the  share  of  foreign 
currency  loans  in  total  loans  has  risen 
significantly  in  all  countries.  This  reflects 
supply and demand effects. On the one hand, 
households  and  enterprises  ask  for  foreign-
currency-denominated loans as they carry lower 
interest  rates  than  loans  denominated  in 
domestic  currency.  On  the  other  hand,  given 
their increasing reliance on foreign borrowing, 
mainly  from  parent  banks,  banks  have 
increasingly lent on to final borrowers in foreign 
currency  to  keep  their  net  overall  foreign 
currency positions small.
Since borrowers, in particular households, are 
typically unhedged, banks’ loan portfolios are 
subject to possibly substantial indirect foreign 
exchange risks, as a depreciation in the domestic 
currency could lead to a deterioration in the 
borrowers’  debt  servicing  capacity.  Against 
this  background,  monetary  authorities  have 
introduced  mandatory  reserve  regulations  to 
discourage  banks  from  further  borrowing 
abroad.  Moreover,  they  have  tightened 
prudential measures and applied moral suasion 
at the creditor and borrower level to limit these 
risks.  Although  such  measures  have  a 
dampening effect in the short run, experience 
suggests that they tend to be circumvented over 
time,  as  customers  either  sidestep  the 
regulations or borrow directly from abroad.
THE SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK
Banking regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
have  been  overhauled  in  the  acceding  and 
candidate countries to address the requirements 
of the acquis communautaire. Minimum capital 
requirements  have  been  upgraded,  loan 
classification  and  provisioning  requirements 
have  been  progressively  tightened  and  an 
explicit  deposit  insurance  system  has  been 
implemented. However, work is still needed in 
a  number  of  areas,  most  importantly  in 
improving cooperation between home and host 
country supervisors. 
The supervision of non-bank financial activities 
is less developed. Further progress is required 
to ensure compliance with the acquis on anti-
money  laundering  measures,  in  terms  of 
legislation and implementation. Thus far, the 
enforcement of such measures appears to have 
been  weak,  partly  hampered  by  corruption, 
organised crime and a large informal economy. 9
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1  PREFACE
Over the last years, acceding countries (Bulgaria 
and Romania) and candidate countries (Croatia 
and Turkey)3 have seen strong economic growth, 
coupled  with  disinflation  or  low  inflation. 
Domestic  demand,  fostered  partly  by  rapid 
credit growth and strong capital inflows, has 
been the main engine of growth. Indeed, banks 
have  expanded  credit  at  a  rapid  pace,  in 
particular  to  households  and  for  housing 
purposes.  This  has  raised  financial  stability 
concerns and been accompanied by a widening 
of external imbalances, despite a buoyant export 
performance, as it has been outpaced by even 
stronger import growth.
More  recently,  inflation  has  picked  up  or 
disinflation has slowed down, as the expansion 
of domestic demand has been accompanied by 
several  negative  supply  shocks,  including  a 
significant rise in energy prices, adjustments in 
regulated  prices,  exogenous  shocks,  such  as 
floods, and increasing wage pressures. Current 
account deficits have remained high or increased 
from already high levels. External private debt 
has  grown  rapidly,  as  banks  and  enterprises 
have  substantially  increased  their  borrowing 
abroad. 
These developments have taken place in financial 
sectors that are generally characterised by: 
–  a recovery from crisis-like developments in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, and, in the 
case of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, an 
ongoing transition process, showing strong 
progress in financial intermediation;
–  a  dominance  of  banks  vis-à-vis  other 
financial intermediaries and markets; 
–  strong participation by foreign-owned banks 
(with  the  notable  exception  of  Turkey), 
either in the form of local subsidiaries and 
branches and/or cross-border lending;
–  the widespread use of foreign currencies, in 
particular the euro; and
–  a  strengthening  of  the  supervisory 
framework.
Against this background, in October 2005, the 
International Relations Committee (IRC) of the 
European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB) 
established a Task Force, comprising participants 
from the ECB and the national central banks of 
the  ESCB,  to  analyse  macroeconomic  and 
financial  stability  challenges  facing  the 
acceding and candidate countries. The ensuing 
report – on which this occasional paper is based 
–  was  reviewed  by  the  IRC  in  March  2006. 
Moreover,  it  served  as  input  to  the  dialogue 
between the Economic and Financial Committee 
(EFC) and acceding and candidate countries in 
April/May 2006.4 
The report is structured around four country-
specific  chapters.  Following  this  brief 
introduction,  each  chapter  deals  first  with 
macroeconomic developments and vulnerabilities 
in each country and then goes on to discuss the 
respective  banking  sectors  in  terms  of  both 
structure as well as risks and shock-absorbing 
capacities. This focus on the banking sector is 
justified given the still limited – albeit growing 
– importance of non-bank financial institutions 
in the countries under consideration. Financial 
markets and other non-bank financial institutions 
are nevertheless dealt with in the first of four 
special features that complement the country-
specific chapters by focusing on specific issues 
relevant to all four countries. The other three 
special  features  deal  with  the  role  of  foreign 
banks, the use of foreign currencies and potential 
currency mismatches, and finally, the supervisory 
frameworks.
3  The  report  does  not  cover  the  former Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia which has been recently granted candidate status by 
the  European  Council  on  17  December  2005,  following  the 
Commission’s recommendation.
4  The cut-off date for the information included in this report was 
30 April 2006. 11
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2  BULGARIA
2.1  MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND 
VULNERABILITIES
DEVELOPMENT OF BULGARIA’S EXTERNAL  
ENVIRONMENT 
Bulgaria  is  a  highly  open  economy  with  full 
capital mobility. Total exports and imports of 
goods  are  approaching  the  value  of  GDP;  if 
services are also taken into account, the ratio 
exceeds  100%  and  has  done  so  since  the 
beginning of this decade. Bulgaria’s balance of 
payments  current  account  is  fully  liberalised 
and virtually all capital account transactions are 
free from administrative restrictions.
Bulgaria’s  main  trading  partner  is  the  EU, 
which accounts for nearly 60% of its foreign 
trade. Approximately half of its total turnover 
is  generated  through  the  euro  area.  Other 
important trading partners are countries in the 
South-Eastern European region, mainly Turkey 
and  Romania.  In  terms  of  product  structure, 
Bulgaria  exports  mainly  raw  materials  and 
consumer goods. On the imports side, Bulgaria’s 
principal  trading  items  are  raw  materials 
(especially energy resources, such as oil and 
gas) and investment goods.
Bulgaria  benefited  from  favourable  external 
financing conditions, as spreads on euro and 
US dollar-denominated government bonds have 
been falling to record lows. Claims by euro area 
BIS reporting banks have risen substantially, 
partly  reflecting  heightened  activity  by  euro 
area banks in the country. On 1 March 2006, 
Moody’s upgraded Bulgaria’s long-term foreign 
currency rating from Ba1 to Baa3, becoming 
the last major rating agency to grant investment-
grade status. 
DEVELOPMENT OF BULGARIA’S DOMESTIC 
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Since the beginning of the decade, strong real 
GDP growth has been underpinned by domestic 
demand expansion. In 2004 and 2005, growth 
exceeded  5%.  Investment  has  been  the  most 
dynamic component of domestic demand, with 
growth rates surpassing 10% annually since the 
beginning  of  the  decade  (except  in  2002), 
leading  to  an  investment-to-GDP  ratio  above 
23% in recent years. This increase in investment 
activity resulted in the technical modernisation 
of  the  enterprise  sector,  which  boosted 
productivity and the quality of produced goods, 
and in turn improved the sector’s competitiveness, 
as  shown  by  the  strong  growth  in  industrial 
output since 2003. 
The  Currency  Board  Arrangement  (CBA), 
adopted in July 1997 in the aftermath of a deep 
economic  and  financial  crisis,  is  credibly 
established  and  has  been  instrumental  in 
providing monetary stability.5 Financial ratios 
describing  its  operation  have  been  high:  in 
2005, the ratios of foreign reserves to reserve 
money  and  to  M1  stood  above  the  levels  of 
other  CBAs  in  the  region  at  173%  and  96% 
respectively. The performance of the CBA has 
been supported by a sound fiscal policy and the 
implementation of key structural reforms, such 
as bank restructuring and privatisation. 
However, inflation has been volatile. Following 
the rapid fall in inflation in the late 1990s, it has 
bounced back twice: at the turn of the century 
and after 2003 (see Chart 2.1). In addition to 
5  The lev was initially anchored (at par) to the Deutsche Mark, 
and since the beginning of 1999 it has been anchored to the euro 
(lev/euro parity rate at 1.95583).
Chart 2.1 Bulgaria: Inflation, 1998-2005 
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strong demand, the second inflation hike was 
driven  mainly  by  three  factors:  oil  price 
developments, shortages of some agricultural 
products (due to the floods in summer 2005), 
and an increase in the prices of electricity and 
central heating in the second half of the year. At 
the end of 2005, year-on-year consumer price 
inflation  reached  6.5%,  up  from  4.0%  in 
December 2004.
Strong credit growth has been a major challenge 
for Bulgaria in the last three years, as domestic 
credit has expanded by more than 30% annually. 
The growth in claims on the non-government 
sector, and in particular, claims on households 
and non-profit institutions serving households 
(NPISHs), was even higher: in 2004, the former 
increased by 48.6% (its stock reaching 37.1% 
of GDP), while the latter rose by 74.8% (its 
stock  reaching  11.5%  of  GDP).  These 
developments took place in an environment of 
declining real interest rates. In fact, except for 
2003,  interest  rates  on  deposits  have  been 
negative in real terms. In 2005, the Bulgarian 
National Bank (BNB) issued several regulations 
to  limit  the  growth  of  credit  to  the  non-
government sector. These were to some extent 
effective, as the annual growth rate of claims on 
the  non-government  sector  as  well  as  on 
households  and  NPISHs  decreased  to  32.4% 
and 58.4% respectively at the end of 2005. 
Against this background, prudent fiscal policy, 
supported by strong growth, has contributed to 
macroeconomic  stability  since  1997.  The 
general government’s primary balance has been 
positive over the decade and the public debt-to-
GDP  ratio  has  been  declining  steadily  (see 
Table 2.1) thanks to continued fiscal restraint, 
rapid  economic  growth  and  active  debt 
management. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy has 
been  key  in  mitigating  the  potentially 
destabilising effects of strong domestic demand. 
Indeed, under the CBA, fiscal policy is the only 
macroeconomic instrument at the disposal of 
the  authorities  for  accommodating  possible 
external shocks. The fiscal policy stance will 
therefore remain crucial, especially given the 
authorities’ stated objective of seeking to join 
the euro area in 2009. 
Domestic demand developments have also had 
a visible impact on the external position of the 
Bulgarian  economy,  as  the  current  account 
deficit has increased sharply, reaching almost 
12% of GDP in 2005. The trade deficit has been 
the main driver of current account imbalances, 
given the permanently positive services balance 
(due  to  strong  tourism  revenues).  Trade 
developments mainly reflected changes in the 
prices of energy resources on the international 
Chart 2.2 Bulgaria: Real GDP and real 
domestic demand growth, 2000-05 
(in %)
Sources: IMF, national authorities.























2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005(f)
real GDP
real domestic demand
Table 2.1 Bulgaria: General government balance and debt, 2000-05  
(% of GDP)
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Overall balance  -0.6  -0.6  -0.6  0  1.7  2.4
Primary balance  3.4  3.1  1.6  2.1  3.6  4
Gross debt  77.1  69.9  56.2  48.2  40.9  32.4
Source: Ministry of Finance.13
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markets (Bulgaria is heavily dependent on fuel 
imports) and rapidly growing physical volumes 
of imports. Since 2003, the growth rate of the 
latter has exceeded that of exports, signalling 
strong domestic demand. 
While  the  CPI-based  real  effective  exchange 
rate  has  been  appreciating  (see  Chart  2.3),   
unit  labour  costs  have  been  decreasing  due   
to  the  rapid  rise  in  productivity.  Bulgaria’s 
competitiveness has therefore been improving, 
as real unit labour costs are below the levels of 
1998. In manufacturing, real unit labour costs 
are even expected to decrease further as a result 
of investment growth.
Table 2.2 Bulgaria: Balance of payments selected items, 2000-05   
(% of GDP)
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Current account balance   -5.6  -5.6  -2.4  -5.5  -5.8  -11.8
  Trade balance  -9.4  -11.7  -11.4  -13.7  -15.1  -20.4
  Services balance  4  2.2  3.1  3.1  3.5  3.1
Financial account balance  6.6  5.0  11.1  13.2  14.9  13.4
  Net foreign direct investment  8  5.9  5.8  10.3  11.5  8.7
  Net portfolio investment  -1.4  0.6  -0.6  -1.1  -2.9  -3.5
  Change in reserve assets  3.6  2.1  3.5  4.6  7.6  1.5
Source: BNB.
The widening of the current account deficit in 
recent years above all reflects strong investment 
growth,  stimulated  by  the  inflow  of  foreign 
capital and insufficient domestic saving. Such 
a pattern of economic development is typical of 
countries reaching a more advanced stage of 
transition  where  reforms  and  privatisation 
stimulate  the  modernisation  of  the  economy. 
Indeed, imports of investment goods have been 
growing  quickly,  reaching  27.6%  of  total 
imports  in  2005.  Furthermore,  the  increased 
borrowing of banks from abroad has been an 
important  factor  in  the  strong  credit 
expansion. 
The  large  trade  and  current  account  deficits 
have  so  far  not  posed  serious  threats  to 
macroeconomic and financial stability. This is 
partly  because,  in  recent  years,  a  substantial 
part  of  the  current  account  deficit  has  been 
financed by large FDI inflows. Moreover, active 
debt management policies reduced the stock of 
public debt (see Table 2.1), for instance through 
the buyback of outstanding Brady bonds, and 
changed the currency composition structure of 
foreign debt, by increasing the share of euro-
denominated  instruments  for  example. 
Consequently, total external debt has stabilised 
at around 65% of GDP, despite the growth in 
private external debt, and its currency structure 
has  become  more  similar  to  the  currency 
structure  of  payments  resulting  from  trade 
flows.  Bulgaria’s  external  debt  is  mostly 
composed  of  instruments  with  longer-term 
maturities,  although  the  share  of  short-term 
debt  has  increased  since  2001,  reaching 
approximately 25% of total gross external debt 
Chart 2.3 Bulgaria: Real effective exchange 
rate, 1997-2005 
(June 1997 = 100)
Source: BNB.
Note:  The  real  effective  exchange  rate  index  is  a  monthly 
average and is based on the relative weights in the manufacturing 
trade for 1999-2001. Consumer prices are used as a measure to 
deflate the nominal exchange rates. The index is calculated as a 
basket of the 19 countries of greatest importance for Bulgarian
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in 2005. Finally, international reserves increased 
from around USD 3 billion in 2002 to around 
USD 9 billion in early 2005 and have remained 
at around that level. 
Reducing the current account deficit will be an 
important  challenge  for  the  authorities,  as 
capital inflows may become more volatile over 
time, even though inflows other than privatisation 
proceeds have been relatively stable in the last 
few  years.  In  view  of  the  large  external 
imbalances,  the  containment  of  demand 
pressures  and  the  enhancement  of  supply 
capacities  are  the  crucial  challenges  for  the 
authorities in preserving economic and financial 
stability.  In  practice,  this  includes  continued 
adherence to prudent fiscal policies and wage 
restraint.
2.2  THE BULGARIAN BANKING SECTOR
STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENTS
A short history of the Bulgarian banking  
system
The early transition years were characterised 
by soft budget constraints as well as the currency 
and financial crisis in 1997. At the end of 1989, 
the former socialist one-tier banking system – 
comprising the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), 
the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank and the State 
Savings  –  was  transformed  into  a  two-tier 
system.  On  the  legal  front,  the  Law  on  the 
Bulgarian National Bank and the Law on Banks 
and Credit Activity came into effect in 1991 and 
1992  respectively.  Despite  these  reforms, 
however,  the  regulatory  and  supervisory 
framework was still not appropriate and banks 
operated  in  an  environment  characterised  by 
soft budget constraints (related party lending 
and lending to state-owned enterprises), which 
ultimately resulted in a credit boom and a surge 
in non-performing loans (74% of the total in 
1995). The BNB tried to prevent large banks 
from failing by providing more loans, but it lost 
control over the money supply. This resulted in 
a  severe  currency  and  financial  crisis  in  the 
years  1996-97,  which  was  compounded  by  a 
period of hyperinflation. 
The strengthening of supervision and regulation, 
privatisation and foreign ownership have been 
key elements in the post-crisis strategy based 
on the CBA. Several measures were introduced 
in 1997 to combat the crisis, the most important 
of which was the CBA, aimed at asserting strict 
control over money supply. At the same time, a 
new banking law and a new law on the BNB 
were  adopted,  prudential  regulations  and 
supervision were strengthened, and a deposit 
insurance fund was introduced. The crisis also 
marked the beginning of the privatisation of the 
banking sector, with foreign investors, who had 
not entered the Bulgarian market until 1994, 
becoming major players. 
The current structure of the banking system
The  Bulgarian  banking  sector  is  now  mostly 
private and foreign-owned and conditions have 
improved  considerably  since  the  crisis.  The 
EBRD index of banking sector reform increased 
from 2.7 in 1999 to 3.7 in 2005, reaching a level 
similar to that of the new EU Member States 
(NMS) (see Table 2.3). Since 1997, the number 
of banks has remained stable around 35, but the 
bank  density  (number  of  banks  per  100,000 
inhabitants) has risen slightly to 0.45, which is 
higher than in the NMS-86 (0.29) but marginally 
lower than in the euro area (0.54). The number 
of state banks has gradually declined, but the 
asset share of private banks increased from 53% 
in  1999  to  around  98%  at  the  end  of  2004. 
Similarly, the share of total banking assets held 
by  foreign-owned  banks  (which  include  the 
country’s five largest banks) rose from 18% in 
1997 to approximately 80% by the end of 2004. 
This share is even higher than the average of the 
NMS-8  (77%  at  the  end  of  2004)  and  much 
higher than that of the euro area (22%).
The  change  in  the  ownership  structure  has 
helped to enhance competition in the Bulgarian 
banking sector. This is illustrated by the change 
in the level of concentration and the evolution 
of the spread between lending and deposit rates. 
The  five  largest  banks  accounted  for  around 
52% of total banking assets at the end of 2004, 
6  NMS-8 stands for the new Member States, excluding Cyprus 
and Malta.15
ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 48
July 2006
compared with 62% in 1999. This concentration 
level is lower than in the NMS-8 (68.6%) and 
similar to that of the euro area. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman  index  also  shows  a  decline  in 
concentration.  Furthermore,  the  drop  in  the 
spread  between  lending  and  deposits  rates 
suggests that the change in structure has boosted 
competition in the Bulgarian banking system.7
The structure of bank assets and liabilities 
Banking  intermediation  in  Bulgaria  is  still 
relatively low compared with the euro area (see 
Table 2.4). This is partly due to the low level of 
per capita income, but can also be attributed to 
the financial crisis, when the ratio of banking 
sector assets to GDP dropped significantly from 
180% in 1996 to 37% in 1999. Although asset 
growth was rather subdued in the late 1990s, 
reflecting banks’ efforts to clean up portfolios 
before privatisation and increased risk aversion, 
it  has  since  then  been  robust. Total  banking 
sector  assets  increased  on  average  by  about   
Table 2.3 The structure of the Bulgarian banking sector 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
EBRD index of banking sector reform  2.7  3.0  3.0  3.3  3.3  3.7  3.7
Number of banks (of which state-owned 1))  34 (6)  35 (4)  35 (4)  34 (3)  35 (2)  35 (2)  34 (2)
(per 100,000 inhabitants)  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.4
Number of branches of banks  659  717  738  744  755  714  653
(per 100,000 inhabitants)  8.1  8.8  9.4  9.5  9.7  9.2  9
Asset share of private banks (%)  53.0  80.2  80.1  85.9  97.5  97.7  98.3
Asset share of foreign banks (%)  42.8  75.3  72.7  75.2  82.7  81.6  80.09
Asset share of ﬁve largest banks (%)  62.3  60.4  56.6  55.3  52.9  52.2  50.83
Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann index 2)  1,159  1,094  930  835  563  634  697
Interest rate spread 3)  9.8  11.7  11.1  10.3  9.2  8.6  8.7
Sources: BNB, Walko (2004) and Walko and Reininger (2005).
1) Including municipal banks.
2) Sum of the squared asset shares of individual banks. (It ranges between 0 and 10,000. Below 1,000 it suggests a non-concentrated 
sector; above 1,800 it is highly concentrated). 
Table 2.4 Asset structure of the Bulgarian banking sector 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Total domestic claims 1) in % of total assets  57.5  51.4  54.5  64.5  72.6  74.8  77.0
  on monetary ﬁnancial institutions  
  (incl. central bank)  11.2  8.4  9.2  9.8  9.2  11.9  14.5
  on general government  13.9  10.6  10.7  12.9  11.3  8.7  8.0
  on households  5.9  6.0  7.3  9.1  13.8  16.9  20.3
  on non-bank corporations  26.5  26.5  27.3  32.6  38.2  37.4  34.2
Domestic loans in % of total assets   39.9  36.8  36.2  40.6  46.3  48.7  55.7
Securities in % of total assets  10.2  7.3  7.8  10.4  9.2  7.8  13.1
External assets in % of total assets  32.8  39.4  36.3  25.1  16.6  17.3  15.9
Fixed assets in % of total assets  5.8  5.7  5.5  5.8  5.8  4.7  4.2
Other assets in % of total assets  3.9  3.5  3.7  4.6  5.0  3.2  1.6
Memo             
Total assets in % of GDP  34.4  36.5  41.1  45.0  50.3  65.6  78.3
Credit to the private sector in % of GDP  12.1  12.6  14.9  19.8  27.6  37.1  44.5
Real growth of credit to the private sector (%)  13.5  5.1  26.0  38.7  40.4  43.0  24.4
Share of loans to households and enterprises  
with maturity of up to one year  37.3  34.1  32.7  31.5  25.2  24.2  22.7
Sources: BNB, IMF (IFS), Walko (2004), Walko and Reininger (2005), Hilbers et al. (2005).
1) Claims are credits, securities and repurchase agreements.
7  It should be noted that a lower concentration level does not 
always signify greater competition. Moreover, the interest rate 
spread may be affected by factors other than competition, e.g. 
the quality of the loan portfolio.
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6 percentage points of GDP per annum, reaching 
68% of GDP at the end of 2004, compared with 
75% in the NMS-8 and more than 280% in the 
euro area. 
On the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, there 
has  been  a  shift  from  foreign  assets  towards 
domestic claims. External assets declined from 
40%  of  total  assets  in  2000  to  17%  of  total 
assets  in  2004,  while  total  domestic  claims 
increased from 50% of total assets in 2000 to 
around 75% of total assets at the end of 2004 
(77% in the NMS-8 and 79% in the euro area). 
This development has been driven by the rise in 
claims  on  households  and  non-banks.  Their 
joint share in total assets increased from 32% in 
1999 to 54% in 2004 (40% in the euro area). 
While the bulk of banks’ domestic claims are on 
non-bank corporations (37% of total assets or 
about 50% of total domestic claims), claims on 
households almost tripled as a percentage of 
total assets between 1999 and 2004 (from 6% to 
17%), also reflecting increased lending activity 
for house purchases. At the same time, claims 
on general government (mostly in the form of 
securities) declined from 13.9% of total assets 
in 1999 to 8.7% of total assets in 2004. 
Owing to the relatively small size of the domestic 
interbank  market,  claims  on  other  banks  are 
modest. Claims on the central bank and gross 
claims on resident commercial banks represented 
Table 2.5 Liability structure of the Bulgarian banking sector 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Total domestic deposits in % of total liabilities  66.8  66.7  72.0  71.4  71.1  64.1  66.9
  of monetary ﬁnancial institutions  4.1  4.4  4.3  5.2  3.9  4.1  7.1
  of general government  3.6  3.0  3.6  3.8  5.1  3.9  3.4
  of households and non-bank corporations   59.0  59.2  64.1  62.4  62.1  56.1  56.3
Debt securities issued in % of total liabilities  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.7  0.6
Capital and reserves in % of total liabilities  14.5  14.4  12.7  12.7  12.5  10.5  10.0
External liabilities in % of total liabilities   3.8  5.3  5.4  5.9  8.3  18.8  16.2
Other liabilities in % of total liabilities   14.9  13.6  9.8  9.9  7.8  5.9  6.3
Memo             
Deposits of households in % of total deposits  52.0  48.9  54.9  54.5  53.4  54.5  51.4
Deposits of non-banks corporations  
in % of total deposits  38.9  40.3  33.1  33.6  35.3  33.6  32.7
Share of deposits of HH&enterp. with maturity  
of up to three months (incl. sight deposits)  88.8  86.2  84.4  82.1  82.1  78.6  84.1
Sources: BNB, Walko (2004), Walko and Reininger (2005).
11.9%  of  the  total  gross  assets  of  Bulgarian 
banks at the end of 2004. The former outpaced 
the  growth  of  the  latter,  mainly  due  to  an 
increase in the reserve requirements and a small 
interbank market.
Bulgarian  banks  are  predominantly  deposit 
financed  and  have  relatively  high  capital 
reserves.  Domestic  sector  deposits  have 
accounted  for  around  two-thirds  of  total 
liabilities over the last few years, although this 
share declined from 71.1% to 64.1% in 2004, 
due to a sharp increase in foreign liabilities (see 
Table  2.5).  Deposits  of  households  and  non-
bank corporations remain the largest liability, 
accounting  for  56%  of  total  liabilities.  The 
share of deposits of general government and of 
monetary financial institutions in total deposits 
has hovered around 3-5% respectively, similar 
to that of the NMS-8 (in the euro area, deposits 
of monetary financial institutions account for 
22% of total liabilities). At the end of 2004, 
capital and reserves amounted to 10.5% of total 
liabilities, which represented a steady decline 
from 14.5% in 1999, but was still significantly 
more than in the euro area (5.6%) and similar 
to the NMS-8 average. 
Rapid credit growth has been associated with a 
substantial change in the banking sector’s net 
asset positions vis-à-vis the real sector. During 
the late 1990s, banks maintained a large negative 17
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Table 2.6 Banking sector’s aggregated balance sheet net position  1) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Net claims on domestic monetary ﬁnancial  
institutions in % of total assets  7.0  4.0  4.9  4.6  5.3  7.8  8.7
Net claims on general government  
in % of total assets  10.3  7.6  7.2  9.1  6.2  4.8  4.9
Net claims on households and  
non-bank corporations in % of total assets  -26.6  -26.8  -29.6  -20.7  -10.0  -1.9  -1.2
Net external assets in % of total assets  29.0  34.1  30.9  19.2  8.3  -1.5  0.6
Other assets, net, in % of total assets   -5.2  -4.4  -0.6  0.5  2.7  1.3  0.2
Capital and reserves in % of total liabilities  14.5  14.4  12.7  12.7  12.5  10.5  10.0
Sources: BNB, Walko (2004), Walko and Reininger (2005).
1) Net positions calculated as claims minus deposits (repurchase agreements, debt securities issued, credits received and equity are not 
taken into account on the liability side).
net position against households and non-bank 
corporations, partly due to the sharp contraction 
of  lending  activity  after  the  crisis. This  was 
accompanied by a positive net position against 
the general government. Since 2002, however, 
the rapid growth of credit to the corporate and 
household sectors has improved the net position 
from -29.6% of total assets in 2001 to -1.2% of 
total assets in 2005 (see Table 2.6). This has 
been matched by a decrease in the net external 
position  of  the  banking  sector,  as  foreign 
liabilities have been increasing at the same time 
as the share of external assets in total assets has 
been declining. There has also been a drop in 
the  net  position  against  the  government  in 
recent  years,  partly  due  to  the  sound  fiscal 
policies that have been implemented under the 
CBA. Finally, banks have also held a positive 
net position against domestic monetary financial 
institutions, essentially as a result of the position 
against the monetary authority. 
The profitability of the banking system 
The  profitability  of  the  Bulgarian  banking 
system has remained fairly stable and relatively 
high over the past few years. Return on assets 
has fluctuated between 2% and 3% (compared 
with  0.4%  in  the  euro  area  in  2004),  while 
return on equity initially increased to 22% in 
2000 and 2001, then fell back to between 16% 
and 19% in 2002 and 2003, and increased again 
to above 20% since 2004 (see Table 2.7). Despite 
Table 2.7 Profitability of the Bulgarian banking sector 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Net interest income in % of average assets  4.6  4.6  4.3  3.9  4.7  4.9  4.8
Net non-interest income in % of average assets  5.7  5.9  3.5  3.2  2.4  2.3  2.1
Operating income in % of average assets  10.3  10.5  7.8  7.1  7.2  7.3  6.7
Ratio of net interest income in operating income  44.5  43.7  55.1  55.0  65.9  68.1  78.0
Operating costs in % of average assets  5.8  5.3  5.0  4.5  4.5  4.2  3.6
Personnel costs in % of operating costs  36.1  41.4  39.7  38.5  37.8  36.7  22.2
Cost-to-income ratio  56.7  49.9  64.1  63.5  63.0  58.3  55.9
Net costs of loan loss provisioning  
in % of average assets  0.7  0.9  -0.7  0.1  0.3  0.7  0.8
Net costs of loan loss provisioning  
in % of operating income  6.6  8.6  -8.7  1.3  3.7  9.4  13.5
Return on assets  2.5  3.1  2.7  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.0
Return on equity 1)  20.9  22.6  21.9  15.9  18.7  20.0  21.6
Sources: BNB, Walko (2004) and Walko and Reininger (2005).
1) Estimates for return on equity provided by Walko (2004) and Walko and Reininger (2005): 16.6% in 1999; 19.8% in 2000; 19.2% in 
2001; 14.4% in 2002; 15.0% in 2003 and 16.8% in 2004.
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the  reduction  in  spreads,  net  interest  income 
recovered from 3.9% of average assets in 2002 
to 4.8% in 2005, compared with 1.2% in the 
euro area and 2.7% in the NMS. This evolution 
has  been  due  to  the  rapid  credit  growth  to 
domestic sectors and the simultaneous decrease 
in the net foreign assets position, as interest 
income on domestic assets significantly exceeds 
that on foreign assets. Non-interest income has 
decreased in recent years, from 5.9% of average 
assets in 2000 to 2.1% in 2005. Consequently, 
operating income, as a percentage of average 
assets,  declined  between  1999  and  2002  and 
then stabilised at around 7%, while the share of 
net interest income in total operating income 
rose from 44.5% in 1999 to 78.0% in 2005. 
Operating costs have fallen but remain relatively 
high. Operating costs gradually decreased from 
5.8% of average assets in 1999 to 3.6% in 2005. 
This can be partly attributed to restructuring 
measures  following  privatisation.  Costs 
nevertheless remain higher than in the euro area 
(1.5%)  and  in  the  NMS  (2.8%).  Loan  loss 
provisioning  contributed  to  gross  profits  in 
2001 due to the release of large reserves (9% of 
operating income) that were created between 
1999 and 2000. Since then, in the light of the 
rapid credit expansion,8 reserve provisions have 
increased, reaching 13.5% of operating income 
in 2005.
RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITIES
The Bulgarian banking system is generally well 
supervised, highly capitalised and profitable. 
However,  credit  growth  has  continued  to 
accelerate  in  recent  years,  which  may  have 
increased financial stability risks. Since 2000, 
real  domestic  credit  in  Bulgaria  has  grown   
on  average  by  more  than  30%  annually  (see 
Table  2.8).  Credit  growth  boosts  financial 
deepening  and  can  largely  be  considered  a 
catching-up  phenomenon  brought  about  by 
deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation. It 
allows  for  a  better  allocation  of  savings  to 
investment opportunities and facilitates higher 
growth. Although no significant deterioration 
in bank loan portfolios has been observed, most 
financial sector indicators are “lagging”, thus 
credit  growth  developments  require  close 
monitoring.
While credit growth is high, the level of private 
sector credit is still relatively low and the debt 
burden of households and enterprises appears 
to remain contained. Financial intermediation 
in  Bulgaria  is  still  limited  by  international 
standards, as evidenced by a private banking 
credit-to–GDP ratio of 45% (2005). Lending to 
households  and  mortgage  lending  have  risen 
particularly quickly in recent years (see Table 2.8), 
albeit  from  very  low  levels.  Household  debt 
amounts to around 16% of GDP (2005), which, 
together  with  a  comparatively  low  ratio  of 
interest  payments  to  disposable  income  of 
around 1% (that of the euro area was 4.5% in 
2004), does not constitute a heavy debt service 
burden. Non-financial enterprises account for 
the bulk of domestic credit (27.6% of GDP in 
2005),  their  debt  amounting  to  almost  twice 
their  deposits  and  their  interest  payments 
totalling around 2% of GDP. In terms of credit 
concentration, the largest exposures are to the 
processing industry (22.3%), the hotel industry 
(6.7%) and the construction industry (5.6%). 
Market developments, however, may potentially 
translate into credit risk. The share of foreign 
currency lending is increasing and accounts for 
almost  half  of  total  lending,  but  credit  risk 
associated  with  increased  foreign  currency 
exposure of the private sector is limited, given 
the CBA and the fact that lending in currencies 
other  than  the  lev  or  the  euro  is  almost 
insignificant (see below). An increase in interest 
rates from their current low levels could affect 
borrowers more significantly. However, as the 
portion of disposable income spent on interest 
payments  is  relatively  low,  the  capacity  of 
households to service their debt may withstand 
a potential increase in interest rates. 
8  The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans has shown a 
steady decline over the last few years (from 14% in 1997 to 2% 
in  2004),  but,  given  the  strong  credit  growth,  banks  have 
increased  their  provision  of  reserves  as  a  precautionary 
measure. 19
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Table 2.8 Bulgaria: Selected banking sector stability indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Risks
Credit risk
Credit growth (annual percentage change)  31.0  26.0  27.4  33.9  34.2  33.0
Credit growth to the private sector (annual percentage change)  17.0  32.1  44.0  48.3  48.6  32.4
Real credit growth to the private sector (annual percentage change)  5.1  26.1  38.7  40.4  43.0  24.6
Credit growth to households (annual percentage change) 1)  17  52.4  47.6  82.3  60.6  46.9
Housing credit growth (annual percentage change)  26.8  44.4  51.8  70.9  149.9  97.4
Non-performing loans (% of total loans)  7.9  3.3  2.4  3.2  2  2.2
Non-performing loans net of provisions (as percentage of capital)  2.6  3.2  3.5  2.9  1.5  2.6
Share of foreign currency credit in total private sector credit  35.4  35.5  41.3  42.8  47.5  47.3
    (share of non-euro credit)          5.9  3.8
Share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits  59.2  58.3  54.6  52.4  46.7  46.5
    (share of non-euro deposits)          19.8  17.8
Growth of foreign liabilities (annual percentage change)  63.6  27.3  28.2  67.7  224.8  14.0
Share of foreign liabilities in total liabilities and equity  7.1  7.0  7.7  10.9  27.5  24.0
Market risk
Foreign currency risk
  Ratio of non-euro loans to non-euro deposits          28.8  21.1
  % mismatch on total deposits          14.1  14.0
  Open FX position in % of total balance sheet assets  -0.77  -0.85  -0.67  -0.58  -0.35  -0.53
Interest rate risk
  Ratio of short-term loans (up to three months) to short term deposits  78.7  67.8  55.8  38.2  44.2  45.4
  % mismatch on total deposits  16.3  24.5  33.4  48.2  41.8  39.5
  Short-term deposits, as a percentage of total deposits  76.6  76.2  75.6  78.0  74.9  72.3
  Short-term loans, as a percentage of total loans  58.2  55.6  46.6  33.2  36.0  34.6
Liquidity risk
  Liquid assets (cash + securities), as percentage of total assets  22.9  27.2  28.0  20.0  18.6  18.4
  Ratio of short-term assets on short-term liabilities  117.0  111.3  101.2  68.9  72.9  75.1
Shock-absorbing factors
  Return on average assets (in %)   2.9  2.6  1.8  2.2  1.7  1.8
  Return on average equity (in %)  18.8  19.3  13.8  16.7  15.9  17
  Net interest margin  8.4  8.2  6.6  5.9  5.76  5.75
  Loan loss provisions (as a percentage of non-performing loans)        52.8  48.9  49.2
  Capital adequacy ratio   35.6  31.3  25.2  22  16.1  15.2
Memo
  Number of banks (foreign-owned)  23  25  24  25  24
  Asset share of foreign-owned banks (%)  75.3  72.7  75.2  82.7  81.6 
Sources: BNB, EBRD, IMF, Hilbers et al. (2005).
1) Excluding housing credit.
Overall credit risk may be rising, but from a 
relatively  low  level.  Given  the  high  credit 
growth,  lending  standards  may  have  fallen, 
which, together with increasing debt burdens, 
would trigger a rise in the credit risk. However, 
as  yet,  there  is  no  evidence  of  this  in  the   
credit  quality  figures.  The  share  of  non-
performing loans in total loans stands at 2.2% 
(see Table 2.8).
Market and liquidity risk
It is difficult to assess the interest rate risk to 
which the Bulgarian banking sector is exposed, 
but it does not appear large. Bulgarian banks 
rely  mainly  on  short-term  deposits  (up  to  3 
months) to fund longer maturity loans. In recent 
years,  banks  have  lengthened  the  maturity   
of  loans  to  households  and  enterprises. 
Consequently, the share of loans with a maturity 
of up to one year decreased from 53% in 1999 
to 35% in 2005. Despite the decline in interest 
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rates, the share of short-term deposits in total 
deposits has been relatively constant, ranging 
between 72% and 78%. The ratio of short-term 
loans to short-term deposits therefore sank to 
around 45% in mid-2005. It is difficult to assess 
the extent of the banking sector’s exposure to 
the interest rate risk arising from this maturity 
mismatch without more detailed information on 
whether credit is extended with fixed or floating 
interest rates. In terms of profit, banks have 
become more dependent on interest income (see 
Table 2.7). As the share of income derived from 
non-interest  sources  has  fallen,  banks  have 
reduced their income diversification and thereby 
have  become  somewhat  more  vulnerable  to 
interest rate volatility. 
Equity market risk is limited, as equity holdings 
are small as a percentage of total assets, and 
banks derive only a minor part of their income 
from equity trading and related activities.
The banking system’s exposure to exchange rate 
risk is limited, mainly due to the stable CBA. 
Foreign  currency  deposits  and  lending  are 
predominantly in euro. Credits and deposits in 
non-euro currencies account for only 3.8% of 
total  lending  and  17.8%  of  total  deposits 
respectively. The ratio of lending in non-euro 
foreign  currencies  to  deposits  in  non-euro 
foreign  currencies  is  21.1%  (see Table  2.8), 
implying  that  the  banking  sector  could  be 
negatively affected by a depreciation of the euro 
against these non-euro foreign currencies.
Liquidity  ratios  have  been  declining  over  the 
last  five  years,  but  may  still  be  considered 
adequate.  Liquid  assets  (cash  and  securities) 
represent  around  18%  of  total  assets  and  the 
ratio of short-term assets (cash and securities 
and credit up to 3 months) to short-term deposits 
(up  to  3  months)  is  around  75%.  Access  to 
liquidity  from  the  interbank  market  is  still 
relatively  limited,  even  though  the  size  of 
interbank claims and interbank money market 
turnover have increased over the past few years. 
Under  the  CBA,  the  availability  of  reserves 
imposes strict limitations on the role of the BNB 
as a liquidity provider for the banking system. 
Shock-absorbing factors
Relatively  high  profitability  and  a  solid 
capitalisation  are  the  basis  for  the  banking 
sector’s  capacity  to  absorb  negative  shocks. 
Despite  declining  interest  rate  margins,  the 
profitability of the banking sector in Bulgaria 
continues to be relatively high, as evidenced by 
the return on equity and return on assets ratios. 
The capital adequacy ratio has decreased over 
recent years, but still comfortably exceeds the 
minimum requirement of 12% set by the BNB 
(and that of 8% in the Basel Capital Accord). 
Provisions cover more than two-thirds of non-
performing loans.
Increased foreign participation in the banking 
sector  through  privatisation,  has  helped  to 
boost efficiency and financial intermediation. 
In  addition,  foreign-owned  banks  are  more 
likely to develop new market segments. Indeed, 
the growing share of household and mortgage 
lending may be seen as a contribution to a more 
diversified  (and  collateralized  in  the  case  of 
mortgage  lending)  loan  portfolio.  Moreover, 
foreign banks bring in their know-how, helping 
to  establish  more  complete  (and  resilient) 
financial markets. Finally, the fact that a large 
part of foreign funding may be attributable to 
parent banks may reduce the risks associated 
with a possible reversal of capital flows.
2.3  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Bulgaria’s macroeconomic challenges relate to 
the recent pick-up in inflation, the increase in 
the  current  account  deficit  and  the  rise  in 
private external debt. Positive fiscal outcomes 
have resulted in a fall in public external debt, 
which  compensates  for  the  rise  in  private 
external debt. Given the strong credit growth, 
which has been accompanied by a widening of 
the current account deficit, the BNB has adopted 
restrictive  administrative  and  prudential 
measures to curb the path of credit expansion. 
However,  with  an  open  capital  account, 
experience suggests that any dampening effect 
may be only temporary, as these measures tend 
to be circumvented over time. 21
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The  financial  sector  is  largely  bank-based, 
private  and  foreign-owned,  and  profitable. 
Banks are predominantly deposit financed and 
have relatively high capital reserves. The change 
in the ownership structure has helped to enhance 
competition.  Rapid  credit  growth  has  been 
associated with a substantial change in the net 
positions of the banking sector vis-à-vis those 
of the real sector, including the foreign sector. 
Consequently, banks’ net foreign assets turned 
from a strongly positive to a slightly negative 
position. On the asset side of the balance sheet, 
there  has  been  a  shift  from  foreign  assets 
towards domestic claims. Owing to the relatively 
small size of the domestic interbank market, 
claims on other banks are modest.
Given the rapid rise in loans, in particular to 
households and for housing, Bulgaria’s banking 
sector is primarily exposed to credit risk. Its 
exposure to interest rate risk, however, appears 
to be limited, though it could become a source 
of credit risk if the costs associated with adverse 
interest  rate  developments  are  passed  on  to 
customers.
3  ROMANIA
3.1  MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND 
VULNERABILITIES 
Development of Romania’s external  
environment
Romania  has  an  increasingly  open  economy. 
The degree of openness, defined as the sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services as a 
share of GDP, was 76.5% in 2005. Romania’s 
largest  trading  partner  is  the  EU,  which 
accounted for 64.5% of total trade in 2005, with 
the euro area accounting for more than 50%. Its 
most  important  partner  countries  are  Italy, 
Germany,  France  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
Other major trading partners are Turkey (7.9% 
of exports) and the United States (4.1%). 
On the export side, Romania is facing increasing 
competition from the textile industries of Asian 
countries, as the share of textile products and 
clothing  in  total  exports  of  goods  has  been 
relatively high (around 19% in 2005). However, 
the higher shares of machinery and electrical 
equipment  in  total  exports  also  indicate  that 
Romania  has  recently  been  moving  up  the 
value-added  scale.  In  general,  the  global 
environment is expected to remain supportive 
of Romania’s external position, as the prospects 
for growth in the EU are improving and global 
growth is expected to remain strong.
In  line  with  global  developments,  external 
financial  conditions  have  been  benign. 
Supported  also  by  improved  macroeconomic 
conditions  and  prospects  for  EU  accession, 
ratings  have  been  upgraded  and  spreads  on 
euro-denominated  government  bonds  have 
declined substantially over the last few years to 
around  50  basis  points.  At  the  same  time, 
financial integration with the EU and the euro 
area has been advancing rapidly. 
Development of Romania’s domestic  
macroeconomic environment
Output growth has been strong in the last few 
years but has slowed down since mid-2005. In 
the  period  from  2001  to  2003,  Romania  saw 
strong  output  growth,  which  on  average 
exceeded  5%  annually.  Economic  growth 
reached 8.4% in 2004 due to strong agricultural 
output.  Household  consumption  increased  by 
12.9% (particularly in the second half of the 
year, when the growth rate exceeded 14%).The 
main  reasons  for  this  rise  were  (i)  high  real 
wage  and  pension  gains,  partly  due  to  pre-
election hikes in the public sector; (ii) strong 
consumer credit growth; and (iii) the positive 
impact of a bumper harvest on rural incomes. 
Moreover,  gross  fixed  capital  formation 
expanded by 10.8%. By contrast, net exports 
were strongly negative, as solid export growth 
at 13.9% was outpaced by an even faster import 
growth  of  22.1%.  In  2005,  GDP  growth 
decelerated  to  less  than  half  of  what  was 
observed the year before, reaching 4.1%, owing 
to  a  slowdown  in  final  consumption  and  net 
exports  of  goods  and  services.  In  addition, 
adverse weather conditions caused agriculture 
output to fall by 13.9%. As a result, gross fixed 
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capital formation became the fastest growing 
component in GDP (13% year-on-year).
After several years of rapidly falling inflation, 
the  disinflation  process  has  slowed  down 
recently. Inflation, measured by CPI, dropped 
from  40.7%  in  December  2000  to  9.3%  in 
December  2004,  despite  sizeable  upward 
adjustments in gas and electricity prices. Food 
prices, with a weight of over 40% in the CPI, 
led the decline, while services initially lagged. 
In 2005, the disinflation process slowed down 
due to the strong domestic demand fostered by 
high wage growth and further adjustments in 
administered prices, particularly in the energy 
sector.  Consequently,  year-on-year  inflation 
was 8.6% in December 2005, and thus slightly 
above  Banca  Naţională  a  României’s  (BNR) 
revised inflation target of 7.5% ±1 percentage 
point. For the end of 2006, the BNR has set an 
inflation target of 5.0%, with a ±1 percentage 
point deviation band. Fiscal and wage policies, 
the future dynamics of administered prices and 
food prices, and developments in international 
oil and natural gas prices all constitute a major 
risk to the inflation outlook. 
Before August 2005, monetary policy operated 
under an eclectic framework that combined a 
monetary  targeting  strategy  with  a  managed 
floating  exchange  rate  regime.  Under  this 
Table 3.1 Romania: Economic activity and financial indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Inﬂation (CPI, average)  45.7  34.5  22.5  15.3  11.9  9.0
Unemployment rate  10.5  8.8  8.4  7.4  6.3  5.9
Real GDP (growth, %)  2.1  5.7  5.1  5.2  8.4  4.1
Growth rates of GDP components (in%): 1)           
  Households ﬁnal consumption  0.2  6.8  4.8  8.3  12.9  9.0
  Final public administration consumption  20.4  -0.2  6.0  8.5  4.6  4.9
  Gross ﬁxed capital formation  5.5  10.1  8.2  8.6  10.8  13.0
  Exports of goods and services  23.4  12.1  17.5  8.4  13.9  7.6
  Imports of goods and services  27.1  18.4  12.0  16.0  22.1  17.2
Money market rate (overnight) 2)  45.5  41.5  26.9  19.6  19.8  7.2
Bond yield (12-month Treasury bills) 3)  70.7  41.3  28.6  15.8  17.6  9.14 4)
Sources: Romanian National Institute of Statistics and BNR.
1) Provisional data for 2005.
2) BUBOR overnight.
3) Volume weighted annual average.
4) Bonds with a two-year maturity.
framework, the BNR attempted to reconcile the 
objective of disinflation with that of achieving 
a sustainable external position.
In August 2005, the BNR officially adopted a 
formal inflation targeting strategy. Under this 
new  monetary  framework,  annual  inflation 
targets  are  set  jointly  by  the  BNR  and  the 
government two years ahead in terms of headline 
CPI. 
The BNR faces the task of fighting inflation in 
a context in which large capital inflows may 
lead to an unsustainable level of exchange rate 
appreciation. In this context, it has increased 
the minimum reserve requirements for foreign-
exchange-denominated  liabilities  of  credit 
institutions, adopted a prudential limit of 300% 
of own funds for credit institutions’ exposure to 
unhedged borrowers in September 2005, and, in 
early February 2006, raised its monetary policy 
rate from 7.5% to 8.5%. This dilemma has to 
some  extent  been  alleviated  by  the  global 
unwinding  of  accommodative  monetary 
policies.
The  role  of  the  interest  rate  in  transmitting 
monetary policy impulses has increased over 
time. The short-term interest rate has gradually 
assumed a quasi-operational role, allowing the 
central  bank  to  influence  the  economy  and 23
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inflationary  expectations  more  efficiently. 
Nominal interest rates declined until mid-2003 
(the  interest  rate  on  12-month Treasury  bills 
dropped from 41.3% in 2001 to 15.8% in 2003), 
when  the  BNR  raised  the  monetary  policy 
interest  rate  to  combat  the  weakening  in  the 
balance of payments, the rapid credit growth 
and the slowdown in disinflation. After mid-
2004, the BNR lowered its interest rates again 
to forestall capital inflows. The interest rates 
applied  by  banks  to  non-government  clients 
also decreased – for new short-term loans from 
about 25% in 2004 to around 14% in December 
2005,  and  for  new  short-term  deposits  from 
15% to around 5% over the same period.
In terms of exchange rate developments, a long-
standing nominal depreciation path has turned 
into appreciation pressures. Since the beginning 
of 2000, the BNR has gradually reduced the 
depreciation  rate,  in  line  with  its  inflation 
target,  and  at  the  same  time  has  allowed 
substantial  short-term  variability  in  the 
exchange rate. The rate of depreciation of the 
leu against the euro therefore slowed down from 
30.1% in 2001 to 8.2% in 2004. As a result of 
the  increase  in  capital  inflows,  the  leu 
appreciated considerably against the euro from 
the last quarter of 2004 to the end of 2005. By 
then, appreciation pressures started to decline 
in  the  light  of  the  reduction  in  BNR  and 
interbank interest rates, but have again picked 
up  moderately  since  early  2006.  The  BNR 
expects  appreciation  pressures  to  remain 
manageable due to less volatile capital inflows, 
a widening of the trade deficit and an increase 
in payments on external private debt. However, 
they  might  increase  again,  due  to  foreigners 
being  granted  access  to  money  market 
instruments,  a  reduction  in  the  country  risk 
with Romania’s entry into the EU and strong 
remittances  flows  from  Romanian  citizens 
working abroad. 
Fiscal  policy  provided  support  for 
macroeconomic  stabilisation  after  2000,  but 
now  faces  several  challenges.  The  general 
government  deficit  gradually  declined  from 
3.8% of GDP in 2000 to an estimated 0.9% of 
GDP in 2005 (see Table 3.2), reflecting savings 
on interest payments, a reduction in expenditures 
and improved tax collections. For 2006, a deficit 
of  0.5%  of  GDP  has  been  budgeted.  Fiscal 
challenges include the lower revenues resulting 
from  the  implementation  of  tax  reforms,  the 
rising  expenditures  generated  by  the  much-
needed investment in the infrastructure and the 
indexation  of  pensions  based  on  CPI 
developments. 
Table 3.2 Romania: Fiscal indicators (ESA) 
(% of GDP) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005(f)  2006(f)
Overall balance  -3.8  -3.5  -2.0  -2.0  -1.4  -0.9  -0.7
Primary balance  -0.7  -0.3  0.2  -0.4  -0.2  …  …
General government gross debt  22.7  23.2  23.3  21.3  18.5  16.2  15.6
Source: Eurostat.
Note: (f) = forecast.
Chart 3.1 Romania: Real effective exchange 
rate 
(2000 = 100)
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The  REER  indices  suggest  that  Romania’s 
competitiveness  remained  more  or  less 
unchanged from 2000 to mid-2004, but that it 
has  deteriorated  recently.  Until  mid-2004, 
unchanged competitiveness was assured by the 
nominal  depreciation  of  the  leu.  Since  mid-
2004, however, the nominal appreciation of the 
leu, together with declining productivity gains 
and strong wage growth (in December 2005, net 
nominal  public  sector  wages  rose  by  25.4% 
year-on-year),  has  been  weakening 
competitiveness.
FDI has increased substantially in recent years 
in  line  with  the  macroeconomic  stabilisation. 
Moreover, further FDI flows to export-oriented 
industries may be prompted by the progress of 
Romania towards EU accession. Export growth 
may therefore be enhanced by long-term capital 
investment and foreign demand growth but it 
could be negatively impacted by the rising real 
unit  labour  costs  and  the  exchange  rate 
appreciation. At the same time, imports can be 
expected to increase given the real appreciation 
of the domestic currency and strong consumption, 
further deteriorating the current account.
The liberalisation of the capital account started 
in 1991 and has been a gradual process. The 
liberalization of medium and long-term capital 
inflows was completed in 1999. With nominal 
convergence progressing, all other flows have 
been liberalized since then, with the exception 
of  inward  and  outward  investment  in  money 
market  instruments  (expected  in  September 
2006). This  process,  along  with  decreases  in 
country  risk  and  relatively  low  interest  rates 
abroad,  has  improved  external  financing 
conditions. 
Table 3.3 Romania: External position of the economy 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Current account (in % of GDP)  -3.7  -5.5  -3.3  -5.8  -8.4  -8.7
FDI (in % of GDP)  2.9  2.9  2.5  3.6  8.4  6.6
International reserves (months of imports)  2.9  3.6  4.2  4.1  5.2  6.4
External debt (in % of GDP)  29.7  32.7  33.4  33.9  36.0  38.5
Source: IMF and BNR.
Foreign  capital  inflows  and  central  bank 
intervention  have  led  to  an  increase  in 
international  reserves,  which  by  end-2005 
stood  at  a  level  sufficient  to  finance 
approximately six months of imports (21.2% of 
annual GDP). Owing to the increasing borrowing 
abroad, external debt is continuing to rise and 
currently amounts to 38.5% of GDP, but this 
figure  is  still  low  in  comparison  with  other 
emerging market economies.
3.2  THE ROMANIAN BANKING SECTOR
STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENTS
A short history of the Romanian banking sector
Until 1998, the Romanian commercial banking 
system was overwhelmingly state-owned. Credit 
institutions  granted  loans  to  a  largely  non-
restructured  state-owned  real  sector,  partly 
financed by direct credit from the BNR. When 
in 1997 macroeconomic policies were tightened, 
banking  supervision  was  strengthened  and 
direct credits were discontinued, several credit 
institutions  faced  solvency  and  liquidity 
problems due to a large number of bad loans 
that  had  accumulated  in  previous  periods. 
Consequently, a number of banks failed between 
1997  and  1999,  including  Bancorex,  the 
country’s largest bank, in 1999.9 In 2000, the 
country’s  largest  investment  fund  failed  and 
several other banks went bankrupt in a second 
wave of turbulence that was triggered by severe 
infringements of banking discipline and non-
9  As the failure of Bancorex threatened the stability of the entire 
banking system, the bank was restructured and taken over by the 
state-owned  Banca  Comercială  Română  (BCR),  which  then 
became  the  largest  bank.  In  total,  the  costs  of  the  various 
recapitalisation and public support schemes for the institutions 
in distress amounted to about 10% of GDP.25
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Table 3.4 The structure of the Romanian banking sector 
  1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005 
EBRD index of banking sector reform   2.7   2.7   2.7   2.7   2.7   3.0   … 
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 1)  34 (19)   33 (21)   33 (24)   31 (24)   30 (21)   32 (23)   33 (24) 
Number of banks per 100,000 inhabitants   0.18   0.18   0.19   0.18   0.18   0.18   0.19 
Asset share of private banks (%)   53.2   53.9   58.2   59.6   62.5   93.1   94.0 
Asset share of foreign banks (%) 2)   47.5   50.9   55.2   56.4   58.2   62.1   62.2 
Asset share of ﬁve largest banks (%)   66.7   65.5   66.1   62.9   61.7   59.8   59.6 
Market share of ﬁve largest banks in total assets   66.7   65.5   66.1   62.9   61.7   59.2   58.8 
Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann index   1,296   1,375   1,427   1,381   1,264   1,120   1,124 
Interest rate spread   20.7   20.6   17.2   16.1   14.5   13.7   … 
Sources: EBRD, BNR and OeNB.
1)  Not including foreign banks’ branches.
2)  Including foreign banks’ branches.
observance of prudential principles in managing 
assets and liabilities. 
Privatisation – mainly through foreign investors 
–  led  to  a  considerable  decrease  in  state 
ownership. In December 2005, Austria’s Erste 
Bank  der  oesterreichischen  Sparkassen  AG 
acquired 61.9%10 of Banca Comercială Română 
(BCR) – the country’s largest single privatisation 
transaction and also the largest amount paid so 
far for a bank in Central and Eastern Europe – 
leaving the savings bank Casa de Economii și 
Consemnatiuni (CEC) and Eximbank (Banca de 
Export-Import  a  României)  as  the  only  two 
banks with majority state-ownership. The sale 
of the majority stake of CEC is ongoing. While 
structural changes in the banking system have 
been substantial, the EBRD index of the banking 
sector reform indicates that there is still scope 
for further improvement.
The current structure of the banking system
The Romanian banking system is mainly private 
and foreign-owned. The share of foreign-owned 
banks in total assets (including foreign bank 
branches) increased considerably between 1998 
and 2004, from 20% to 62.1%. Including the 
BCR, end-2005 figures show majority foreign-
owned  banks  to  account  for  87.9%  of  total 
sector assets.11
Bank  density  has  remained  more  or  less 
unchanged and stands at a level lower than in 
the euro area. By contrast, the number of bank 
branches  has  been  rising  and,  in  2004,  the 
number of bank branches per credit institution 
was almost five times higher than that in the 
euro  area.  Concentration  in  the  Romanian 
banking sector, as measured by the share of the 
five largest institutions in total assets, has been 
falling but is still higher than in the euro area. 
This can be substantiated by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. Falling concentration and the 
growing share of foreign-owned banks12 can be 
perceived as signs of improving competition. 
The structure of assets and liabilities
The level of banking intermediation in Romania 
is the lowest among the four countries under 
review and considerably lower than in the euro 
area and the NMS-8. This can be partly explained 
by the difference in per capita income. Moreover, 
capital  account  liberalisation  and  strong 
financial inflows provide domestic enterprises 
with access to ample financial sources outside 
the  domestic  banking  system.  Finally,  the 
recently introduced prudential measures aimed 
at curbing credit growth might have pushed a 
larger share of the credit demand towards non-
bank  financial  institutions  (e.g.  leasing 
companies  and  non-bank  consumer  credit 
companies).
10  The share was comprised of a joint stake of 25% of the EBRD 
and  the  IFC,  and  36.9%  of  the  Authority  of  State  Asset 
Recovery.
11  It should be noted that since the property transfer between the 
BCR and Erste Bank was not completed by the end of 2005, the 
official figure for the share of foreign-owned banks in total 
banking sector assets is 62.2% as reported in table 3.4.
12  For empirical evidence on the relationship between foreign bank 
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The restructuring and consolidation processes 
have changed the asset structure of the banking 
sector,  with  banks  returning  to  core  banking 
activities. The share of domestic claims in total 
assets increased from 71.4% in 1999 to 88.6% 
in  2005  (see Table  3.5),  driven  by  (i)  strong 
growth  in  household  and  mortgage  lending, 
albeit from low levels, and (ii) a doubling in 
claims  on  domestic  monetary  and  financial 
institutions  (MFIs),  with  claims  on  the  BNR 
constituting  the  lion’s  share  (almost  80%). 
Claims on the BNR reflect its activities to drain 
excess liquidity from the system provided by 
foreign capital inflows and foreign exchange 
interventions (which lasted until October 2005). 
Among the latest moves of the BNR was the 
raise of the required reserve ratio on foreign 
currency deposits to 40% from 35% in February 
2006. 
Claims on non-bank corporations still account 
for a large share of total banking sector assets 
(30.2% in 2005). The sectoral decomposition of 
bank  credit  mirrors  the  structure  of  the 
Romanian economy, with industry and services 
accounting  for  the  largest  shares.  Another 
noteworthy development is the decrease in the 
share of external assets in total assets. This, in 
turn,  coincides  with  the  increase  in  total 
domestic  claims,  indicating  that  banks  first 
liquidated part of their foreign assets to fund 
the expansion of domestic credit. By contrast, 
lending to general government has decreased 
considerably,  reflecting,  among  other  things, 
the decline in budget deficits and the relatively 
low level of public debt. 
Deposits  of  households  and  non-bank 
corporations are the most important source of 
financing  for  commercial  banks  (57.5%,  see 
Table 3.6), whereas deposits of MFIs account 
for less than 3% of total liabilities. This is in 
contrast  to  the  euro  area,  where  deposits  of 
MFIs make up for about 20% of total funding, 
indicating  that  interbank  market  activities  in 
Romania  are  fairly  limited.  Debt  securities, 
which are used extensively by euro area banks 
as a source of funds, do not play any role either, 
suggesting  that  the  domestic  bond  market  is 
still underdeveloped and that ample liquidity is 
available from other sources, i.e. in the form of 
foreign borrowing, mostly from parent banks. 
Foreign  borrowing  has  risen  considerably  in 
recent years, from 5.7% of total liabilities in 
2000 to 20.9% in 2005.
Although  net  claims  on  domestic  households 
and  non-bank  corporations  are  negative   
(-10.9% in 2005), they have increased in the 
past few years. The turning point came in 2001 
when the share of claims in total assets started 
to increase and the share of deposits in total 
liabilities began to decrease. By contrast, and in 
parallel,  the  net  position  against  the  general 
government fell from 13.8% in 1999 to -1.5% 
in 2005, largely owing to the reduction in credit 
Table 3.5 Romania: Asset structure of the Romanian banking sector 
(in % of total assets)
  1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005 
Total domestic claims (credit)   71.4   70.5   71.4   78.6   83.1   84.7   88.6 
Claims on domestic MFIs   22.9   24.6   27.2   32.0   29.3   36.5   40.0 
  of which: claims on the BNR   18.7   20.8   23.4   28.6   26.3   28.4   25.1 
Claims on domestic non-banks   48.5   45.9   44.2   46.6   53.8   48.1   48.6 
    of which:   claims on general government   16.8   13.6   10.8   9.2   4.7   2.4   2.0  
claims on domestic non-bank  
corporations   30.1   30.4   31.1   33.0   36.9   32.7   30.2  
claims on households   1.6   1.8   2.3   4.4   12.2   13.0   16.4 
Money market fund shares   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
External assets   12.5   17.2   14.5   8.3   5.7   5.7   3.5 
Fixed assets   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
Other assets   16.1   12.3   14.1   13.1   11.2   9.6   7.9 
Source: BNR.27
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Table 3.6 Romania: Liability structure of the Romanian banking sector 
(in % of total liabilities)
  2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005 
Total deposits of domestics (incl. liabilities to MFIs)   76.3   74.4   75.1   71.4   68.0   63.6 
Deposits of MFIs   4.7   4.0   3.4   3.2   3.0   2.6 
Deposits of domestic non-banks   71.6   70.4   71.7   68.2   65.0   61.0 
    of which:   deposits of general government   3.0   3.7   3.1   3.0   2.6   3.5  
deposits of households & non-bank corporations   68.5   66.7   68.6   65.2   62.4   57.5 
Money market fund shares   0   0   0   0   0   0 
Debt securities issued   0   0   0   0   0   0 
Capital and reserves   10.8   14.4   13.5   13.1   11.8   12.2 
External liabilities   5.7   5.9   7.0   11.7   15.8   20.9 
Remaining liabilities   7.3   5.3   4.4   4.0   4.5   3.3 
Source: BNR.
outstanding to the government, while net claims 
on domestic MFIs rose sixfold between 1998 
and 2005, mainly as a result of soaring deposits 
and commercial bank reserves held at the BNR. 
Finally, owing to the sharp increase in foreign 
borrowing and banks’ sales of foreign assets, 
Romania’s  net  external  asset  position  has 
deteriorated significantly, turning from positive 
in 1999 to negative in 2003 and reaching -17.4% 
of total assets in 2005. 
Comparing the net position of Romanian banks 
with that of euro area banks reveals differences 
in their balance sheet structure. In Romania, 
banks  rely  mostly  on  domestic  deposits  and 
borrowing from abroad to finance the growing 
net  claims  on  domestic  households  and  non-
Table 3.7 Profitability of the Romanian banking sector 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Net interest income in % of average assets  -1.6  0.0  2.6  3.4  4.7  4.9  3.6
Net non-interest income in % of average assets  22.7  12.4  10.4  7.4  5.9  5.1  4.6
Operating income in % of average assets  21.1  12.4  13.0  10.9  10.5  10.0  8.2
Ratio of net interest income in operating income  -7.5  0.4  20.0  31.7  44.2  49.4  43.8
Operating costs in % of average assets  12.4  7.8  7.5  6.7  6.9  6.2  5.5
Personnel costs in % of operating costs  51.3  44.9  41.7  43.9  42.8  41.9  41.5
Cost-to-income ratio  58.5  62.4  57.8  62.0  65.1  61.6  66.7
Net costs of loan loss provisioning  
in % of average assets  8.0  2.0  0.6  0.2  0.6  0.7  0.5
Net costs of loan loss provisioning  
in % of operating income  37.9  16.1  4.7  2.0  5.5  7.3  6.0
Return on assets  -1.5  1.5  3.1  2.6  2.2  2.0  1.7
Return on equity   -15.3  12.5  21.8  18.3  15.6  15.6  12.9
Source: OeNB and BNR.
Note: (e) = estimate.
bank  corporations.  Conversely,  the  euro  area 
banks’ sources of funds are more diversified, as 
they are benefiting from the developed bond 
and interbank markets.
The profitability of the banking system
The  Romanian  banking  sector  has  been 
characterised  by  a  relatively  high  level  of 
profitability.  Rising  net  interest  income  has 
been one of the main drivers of profitability in 
recent years, mainly reflecting the rapid growth 
in  domestic  credit.  This  marks  a  substantial 
change  from  the  late  1990s,  when  net  non-
interest income constituted the bulk of revenues, 
due to the arbitrage opportunities opened up to 
banks by the imperfections in various segments 
of  the  financial  and  exchange  markets.  A 
3  ROMANIA28
ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 48
July 2006
substantial decline in the net costs of loan loss 
provisioning has been another important factor 
supporting  profitability,  but,  more  recently, 
these  have  increased  again,  which  partly 
explains the most recent drop in profitability, as 
measured  by  return  on  equity  and  return  on 
assets. 
Romanian banks have succeeded in improving 
cost efficiency, mostly through substantial cuts 
in personnel costs, which – as a percentage of 
total operating costs – currently stand at a lower 
level than in the euro area. Further progress in 
the cost-cutting process might help to preserve 
profitability,  particularly  in  the  light  of  the 
deterioration in some sources of income. But, 
given that personnel costs are already relatively 
low  as  a  percentage  of  total  operating  costs, 
further cost cuts will most likely come from 
other areas. 
While  the  outlook  for  profitability  remains 
positive,  there  are  a  number  of  challenges. 
First, operating income has been declining, and 
this  trend  might  continue  in  the  light  of 
decreasing  interest  rate  margins,  increasing 
competition  and  a  falling  share  of  domestic 
deposits, which are considered to be a relatively 
cheap source of financing. Second, further cuts 
in operating costs might be more difficult to 
achieve, as basic restructuring measures have 
already been implemented. Last, but not least, 
any deterioration in credit quality would lead to 
additional provisioning costs. 
RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITIES
Credit risk
The  Romanian  banking  system  is  primarily 
exposed to credit risk. As the degree of financial 
intermediation  continues  to  rise  rapidly  and 
bank assets increasingly consist of loans, credit 
risk is likely to remain of concern in the near 
future. 
Ongoing financial deepening in the Romanian 
banking sector is translating into rapid private 
sector  credit  growth,  with  household  credit 
growing  much  faster  than  corporate  credit, 
albeit from a much lower level (see Table 3.8). 
Real  domestic  credit  in  Romania  grew  at  an 
average of 18.4% per annum between 2000 and 
2005,  up  from  the  average  5%  growth  rate 
between 1995 and 1999. However, while credit 
to the private sector has been the true driver of 
total credit growth, lending to the public sector 
has actually been decreasing since 2002. Real 
claims on the private sector grew at an average 
of  18.3%  per  annum  in  the  period  2000-04, 
supported  by  lower  interest  rates,  as  well  as 
rising household incomes and real estate prices, 
which made household credit the most dynamic 
category. Overall, the share of household credit 
in total private sector credit grew from 5.7% in 
2000  to  35.2%  in  December  2005.  Within 
household credit, loans for real estate purchase 
advanced rapidly, growing at an average annual 
rate of 98.9% in real terms; thus, the share of 
mortgage  loans  in  total  private  sector  credit 
rose  from  1.7%  to  14.9%  between  2000  and 
October 2005.
Despite these developments, credit quality has 
been  improving  since  2003.  Non-performing 
loans (unadjusted exposure of doubtful and loss 
loans and interests over total classified loans 
and interests) and doubtful and past due claims 
(over total net assets) have decreased, to 2.6 and 
0.1 in 2005, respectively. These figures should 
be  interpreted  with  some  caution  however, 
particularly  because  they  benefited  from  the 
favourable  economic  conditions  and  are 
therefore subject to change in the event of a 
cyclical  downturn.  Moreover,  the  non-
performing  loan  ratio  tends  to  be  biased 
downward during times of strong credit growth, 
when  the  ratio’s  denominator  is  rapidly 
increasing. Finally, rapid credit growth can be 
associated  with  an  overstretching  of  risk 
management  capabilities  (and  consequently 
less  careful  analysis),  as  well  as  with  the 
financing of less creditworthy clients and less 
profitable projects. In particular, this may be 
the case when bank managers are focusing on 
volumes in a bid to win market share. 29
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Table 3.8 Romania: Selected banking sector stability indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Risks
Credit risk
Domestic credit growth (%, y-o-y)  11.4  26.9  39.9  50.4  21.2  49.7
Real domestic credit growth (%, y-o-y) 1)  -20.8  -2.6  18.8  31.8  10.9  37.8
Growth in real claims on the private sector  (%, y-o-y)  -10.2  16.5  14.2  23.7  18.7
Growth in real claims on non-bank ﬁnancial institutions  (%, y-o-y)  -0.6  29.6  109.5  181.0  39.8
Real credit growth to households  (%, y-o-y) 1)  3.2  44.0  122.0  214.6  44.8  65.7
Real growth in loans for real estate purchase  (%, y-o-y)    91.1  68.1  150.9  85.3
Non-performing loans (% of total loans)  3.8  2.5  1.1  3.4  2.9  2.6
Doubtful and past-due claims (in % of total net assets)  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1
Foreign currency credit (% of total private sector credit)  59.5  59.8  62.9  55.4  60.8  57.9
Foreign currency deposits (% of total deposits by non-banks)  47.0  49.3  44.7  42.5  41.2  34.5
Foreign liabilities real growth (%, y-o-y)  -16.2  21.7  36.7  88.2  83.4  73.2
Foreign liabilities (% of total liabilities)  5.7  5.9  7.0  11.7  15.8  20.9
Market risk
Interest rate risk
  Net interest income in % of average assets  0.0  2.6  3.4  4.7  4.9  3.6
  Net non-interest income in % of average assets  12.4  10.4  7.4  5.9  5.1  4.6
  Interest rate spread  20.6  17.2  16.1  14.5  13.7
  Ratio of short-term loans to total loans  50.4  53.7  53.4  45.2  40.6  35.9
Forex risk
  Open FX position in % of total balance sheet assets  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.1  0.1
Liquidity risk
Ratio of liquid assets to total assets  52.4  52.4  50.4  39.2  36.4  31.4
Ratio of loans to deposits  44.9  46.2  50.0  70.7  70.1  76.0
Ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities   …  116.2  118.5  207.2  197.0  239.8
Shock-absorbing factors
Loan loss reserves and provisions (% of non-performing loans)  85.7  78.2  53.7  59.4  68.9  55.1
Capital adequacy ratio  23.8  28.8  25  21.1  20.6  20.2
Memo
Number of banks (foreign-owned)  33 (21)  33 (24)  31 (24)  30 (21)  32 (23)  33(24)
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (in %) 2)  43.1  47.3  49.0  50.5  53.6  54.7
Sources: BNR, EBRD, IMF and ECB calculations.
1) Deflated by CPI Dec./Dec.
2) Asset share of foreign-owned banks does not include foreign banks’ branches.
Inspections  by  the  BNR  have  identified 
deficiencies  in  credit  risk  management,  such 
as:
–  the misapplication of the loan classification 
methodology; 
–  the repeated extension of credit lines, and 
debt rescheduling; 
–  the  large  exposure  to  a  small  number  of 
customers; 
–  the granting of preferential loans to debtors 
in special relations with the bank; 
–  the delayed publicity of the collateral.
Banks  are  potentially  exposed  to  significant 
credit  risk  through  indirect  foreign  exchange 
risk. In 2005, 54% of private sector credit was 
foreign-exchange-denominated.  Moreover,  a 
large proportion of this credit is extended to the 
non-tradables  sector.  Stress  tests  indicate  that 
“the main source of risk to banks is the credit 
risk materialising from exchange rate and interest 
rate exposures of the corporate sector”.13 Owing 
to low debt levels, credit risk related to household 
lending is still limited, but is growing rapidly.
13  See IMF (2003) p. 15.
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Market and liquidity risk
Interest rate risk is low, but has been increasing, 
both in terms of income and the balance sheet. 
This means that the income of banks is becoming 
more sensitive to interest rate developments.14 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of balance sheets 
to interest rates has been rising due to increasing 
loan  maturities,  which  is  indicated  by  the 
shrinking  share  of  short-term  loans  in  total 
loans. Whereas longer maturity loans have so 
far tended to have variable interest rates, which 
attenuate the interest rate risk, this is likely to 
change as mortgage lending takes off.15 
Equity  price  risk  is  limited,  as  banks  do  not 
have  substantial  holdings  of  shares  and 
participations, and derive only a negligible part 
of their income from stock trading activities. 
Romanian  banks  are  exposed  to  some  direct 
foreign exchange rate risk, which is reflected in 
a (small) short position on their balance sheet 
and  in  the  fact  that  a  sizeable  part  of  their 
income  is  derived  from  foreign  exchange 
arbitrage.  Domestic  credit  denominated  in 
foreign currencies grew, on average, by 49% 
per annum between 2000 and 2005, and at the 
end of 2005, it accounted for 54% of total loans, 
which already reflects the BNR’s measures to 
limit its growth. This high share is attributable 
to the lower interest paid on foreign currency 
credit16. Conversely, foreign currency deposits 
have been decreasing as a percentage of total 
deposits since 2001, due to increased confidence 
in the leu and the appreciation pressures it has 
been facing vis-à-vis the euro. In the face of 
rapid credit expansion, this has resulted in a 
funding shortage which has been compensated 
by foreign borrowing. In fact, growth in foreign 
liabilities has been generally accelerating since 
the start of the decade, doubling in 2004. Stress 
tests by the BNR, however, indicate that banks’ 
exposure to exchange rate shocks is minimal. 
Liquidity  risk  has  been  decreasing,  as  the 
system as a whole is highly liquid. The ratio of 
liquid  assets  to  total  assets  has  remained 
relatively constant, due, among other things, to 
sizeable deposits at the central bank originating 
from its sterilisation activity. The ratio of short-
term assets to short-term liabilities has increased 
together  with  the  ratio  of  loans  to  deposits. 
Liquidity  is  high  by  international  standards, 
because most loans have a short maturity and 
deposits with the central bank are considered 
highly liquid. Stress tests by both the IMF and 
the  BNR  find  liquidity  risk  to  be  small, 
indicating that most institutions would be able 
to  withstand  large  deposit  withdrawals.  The 
contagion  risk  from  the  interbank  market  is 
negligible,  as  most  interbank  assets  and 
liabilities are held at the BNR. 
Shock-absorbing factors
A  reduction  in  spreads,  owing  to  increased 
banking  competition,  fast  credit  growth,  and 
macroeconomic stability, has recently led to a 
decline in the profitability of Romanian banks. 
The return on assets decreased from 3.1% at the 
end of 2001 to 1.7% at the end of 2005, and the 
return on equity decreased from 21.8% to 12.9% 
over the same period (see Table 3.7). Further 
declines  in  spreads  triggered  by  continued 
nominal  convergence  and  incoming  capital 
flows  for  example,  could  have  a  further 
dampening impact on banks’ profitability, and 
may thus increase their appetite for risk. 
Privatisation  and  recapitalisation  efforts,  as 
well  as  increasingly  higher  minimum  capital 
requirements, have led to a well capitalised and 
sound banking system.17 The capital adequacy 
ratio, which stood at 28.8% in 2001 (partly as a 
result of enhanced risk aversion towards lending 
14  Stress tests by the BNR conducted in June 2005 indicate that 
banks’ balance sheets are resilient to interest rate shocks, even 
though the sensitivity of balance sheets to interest rates has been 
rising.
15  The  maturity  structure  of  claims  on  households  and  on 
enterprises is rather different, as the largest part of claims on 
the  latter  constitutes  short-term  credit,  whereas  claims  on 
households are more of a medium to long-term nature.
16  In  October  2005,  the  average  interest  rate  applied  by  credit 
institutions on new loans in leu for individuals and legal entities 
was 15.6% and 14.2% per annum respectively, in comparison 
with 9.2% and 5.9% for new loans in euro and 9.4% and 6.0% 
for new loans in US dollar.
175 In its Financial System Stability Assessment (2003), the IMF 
described  the  Romanian  banking  sector  as  well  capitalised, 
liquid and generally well supervised.31
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in  the  aftermath  of  the  banking  crisis),  has 
fallen (to 20.2% in December 2005), but is still 
well above the minimum requirement of 12%. 
At  the  same  time,  loan  loss  reserves  and 
provisions  (as  percentage  of  non-performing 
loans) have decreased from 85.7% in 2000 to 
68.9% in 2004.
The increase in foreign ownership can be said 
to contribute to the resilience of the banking 
system, as it helps to enhance credit quality, for 
example, by providing know-how for improved 
risk  assessment  and  credit  management. 
Evidence of this can already be seen in the low 
incidence of bad loans despite the rapid credit 
expansion. Moreover, the presence of foreign 
banks  may  reduce  the  likelihood  of  sudden 
capital outflows due to the strategic nature of 
their investment in the country and region as a 
whole.  However,  the  extent  to  which  parent 
banks will support subsidiaries in practice also 
depends on the internal risk and profitability 
assessment of the parent bank.
The rapid growth of private sector credit could 
create  debt-servicing  problems  over  the  long 
term. However, it is not doing so at the moment 
as  indebtedness  is  still  relatively  low. 
Nevertheless, as households and the corporate 
sector have less assets (deposits) than liabilities 
(loans) in foreign currency, a depreciation of 
the leu or an increase in foreign interest rates 
could  increase  the  debt  and  debt  service 
burden.
3.3  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main challenge for the Romanian authorities 
is  to  keep  disinflation  on  track,  as  domestic 
demand (fostered partly by strong credit growth) 
has  been  expanding  rapidly,  wage  pressures 
have  been  increasing,  adjustments  in 
administered  prices  have  been  ongoing  and 
energy  prices  have  been  persistently  high. 
Formally operating under an inflation targeting 
regime  since  August  2005,  monetary  policy 
faces the issue of tightening monetary conditions 
within  the  constraints  posed  by  the  need  to 
prevent  an  unsustainable  exchange  rate 
appreciation stemming from large and volatile 
capital inflows. Fiscal consolidation therefore 
remains  key  to  supporting  macroeconomic 
stabilisation.  To  minimise  external 
vulnerabilities, the main policy challenge is to 
reduce  the  current  account  deficit  –  albeit 
largely  financed  by  FDI  inflows  –  that  has 
resulted from strong domestic demand, rising 
real unit labour costs and appreciation pressures 
on the leu. 
Banking  sector  development  in  Romania  has 
been characterised by fast private credit growth, 
in  particular  to  households  (e.g.  consumer 
lending, mortgages). However, expressed as a 
share  of  GDP,  intermediation  is  still  low. 
Moreover,  the  Romanian  banking  sector  is 
generally  composed  of  well  capitalised, 
profitable and mostly foreign-owned banks.
Credit risk remains the main risk to financial 
stability in Romania. Private credit growth has 
been driven by improved consumer confidence, 
high  economic  growth  and  macroeconomic 
stabilisation. As a substantial share of lending 
is  denominated  in  foreign  currencies,  end-
borrowers  face  significant  foreign  exchange 
rate risk, which could transform into a higher 
credit  risk  for  banks.  Banca  Naţională  a 
României (BNR) has taken restrictive measures 
to  limit  credit  growth,  in  particular  foreign 
currency  borrowing,  which  has  been  partly 
induced  by  spreads  between  domestic  and 
foreign interest rates. To date, there have been 
no  signs  of  a  deterioration  in  credit  quality. 
Interest rate risk is also increasing, but is still 
at a low level. 
4  CROATIA
4.1  MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND 
VULNERABILITIES
Development of Croatia’s external environment:
Croatia has a highly open economy, with the 
EU as its main trading partner. Since 2000, the 
sum  of  exports  and  imports  of  goods  and 
services has increased from close to 100% of 
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GDP to about 110%, with the share of the EU 
and the euro area constituting almost 70% and 
50% respectively. 
Croatia’s external position is characterised by 
a substantial merchandise trade deficit.  This 
partly  reflects  the  fact  that  tourism  services 
constitute  a  key  export  item,  but  is  also 
attributable to the strong import demand arising 
from  households’  optimistic  income  growth 
expectations.  Moreover,  as  an  oil  importing 
country,  Croatia  is  dependent  on  oil  market 
developments.  Finally,  Croatia’s  trade  deficit 
partly  stems  from  the  need  to  foster  the 
accumulation and modernisation of the country’s 
capital stock. 
On the export side, Croatia has been relatively 
slow in upgrading its export structure. Ships, 
textile products, minerals, basic materials and 
manufactured goods increasingly commoditised 
on the global markets still feature prominently 
among its exported goods. Tourism is a highly 
competitive industry. Croatia’s pattern of export 
specialisation therefore makes it vulnerable to 
adverse  shocks  arising  from  global 
competition. 
In the long term, a rise in competitiveness will 
be important for external stability. There is room 
for  improvement,  as  wage  costs  are  relatively 
high compared with those of the other countries 
in the region and high value-added goods and 
knowledge intensive products constitute only a 
low proportion of exports. There are also still 
opportunities for privatisation in major export 
sectors,  such  as  tourism  or  shipbuilding,  as  a 
substantial part of FDI is still oriented towards 
non-export sectors. This explains why the share 
of Croatian exports in key markets has grown 
less  rapidly  than  the  share  of  exports  of 
comparable countries (see Chart 4.1). 
In  terms  of  external  financial  conditions, 
Croatia  has  benefited  from  the  heightened 
global appetite for risk. The risk premium on 
euro-denominated assets issued by the Croatian 
government has been well below JPMorgan’s 
EMBI Global index and has also benefited from 
the  country’s  investment-grade  status  (see   
Chart  4.2).  Investors’  sentiment  has  been 
reinforced  by  the  prospect  of  EU  accession. 
Nonetheless, the economy remains vulnerable 
to  the  potential  risks  arising  from  a  sudden 
change in the financial environment. 
Chart 4.1 Croatia: Development of export 
shares of selected countries in 35 countries 
(1995 = 100)
Sources: European Commission and AMECO.
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Prudent  fiscal  policies  are  key  to  reducing 
external vulnerabilities. In the short term, more 
fiscal  prudence  would  create  room  for 
manoeuvre in responding to adverse external 
shocks. This is especially important in the light 
of the limited flexibility of monetary policy. In 
the longer term, reducing external debt, which 
has  stabilised  above  80%  of  GDP,  will  be 
instrumental in enhancing the resilience of the 
Croatian economy.
Development of Croatia’s domestic  
macroeconomic environment
Output grew by 4.1% on average between 2000 
and 2005 (see Table 4.1). Throughout, growth 
was  fuelled  by  household  consumption  and 
volatile government investments. Growth rates 
also reflected changing conditions on the foreign 
exchange and credit markets, stop-and-go fiscal 
policies, as well as monetary policy reactions to 
emerging external and internal imbalances. 
Monetary  policy  aims  to  strike  a  balance 
between  external  and  internal  objectives. 
Table 4.1 Croatia GDP growth and growth contributions 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005(f)  Volatility
Real GDP growth  2.9  4.4  5.2  4.3  3.8  4.1  0.8
Total consumption   2.1  1.1  4.1  2.5  2.3  2.3  1.0
    of which:    Private consumption  2.5  2.7  4.5  2.5  2.4  2.2  0.9 
Public consumption   -0.4  -1.6  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.6
Gross ﬁxed capital formation  -0.9  1.5  2.7  4.0  1.2  0.9  1.7
Inventories   -1.5  3.2  2.7  -0.7  -0.2  0.8  1.9
Balance of goods and services   3.2  -1.4  -4.2  -1.5  0.5  0.1  2.5
Sources: European Commission and AMECO database, autumn, 2005.
Notes: (f) = forecast (forecast according to the official CBS data for the first three quarters and lastest official CNB porjection for the 
last three quarters of 2005).
Table 4.2 Croatia: Nominal and financial indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Inﬂation (CPI)  4.6  3.8  1.7  1.8  2.1  3.3
Zagreb money market overnight interest rate (December value)  2.4  2.5  1.6  5.5  3.6  2.3
Real short-term interest rate (contemporaneous)  -2.2  -1.3  -0.1  3.7  1.5  -1.0
Domestic credit (annual % change)  10.1  23.2  33.6  16.8  13.1  20.3
Exchange rate (euro, period average)  7.6  7.5  7.4  7.6  7.5  7.4
Nominal effective exchage rate (1990 = 100)  104.8  103.4  101.2  98.2  94.8  93.5
Real effective exchange rate (1999 = 100)  101.5  98.7  96.3  94.2  90.7  91.1
Source: IFS.
Monetary policy aims at keeping a stable kuna-
euro exchange rate, although there is no explicit 
exchange rate target. The tightly managed float 
strategy  employed  by  the  Croatian  National 
Bank (CNB) reflects the fact that the economy 
is highly “euroised.” While parts of the 1990s 
were characterised by downward pressures on 
the  kuna,  particularly  during  the  Asian  and 
Russian  crises,  more  recently,  strong  capital 
inflows  have  created  substantial  appreciation 
pressures.  Yet,  the  CNB  has  prevented  a 
significant strengthening of the kuna to avoid a 
deterioration in competitiveness and in order 
not  to  provide  further  incentives  for  capital 
inflows. 
While the CNB’s commitment to exchange rate 
stability limits its room for manoeuvre, it has 
been  largely  successful  in  achieving  price 
stability.  Inflation  dropped  from  the  higher 
levels of 2000 and 2001 to around 2% in the 
period  2002-04  (see  Table  4.2).  This  was 
accompanied by falling nominal interest rates. 
In 2005, however, inflation edged up again to 
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3.3%, but this was partly a result of one-off 
shocks,  such  as  the  increase  in  oil  and  food 
prices.  CPI  developments  are  expected  to 
remain  closely  in  line  with  the  definition  of 
price stability. 
Despite  the  relative  depth  of  the  financial 
sector,  interest  rate  transmission  is  weak, 
reflecting widespread euroisation and the easy 
access  that  banks  and  enterprises  have  to 
foreign  funds.  Against  this  background,  the 
CNB  has  been  using  foreign  exchange  rate 
intervention and reserve requirements to absorb 
excess  liquidity  and  reign  in  banks’  credit 
expansion. In April 2005 the CNB introduced 
new,  flexible  and  active  monetary  policy 
instruments such as repo, reverse repo etc. 
Because  of  the  tightly  managed  float,  fiscal 
policy is the main policy tool for macroeconomic 
adjustment. However, for several reasons, fiscal 
policy  has  provided  only  limited  support  to 
stabilisation  policies.  Public  finances  are 
overstretched  due  to  structural  expenditures 
such  as  subsidies  for  various  industries,  and 
high health and pension commitments, which 
are  often  inadequately  controlled.    On  the 
Table 4.3 Croatia: Fiscal indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
General government balance (in % of GDP) 1)  -6.5  -6.7  -5.0  -6.3  -4.9  -4.2
General government debt (in % of GDP) 2)  49.5  51.1  51.3  52.5  53.5  54.2
Sources: MoF and CNB.
1) Modified accrual basis.
2) Includes general government debt, CBRD debt and general government guaranteed debt.  
Table 4.4 Croatia: External position of the economy 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Current account balance (% of GDP)   -2.5   -3.7   -8.6   -7.1   -5.1   -6.3 
FDI inﬂow (in % of GDP)   5.9   6.7   5.3   7.2   3.6   4.2 
External liabilty of the public sector (in % of GDP)   34.8   33.8   29.8   32.6   31.0   27.9 
External debt (total economy, in % of GDP)   60.6   60.7   61.5   75.5   80.2   82.5 
International reserves (no. of months of import)   4.3   5.3   4.9   5.2   4.8   5.1 
Sources: CNB and the Croatian Ministry of Finance.
Notes: Public sector includes: general government, CNB, Croatian bank for restructuring and development and companies with total or 
major state ownership.
revenue  side,  authorities  regularly  face 
difficulties in collecting the budgeted amount 
of taxes. 
The government has nevertheless made efforts 
to tighten its control over public finances since 
2004.  It  has  been  partially  successful  in 
offsetting the excessive demand growth caused 
by private sector spending. However, in mid-
2005, the Parliament adopted an amendment to 
the  budget  law,  increasing  the  deficit  target 
from the original 3.7% to 4.2% of the GDP (see 
Table 4.3). To ensure macro-economic stability, 
further measures to contain fiscal deficits are 
crucial. 
The external position of the economy remained 
relatively stable in 2005. The reduction in the 
government deficit, the central bank’s measures 
to  curb  the  rapid  growth  of  bank  credit,  the 
slowdown  of  income  growth  and  domestic 
demand all contributed to this (see Table 4.4). 
Furthermore,  fiscal  consolidation  and  the 
reorientation  of  public  debt  issue  toward  the 
domestic  market  have  helped  to  stabilise 
government external indebtedness. At the same 
time, international reserves have continued to 35
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grow in euro terms due to foreign capital inflows 
and central bank interventions. 
4.2  THE CROATIAN BANKING SECTOR
STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENTS
A short history of the Croatian banking system
Financial sector developments in Croatia have 
been influenced by the 1998-99 banking crisis, 
during which the CNB had to intervene in the 
foreign  exchange  markets  to  counter 
depreciation  pressure.  The  crisis  peaked  in 
February and March 1999 and led to the failure 
of numerous banks. It originated in an excessive 
lending boom funded by capital inflows as well 
as  in  high  risk  activities  of  some  small  and 
medium-sized banks. The crisis triggered a far-
reaching privatisation process largely involving 
foreign investors, which, according to the IMF 
and the CNB, has been a key factor in creating 
a stable and well organised banking system. At 
the same time, the role of banking supervision 
was reinforced. 
The current structure of the Banking System
The  Croatian  banking  sector  is  relatively 
concentrated and dominated by private, foreign 
ownership (see Table 4.5). By September 2005 
the  number  of  banks,  which  surpassed  60  in 
1997, had fallen to 34. Of those, private majority 
foreign  owned  banks  (13)  have  acquired  a 
dominant market share of 91.2% of total banking 
sector assets (one of the largest in Central and 
Eastern Europe). Italian and Austrian banks are 
among the biggest foreign investors. Moreover, 
Table 4.5 The structure of the Croatian banking sector 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 1)
EBRD index of banking sector reform  3.0  3.3  3.3  3.7  3.7  4.0  …
Number of banks (foreign-owned)  53 (13)  43 (21)  43 (24)  46 (23)  41 (19)  37 (15)  34 (13)
Asset share of private banks (%)  54.4  94.3  95.0  96.0  96.6  96.9  96.6
Asset share of foreign banks (%)  39.9  84.1  89.3  90.2  91.0  91.3  91.2
Market share of 4 largest banks in total assets  58.1  62.0  60.0  58.6  61.6  64.9  65.0
Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann index 2)  1,190  1,368  1,315  1,237  1,270  1,363  1,361
Sources: EBRD, Walkjo (2004), Walko and Reininger (2005) and OeNB.
1) Sum of the squared asset shares of individual banks. The index ranges between 0 and 10,000. Below 1,000 it suggests a non-
concentrated sector; above 1,800 it is highly concentrated.
2) September 2005.
the banking sector is now almost fully privatised, 
with private banks holding 96.6% of total assets. 
Despite a relatively large number of banks, the 
banking sector appears relatively concentrated. 
The four largest banks had a combined market 
share of 65% at the end of 2004. Moreover, the 
share of the 27 smallest banks amounts to less 
than 3% of the total. 
The  restructuring  of  the  banking  sector  has 
been accompanied by institutional reform. The 
EBRD  Index  of  Banking  Sector  Reform  has 
shown a continuous rise in the level of reform 
over the past decade, with the maximum level 
almost being reached in 2004. Indeed, according 
to  the  EBRD,  the  level  of  compliance  with 
international  solvency  standards  is  high  and 
rated even higher than in the NMS-8. 
The Structure of Bank Assets and Liabilities
Financial intermediation by banks has grown 
rapidly since the banking crisis of 1998. The 
ratio of banking sector assets to GDP increased 
by  more  than  60  percentage  points  reaching 
more than 110% at the end of 2005 (see Table 
4.6). This is higher than in the NMS-8 (75% of 
GDP), but is still below euro area levels. 
Banks’  assets  are  dominated  by  claims  on 
households and non-bank corporations, which 
account for over 55% of total assets. Owing to 
administrative  measures  taken  by  the  CNB, 
credit growth to the private sector has slowed 
down over the past few years to a nevertheless 
substantial 18.5% in 2005 (see Table 4.9). Until 
2004, lending to enterprises decelerated, whereas 
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credit growth to households also fell but remained 
high. In fact, the share of claims on households 
in total assets has increased rapidly over the past 
few  years,  while  that  on  non-financial 
corporations  has  slowly  declined.  Although 
loans  to  households  and  enterprises  with  a 
maturity of longer than one year accounted for 
around 62% of total loans by the end of 2004, the 
share of long-term corporate loans whose interest 
rate may vary within a year exceeded 80% of 
total corporate loans in 2004.18 
Claims of the banking sector on the government 
are relatively low. The share of bank claims on 
the general government as a ratio of GDP has 
declined  since  the  end  2000,  reflecting 
institutional  factors  and  the  financing  of  the 
budget  deficit  by  non-residents.  In  2005  it 
edged  up  again,  accounting  for  12%  of  total 
assets. In 2004, the share stood at around 10%, 
comparable with the euro area (9.9%) and less 
than in the NMS-8 (14.7%). 
Banks’ liabilities are dominated by non-bank 
deposits, especially from the household sector. 
By the end of 2005, domestic non-bank deposits 
accounted for 59.2% of total liabilities compared 
Table 4.6 Asset structure of the Croatian banking sector 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Commercial bank assets in % of GDP  65.9  72.1  86.1  91.4  98.4  106.0  111.5
Total domestic claims in % of total assets  86.7  82.1  77.0  84.3  81.9  80.7  86.1
Claims on domestic MFI in % of total assets  9.7  9.7  10.6  12.4  13.9  15.2  16.6
Claims on domestic non-banks in % of total assets  77.0  72.4  66.4  71.9  67.9  65.5  69.5
  of which:
  claims on general government in % of total assets  18.4  18.4  15.0  14.1  11.8  10.1  12.0
  claims on domestic households and enterprises  
  in % of total assets  58.6  54.0  51.4  57.8  56.1  55.3  57.5
  of which:
  claims on domestic enterprises in % of total assets  38.0  32.8  30.3  31.8  27.9  26.4  26.7
  claims on domestic households in % of total assets  20.6  21.2  21.1  26.0  28.2  28.9  30.8
Money market fund shares in % of total assets  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
External assets in % of total assets  13.3  17.9  23.0  15.7  18.1  19.3  13.9
Claims on domestic households in % of total  
claims on households and enterprises  35.2  39.3  41.1  45.0  50.2  52.3  53.5
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic nonbanks  74.8  74.3  77.0  81.8  85.6  87.1  87.3
of which:
Loans-to-claims ratio for general government  17.4  20.5  19.7  29.1  37.6  39.9  42.8
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic households  
and enterprises  92.8  92.7  93.7  94.7  95.7  95.7  96.6
Sources: Walko (2004), Walko and Reininger (2005) and CNB.
with 53.3% in the NMS-8 and to 31.7% in the 
euro area. Capital and reserves made up 12.8% 
of total liabilities and other sources accounted 
for 28% (see Table 4.7). The share of domestic 
sectors liabilities has declined in recent years 
alongside  the  increasing  portion  of  external 
liabilities  26.3%  in  2005,  up  from  15.3%  in 
2001.  
Households  were  the  main  depositors  with 
Croatian  banks  (accounting  for  65%  of  total 
deposits at the end of 2005), followed by non-
financial corporations (24% of total deposits). 
A significant factor in deposit growth was the 
euro cash changeover. Authorities encouraged 
the exchange (mostly of the Deutsche Mark) via 
bank accounts instead of direct cash exchanges. 
In  addition,  strengthening  confidence  in  the 
domestic banking sector has played a role.
The  banking  sector  is  characterised  by 
widespread  euroisation.  Foreign  currency 
deposits, including those denominated in kuna 
but indexed to foreign exchange rates, accounted 
18  Furthermore,  85%  of  loans  to  households  with  a  remaining 
maturity of over one year were contracted at an interest rate 
changeable within a year. 37
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Table 4.7 Liability structure of the Croatian banking sector 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Liabilities as % of total liabilities
Deposits of MFIs  1.3  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.4  2.3
Deposits of domestic non-banks  63.8  68.4  73.2  68.7  63.7  60.4  59.2
  deposits of general government  6.9  7.0  4.9  5.1  4.0  4.2  4.5
  deposits of households and enterprises  56.8  61.4  68.3  63.6  59.7  56.2  54.7
Money market fund shares   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Debt securities issued   0.5  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.4
Capital and reserves  23.6  22.7  17.9  15.9  14.0  12.7  12.8
External liabilities  18.5  16.2  15.3  21.1  25.6  27.1  26.3
Remaining liabilities  -7.5  -8.0  -6.7  -6.0  -4.3  -1.1  -1.0
Memorandum items:             
Domestic non-banks’ claim-to-deposit ratio  120.8  105.9  90.7  104.6  106.6  108.4  117.4
General government’s claim-to-deposit ratio  266.0  262.8  304.2  273.8  293.5  242.6  266.4
Households’ & Enterprises’ claim-to-deposit ratio   103.1  88.0  75.3  90.9  94.0  98.4  105.1
Sources: Walko (2004), Walko and Reininger (2005) and CNB.
Table 4.8 Profitability of the Croatian banking sector 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Total operating income  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
  Net interest income in % of total income  68.6  78.8  70.8  74.3  69.2  70.4
  Net non-interest income in % of total income  31.4  21.2  29.2  25.7  30.8  29.6
General administrative expenses in % of total income  56.7  65.6  59.3  56.9  54.3  59.1
Loan loss provision expenses in % of total income  20.6  13.7  6.6  7.7  6.6  4.9
Income tax in % of total income  2.0  5.7  6.3  5.9  6.4  7.9
After-tax proﬁt/loss in % of income  20.7  15.2  27.8  29.5  32.6  33.7
Net interest income in % of average assets  4.2  3.6  3.3  3.4  3.0  2.9
Net non-interest income in % of average assets  1.9  1.0  1.3  1.1  1.3  1.2
Interest rate spread (total loans – total deposits)  7.6  6.6  7.7  8.0  7.6  7.0
Return on average assets – before tax (in %)   1.4  0.9  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7
Return on average equity (in %)  10.7  6.6  13.7  14.5  16.1  15.6
Net interest margin  3.8  3.1  3.0  3.5  3.1  …
Sources: CNB, EBRD, IMF and Hilbers et al. (2005).
for 85% of total deposits at the end of 2005, 
showing almost no downward trend since 2001. 
The proportion of foreign currency (indexed) 
loans (mostly in euro) is also high and exceeded 
75% of total loans at the end of 2005.
Domestic  credit  expansion  has  been  funded 
largely  by  banks’  external  borrowing  (see   
Table 4.7). Consequently, the Croatian banking 
sector’s net foreign assets have turned negative, 
reaching -12.4% of total assets by the end of 
2005. Gross external debt of banks (excluding 
the CNB) made up roughly 30% of GDP and the 
end  of  2004  (compared  with  approximately 
12% at the end of 2001).
The Profitability of the Banking System
Owing to an improvement in cost management 
and overall efficiency, the profitability of the 
banking sector has increased over the past few 
years (see Table 4.8).19 The cost-to-income ratio 
19  Owing  to  the  fall  in  interest  rates,  net  interest  income  as  a 
percentage of average assets and the share of net interest income 
in operating income declined from 2001 to 2005 (from 3.5%  to 
3% and from around 80% to 70% respectively), while net non-
interest income as a percentage of average assets rose slightly. 
Operating  income  remained  almost  stable  at  4  to  4.5%  of 
average assets. By cutting general administrative expenses the 
operating costs as a percentage of average assets were reduced 
in the same period and the cost-to-income ratio declined from 
65% to 54%. After the crises of 1998 and 2001 the high net costs 
of loan provisioning as a percentage of operating income could 
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seems to be below those of the NMS and the 
euro  area.  The  structure  of  non-performing 
loans has also improved. 
RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITIES
Credit risk
The prime risk for Croatian banking sector is 
credit risk. Credit growth to the private sector 
peaked at 24.7% and 31.6% in 2001 and 2002 
respectively  (see  Table  4.9).  As  this  rapid 
expansion  of  credit  was  being  financed 
increasingly  through  external  borrowing, 
mainly from parent banks, the CNB introduced 
higher  reserve  requirements,  especially  for 
foreign  credit,  and  made  it  mandatory  for 
commercial banks to keep a minimum of foreign 
exchange  liquid  assets.  Consequently,  credit 
growth to the private sector as a whole slowed 
down initially but edged up again in 2005. At 
Table 4.9 Croatia: Selected banking sector stability indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Risks
Credit risk
Credit growth (annual percentage change)  10.1  23.2  33.6  16.8  13.1  20.3
Credit growth to the private sector (annual percentage change)  8.5  24.7  31.6  15.9  13.6  18.5
Real credit growth to the private sector (annual percentage change)  1.4  17.2  27.5  13.1  11.3  16.2
Credit growth to households (annual percentage change)  21.0  29.3  43.0  27.7  18.7  20.3
Mortgage credit (housing loans) growth (annual percentage change)  10.6  14.4  30.8  36.7  26.6  28.8
Non-performing loans (% of total loans)  9.5  7.3  5.9  5.1  4.5  4.0
Share of foreign currency credit in total private sector credit  85.6  84.9  80  74.4  75.8  77.5
Share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits  91.3  91.2  89.4  87.1  86.8  84.3
Market risk
Forex risk
  Open FX position in % of total balance sheet assets  3.5  0.4  1.4  1.6  1.0  0.5
Stock market risk
  Ratio of shares and participations to total assets (equity holdings)  1.1  1.0  0.6  0.4  0.2  0.1
Liquidity risk
  Ratio of liquid assets 1) to total assets  31.5  37.6  29.7  32.8  31.3  28.0
  Ratio of total loans to total deposits  70.5  62.9  74.1  76.6  80.6  88.5
  Ratio of liquid assets 1) to short-term liabilities  110.4  126.7  97.7  117.2  120.4  104.5
Shock-absorbing factors
Loan loss provisions (as a perecentage of non-performing loans)   79.9     71.8     68.1     60.8    60.3  58.0
Capital adequacy ratio   21.3  18.5  17.2  16.2  14.1  15.8
Memo
Number of banks (foreign-owned)  43 (21)  43 (24)  46 (23)  41 (19)  37 (15)  …
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (in %)  84.1  89.3  90.2  91  91.3  …
Sources: CNB, EBRD, IMF and Hilbers et al. (2005).
1) Liquid assets = cash in vaults + deposits with CNB + deposits with other banks + treasury bills.
the  same  time,  lending  to  households  has 
continued to rise rapidly. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the corporate sector increasingly 
resorted to direct borrowing from foreign banks 
and non-bank financial institutions (leasing), as 
well  as  to  increases  in  trade  credit.  The 
household  sector  has  limited  access  to  these 
sources of credit and banks have found enough 
capital  and  liquidity  to  continue  expanding 
their lending to private households. 
Credit risk from the household sector appears 
to be on the rise as debt levels and debt service 
burdens  increase.  The  estimated  household 
debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 19% in 2001 to 
almost  34%  in  June  2005  (see  Table  4.10). 
According  to  the  CNB,  this  mainly  reflects 
strong  growth  in  household  borrowing  from 
banks. While Croatia’s household debt-to-GDP-
ratio is still below its average ratio in the euro 39
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area, it is roughly estimated to be twice as high 
as  in  the  NMS-8.  Moreover,  the  debt  of 
households  in  relation  to  gross  disposable 
income  rose  rapidly  from  28%  to  more  than 
70%  and  debt  service  to  gross  disposable 
income ratio increased from 3.6% in 2000 to 
6% in 2004, despite a decline in interest rates.
Banks’  exposure  to  the  corporate  sector  has 
grown less rapidly. By the end of 2004, bank 
claims on the corporate sector accounted for 
only  48%  of  total  claims  on  households  and 
non-bank  corporations,  whereas  in  the  euro 
area  they  accounted  for  56%. The  estimated 
total debt of non-financial enterprises rose from 
around 43% of GDP at the end of 2001 to almost 
50% in June 2005. In the past few years, their 
external  debt  increased  by  rates  of  around 
around 18%, and their debt to leasing companies 
grew at three-digit rates. 
Rapid credit growth may lead to higher credit 
risk through a number of channels. First, debt 
levels and debt service burdens have increased, 
making debtors more vulnerable to any kind of 
shock. Second, rapid credit growth may entail 
lower  vetting  standards  and  thereby  cause 
lending  to  less  creditworthy  customers. 
Furthermore, local managers of foreign banks 
may be more concerned about lending volumes 
than the risks of such a high growth environment. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that banks have 
indeed begun more risky lending, for instance 
by accepting loans with debt service burdens in 
excess of 50% of disposable income. 
Foreign-currency related risk is an important 
part  of  credit  risk  and  stems  from  the  high 
proportion  of  banking  system  activity 
denominated in or linked to euro.20 Domestic 
borrowers that are not foreign exchange earners 
bear the bulk of foreign exchange risk. While 
this risk is somewhat mitigated by the fact that 
most  deposits  are  also  in  euro,  net  debtor 
households still bear foreign exchange rate risk 
and the structure of credit commitments directly 
exposes households to a high level of currency 
risk. 
Households’ borrowing in currencies other than 
the euro is increasing, particularly in the Swiss 
franc (11% of total households’ borrowing in 
September 2005). The CNB is trying to improve 
the  monitoring  of  borrowers’  exposure  to 
foreign  exchange  risk  and  further  strengthen 
supervision. This includes requiring banks to 
collect information on their borrowers’ foreign 
currency exposure as part of their credit risk 
evaluation, and issuing a guideline for banks to 
report  their  exposures  to  foreign-exchange 
induced credit risk to the CNB. 
The  influx  of  foreign  banks  (mostly  from  the 
euro  area)  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1998-99 
domestic banking crisis has played a key role in 
bringing  credit  risk  management  standards 
closer  to  international  best  practices.21 
Furthermore, the share of non-performing loans 
in total loans has declined in recent years from 
the  peak  that  followed  the  eruption  of  the 
banking  crisis.  In  the  period  2000-2005,  it 
decreased from 9.5% to 4%. 
Market and liquidity risk
The  Croatian  banking  sector’s  exposure  to 
interest rate risk appears to be relatively small, 
both in terms of income and the balance sheet. 
In  2005  net  interest  income  accounted  for   
70% of operating income, a share which has 
been falling in favour of non-interest income, 
such as commissions. This income diversification 
has  somewhat  reduced  the  exposure  of  the 
banking  sector  to  adverse  interest  rate 
movements.  Although  the  spreads  between 
lending  and  deposit  rates  are  higher  than  in 
advanced  economies,  this  is  mainly  due  to 
substantial  but  declining  overhead  costs, 
20  Most loans are not granted directly in euro but in kuna indexed 
to the euro. In particular, the relatively low interest rates for 
foreign-currency-denominated  or  foreign-currency-indexed 
loans  have  stimulated  the  growth  of  these  credit  categories. 
According to the CNB, the ongoing euroisation (especially of 
deposits)  in  the  banking  sector,  in  an  environment  of  low 
inflation, is due to the fear of a depreciation of the kuna and 
another period of high inflation. The role of the euro in the 
domestic banking sector is therefore not directly linked to the 
presence of banks from the euro area.
21  Whilst the high incidence of foreign currency lending is not 
necessarily  in  line  with  international  best  practice,  it  is  a 
complement  to  the  supply  of  euro  deposits  and  an  almost 
completely fixed exchange rate.
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reflecting  the  low  productivity  of  banks  and 
possibly also differences in the risk profiles of 
borrowers.  Overall,  the  interest  rate  risk  in 
terms of income seems limited. In terms of the 
balance sheet, interest risk is, at least formally, 
negligible  because  most  loans,  even  “fixed 
interest”  loans,  carry  a  provision  that  the 
interest rate can be changed at will and time 
deposits rarely have a maturity of over a year. 
This means that most of the interest rate risk 
has been passed on to the customer and may 
filter back through credit risk in the event of 
adverse macroeconomic shocks. 
Equity price risk is limited, as the ratio of shares 
and participations to total assets has declined to 
much less than 1%, and both available-for-sale 
and held-for-trading assets and liabilities have 
accounted for only a small part of income (and 
loss). 
The exposure of banks to direct foreign exchange 
rate risk is limited. The share of foreign currency 
deposits is high, but the CNB has put a limit of 
20%  on  the  ratio  of  the  total  open  foreign 
Table 4.10 Croatia: Selected macroprudential indicators – domestic debt 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  June 2005
Debt
Households
as % of GDP  15.9  19.0  24.9  29.6  32.8  33.9
as % of gross disposable income  28.1  36.9  49.2  63.3  70.2  72.5
y-o-y rate of change  21.1  29.6  42.2  27.8  18.9  21.0
Implicit interest payments, as % of gross disposable income  2.9  3.9  4.4  5.7  6.0  6.1
Non-financial enterprises
as % of GDP  42.9  42.9  45.3  46.3  49.2  49.7
as % of corporate bank deposits  428.9  352.0  306.9  290.0  303.5  338.7
y-o-y rate of change  4.1  8.5  14.6  10.4  13.3  12.5
Implicit interest payments, as % of GDP  3.8  3.4  3.2  3.1  2.9  2.9
Total non-financial private sector
as % of GDP  58.8  61.9  70.4  76.2  82.0  83.6
y-o-y rate of change  8.2  14.2  23.1  16.5  15.4  15.8
General government 
as % of GDP  40.6  41.7  42.6  44.6  47.6  49.0
y-o-y rate of change  28.7  11.6  10.6  12.7  14.5  11.6
interest paid as % of GDP  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.2
Total non-financial sector
as % of GDP  99.4  103.6  112.9  120.8  129.6  132.6
y-o-y rate of change  15.7  13.2  18.1  15.1  15.1  14.2
Sources: CNB.
exchange  position  to  regulatory  capital. This 
ratio  stood  at  4.2%  in  the  second  quarter  of 
2005, which is a substantial decrease from 7.2% 
in 2004. Moreover, if the kuna were to depreciate, 
this long position would provide a partial hedge 
against the increase in credit risk that would 
result due to the short position of the banks’ 
counterparties (see above). 
In general, it appears that most of the market 
risk has been passed on to customers, which 
means that these risks are likely to resurface 
through credit risk. Moreover, it seems plausible 
that in particular some of the foreign exchange 
rate risk and interest rate risk now borne by 
customers could be better managed by banks 
themselves. By passing these risks to customers, 
they have made them harder to control, which 
could be to their own disadvantage in the event 
of a large macroeconomic shock.
Liquidity risk has been increasing but is still 
low, as the system as a whole is still relatively 
liquid. The decline in the ratio of liquid assets 
to total assets and the rise in the loan-to-deposit 41
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ratio point to a deterioration in liquidity in the 
Croatian banking sector over the past few years. 
This can be partly attributed to the CNB’s active 
policy to reduce liquidity through administrative 
measures, such as special reserve requirements 
on foreign currency assets.22 But, despite these 
measures, liquidity is still high, which is also 
reflected in the large amounts of free reserves 
held at the central bank. Stress tests by the CNB 
suggest that banks would withstand a substantial 
(35%)  one-off  deposit  outflow.  At  the  same 
time, however, international financing risk has 
been  growing  due  to  an  increasing  share  of 
liabilities  being  owed  to  non-residents.  Even 
though most of these are owed to foreign banks, 
which are, in most cases, probably the parent 
banks, this development warrants monitoring. 
Shock-absorbing factors
Profitability  remains  relatively  high  and 
provides a buffer against shocks. For the banking 
system as a whole, the return on average assets 
was 1.7% at the end of 2005, while the return on 
average equity stood at 16% (see Table 4.8). 
Banks appear well capitalised, and, despite a 
decreasing  trend,  capital  adequacy  ratios 
remain well above requirements. Commercial 
banks’ capital adequacy ratios ranged between 
14  and  16%  during  2003  and  2005,  and  all 
banks  posted  capital  adequacy  ratios  in   
excess  of  the  minimum  10%  statutory  limit. 
Following  the  new  Banking  Law  (2002)  and   
by-laws, market risk coverage is now included 
in the capital adequacy calculation. However, 
capital  formally  assigned  to  non-credit  risk 
constitutes  only  3.9%  of  total  capital  (June 
2005), which seems low, even for the limited 
market risks of the Croatian banks. Moreover, 
banks do not take operational risk into account. 
That said, given that banks have capital ratios 
in  excess  of  regulatory  requirements,  they 
appear sufficiently well capitalized to withstand 
shocks related to operational and market risk. 
Stress tests by the CNB using 2004 year-end 
data show that credit risk still poses the greatest 
threat to the Croatian banking system but that 
most banks would be able to tolerate substantial 
losses  arising  from  asset  deterioration. 
22  The  CNB  introduced  the  marginal  reserve  requirement  on 
external borrowing and then raised it several times to 55% in 
December 2005; it also increased the foreign exchange reserve 
requirement calculation base, allocated in kuna, from 42% to 
50% and reduced the remuneration rates on both the kuna and 
foreign exchange components of the reserve requirements.
Moreover, the stress tests find small banks to be 
even less vulnerable to credit risk shocks than 
the large banks. 
Foreign ownership may be seen as an additional 
shock  absorption  factor.  In  the  event  of 
idiosyncratic shocks, foreign banks are likely to 
have  sufficient  reserves  to  recapitalise  their 
comparatively  small  Croatian  subsidiaries. 
Both the reputation risk associated with letting 
a  subsidiary  fail  and  the  strategic  nature  of 
investments  in  this  region  may  provide  an 
incentive for them to do so. However, the extent 
to  which  this  would  happen  in  practice  also 
depends on the internal risk and profitability 
assessment of the parent bank.
4.3  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Croatia’s  main  macroeconomic  challenge 
relates  to  the  external  factors.  Export 
performance is highly dependent on tourism, 
and Croatian exports have been relatively slow 
in penetrating major export markets. This raises 
concerns about medium-term competitiveness 
and may have an impact on the current account. 
It is therefore important to contain the growing 
external debt (including from banks), which is 
associated with rapid capital inflows. Monetary 
policy has, however, little room for manoeuvre, 
given  the  tightly  managed  floating  exchange 
rate  regime  and  the  high  degree  to  which 
financial assets and liabilities are denominated 
in foreign currency, particularly in euro. Against 
this background, the CNB has adopted a series 
of  restrictive  administrative  and  prudential 
measures to curb foreign borrowing by banks 
and domestic credit growth. Since such measures 
tend to be circumvented, fiscal policy ought to 
play  a  greater  role  in  the  macroeconomic 
adjustment  process  in  order  to  moderate  the 
impact of the sizeable capital inflows. 
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The Croatian financial sector is largely bank-
based, private and foreign-owned and relatively 
concentrated.  Rapid  credit  growth  has  been 
associated with a decrease in the net foreign 
asset position of banks. Claims on the corporate 
sector are high, but have been falling vis-à-vis 
the household sector, due to the cross-border 
and non-bank financing of enterprises. Banking 
sector assets and liabilities are predominantly 
denominated in or indexed to foreign currency, 
mostly the euro. 
The prime risk the banking sector is exposed to 
is credit risk. The common indicators of asset 
quality are still positive, but credit risk may be 
rising due to high credit growth. Despite the 
restrictive measures taken by the CNB, credit 
growth to the household sector has remained 
high, leading to rapidly rising debt levels and 
an  increasing  debt  service  burden.  This  is 
indicative of a considerable increase in credit 
risk, as most of the interest and exchange rate 
risk  has  been  passed  on  to  borrowers. 
Consequently,  market  risks  are  likely  to 
resurface  through  credit  risk  in  the  event  of 
serious shocks. Against this background it is 
reassuring that the Croatian banking sector is 
well-placed to absorb shocks due to its relatively 
high profitability and capitalisation.
5   TURKEY
5.1  MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND 
VULNERABILITIES
Development of Turkey’s external environment
With  total  trade  in  goods  and  services 
representing  roughly  60%  of  GDP, Turkey  is 
somewhat more closed than most of the current 
EU  members,  although  it  has  opened  up 
significantly  over  the  past  ten  years.  The 
geographical composition of international trade 
has  been  quite  stable.  The  EU  is  Turkey’s 
principal  trading  partner  and  accounts  for 
roughly half of its international trade. 
While external demand is likely to grow in line 
with the EU economy, Turkey has recently faced 
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an adverse external trade environment. Turkey’s 
trade  balance  has  recently  deteriorated  as  a 
result of specific terms-of-trade shocks, both 
on the import and export sides of the current 
account.  On  the  importing  side,  Turkey  has 
suffered from the elevated oil and energy prices, 
and  on  the  exporting  side,  textiles,  which 
account for 30% of total export earnings and 
contribute  about  10%  of  output,  have  shown 
signs  of  stress  following  the  elimination  of 
international textile quotas in early 2005.
External balances have therefore deteriorated. 
The combination of an appreciating lira with 
specific terms-of-trade shocks has contributed 
to a widening current account deficit (6.3% of 
GDP in 2005). However, export profit margins 
have been well above pre-crisis levels, while 
some of the adverse exchange rate dynamics are 
being  offset  by  subdued  wage  developments 
and strong productivity growth. 
However, like most emerging market economies, 
Turkey  benefited  from  improved  financing 
conditions over the past years. A continuous 
strengthening of macroeconomic fundamentals 
and improving prospects for EU accession have 
also contributed to the improvement in financing 
conditions,  as  illustrated  by  credit  rating 
upgrades from Standard & Poor’s and Fitch in 
late 2004 and early 2005 respectively, the sharp 43
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decline in Turkish bond spreads (see Chart 5.1) 
and  strong  capital  inflows.  Against  this 
background,  capital  inflows  have  reached  an 
all-time high of more than USD 40 billion in 
2005,  thereby  amply  financing  the  current 
account  deficit,  though  capital  inflows  have 
been  mostly  of  a  debt-creating  nature  rather 
than FDI. 
Development of Turkey’s domestic  
macroeconomic environment
Following  a  crisis  in  2001,  Turkey’s  robust 
growth  record  has  been  underpinned  by 
improved  macroeconomic  policies.  Over  the 
period  2002-05,  average  economic  growth 
exceeded 7% per annum. Since the crisis, the 
Turkish authorities have adhered to a primary 
surplus target of 6.5% of GDP (which is the 
cornerstone of IMF conditionality). This policy 
has  helped  to  reduce  Turkey’s  net  public 
indebtedness that, in the face of a costly banking 
sector recapitalisation, peaked at over 90% of 
GDP  in  2001.  Continued  fiscal  restraint  has 
also  contributed  to  strong  disinflation,  from 
nearly 100% in 2000 to within a single digit 
range, despite the sharp depreciation of the lira 
in 2001. Besides the strengthening of budgetary 
Chart 5.2 Turkey: Net Public Sector Debt 
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discipline, other contributing factors have been 
wage  restraint  in  the  public  sector,  a  switch 
from  backward  to  forward-looking  wage 
indexation,  the  increasing  credibility  of  the 
price stability objective of the Central Bank of 
the  Republic  of  Turkey  (CBRT)  and  the 
strengthening  of  the  Turkish  lira  from  2002 
onwards. Against this background, the CBRT 
has eased policy interest rates in line with the 
decline in inflation expectations.
Public  debt  sustainability  analyses  highlight 
Turkey’s exposure to financial market conditions. 
Analysis conducted by the IMF suggests that 
under a baseline scenario of economic growth 
of  5%,  continued  adherence  to  an  ambitious 
surplus target of 6.5% of GDP and real interest 
rates of 8%, the public debt ratio would show a 
rapid downward trend. However, a combination 
of shocks would severely threaten public debt 
sustainability (see Chart 5.2). Moreover, under 
a scenario of policy complacency, in which the 
primary balance is permanently reduced to 4% 
of GDP, privatisation is cancelled, real interest 
rates  rise  by  four  percentage  points  and 
economic  growth  slows  down  to  2.5%  per 
annum, public debt would rise steadily.
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Continued commitment to sound macroeconomic 
policies  remains  crucial  for  ensuring  debt 
sustainability  and  further  inflation  reduction 
(see  Chart  5.3).  The  current  level  of  gross 
public  indebtedness  is  still  relatively  high  at 
more  than  70%  of  GDP  in  2005,  and  debt 
interest payments still accounted for more than 
50% of total tax revenue in 2004. Furthermore, 
a large fraction of the public sector debt stock 
is  indexed,  either  to  the  exchange  rate  or  to 
overnight interest rates. This implies that public 
debt  sustainability  largely  depends  on  the 
prevailing financing conditions. Owing to the 
benign financing conditions, real interest rates 
have dropped to 7-8%. This is historically low 
for Turkey, but still high in comparison with the 
other  EU  acceding  and  candidate  countries, 
highlighting  the  continued  importance  of 
confidence-inspiring  economic  policies  and 
strict compliance with the structural benchmarks 
agreed in Turkey’s programme with the IMF.
Since the crisis in 2001, the Turkish authorities 
have made significant headway in restructuring 
the financial sector, but now face the additional 
challenge of buoyant credit growth. While real 
interest rates remain high, they have declined 
substantially prompting a surge in the demand 
for credit. Notwithstanding the much improved 
health of the financial sector, the acceleration 
of private sector credit growth presents a major 
challenge for the Turkish authorities, not least 
because of its stimulating effect on domestic 
demand  and  the  consequent  widening  of  the 
current  account  deficit.  This  development 
warrants intensive monitoring, since experience 
shows  that  a  substantial  proportion  of  credit 
booms end in a banking crisis. However, in the 
case of Turkey, there are some mitigating factors 
at play. First, at 25% of GDP, Turkey’s ratio of 
private credit to GDP is significantly lower than 
in  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries. 
Second, rapid credit growth may be interpreted 
as an indication that the Turkish commercial 
banking  sector  is  reorienting  its  activities 
towards  the  private  sector.  In  the  preceding 
decade,  commercial  lending  was  almost 
marginalised,  as  the  share  of  government 
Chart 5.4 Turkey: Current account and net 
capital flows 
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securities in the banking system’s total assets 
reached 60%, thereby crowding out the provision 
of credit to the private sector.
Despite record capital inflows, macroprudential 
indicators  of  the  economy’s  liquidity  and 
solvency suggest a number of vulnerabilities. 
The current account deficit is amply financed 
by record capital inflows (see Chart 5.4), but 
several developments warrant vigilance. First, 
short-term debt-creating inflows constitute the 
lion’s share of total capital inflows into Turkey. 
However, reflecting new arrangements in the 
investment environment (including an FDI law 
aimed at ensuring the equal treatment of foreign 
and  domestic  investors  that  was  approved  in 
June 2003), the composition of capital inflows 
has recently displayed some improvement, as 
FDI has increased from traditionally low levels. 
Second,  conventional  solvency  and  liquidity 
indicators  indicate  some  vulnerability.  At 
roughly 50% of GDP, the level of gross external 
indebtedness is relatively high compared with 
other  emerging  market  economies.  Debt 
servicing obligations expressed as a share of 
total exports are also relatively high, at around 45
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60%. Turning to liquidity indicators, short-term 
external debt (debt with a residual maturity of 
less  than  one  year)  is  not  fully  covered  by 
international  reserves.  However,  reserve 
coverage  is  increasing,  reflecting  significant 
central  bank  purchases  amounting  to 
USD 21 billion in 2005. This is an encouraging 
development  given  that  Turkey  will  have  to 
make significant repayments to the IMF in the 
near future and that private short-term external 
debt has been rising. 
5.2  THE TURKISH BANKING SECTOR
STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENTS
The Turkish banking sector before the crises  
of 2000 and 2001
Turkey’s  recent  financial  history  has  been 
marked  by  repeated  crises,  most  recently  in 
2000  and  2001.  During  the  1990s,  Turkey’s 
macroeconomic situation was characterised by 
volatile  growth,  high  inflation  and  an  ever 
increasing  debt  problem.  To  address  the 
situation,  an  IMF-backed  disinflation 
programme based on an exchange rate anchor 
was introduced at the start of 2000. However, 
during  2000  and  2001,  the  Turkish  banking 
sector,  which  constitutes  over  90%  of  the 
Turkish financial sector, experienced two severe 
crises that had far-reaching consequences for 
the  rest  of  the  economy.  In  mid-2000,  the 
government took steps towards addressing some 
of the problems in the banking sector, including 
the  provision  of  subsidised  credit  to  various 
political constituencies by state-owned banks, 
which resulted in “duty losses” that had to be 
covered by the government. Despite the reform 
efforts,  volatility  in  international  capital 
markets and deteriorating economic conditions 
in Turkey resulted in significant losses in the 
banking system. In November 2000, Demirbank, 
a medium-sized private bank, was unable to roll 
over its overnight liabilities and liquidated large 
quantities  of  government  securities.  The 
following collapse in the value of government 
bonds prompted creditors to refuse to roll over 
overnight  credit,  which  triggered  a  capital 
outflow and a sharp fall in Turkey’s international 
reserves.
The  banking  crisis  culminated  in  a  currency 
crisis  which  only  abated  when  the  exchange 
rate was freely floated. In December 2000, the 
IMF  and  the Turkish  authorities  agreed  on  a 
rescue package in order to avoid the unravelling 
of the existing disinflation programme, but the 
respite was short-lived. Inflation did not come 
down as quickly as initially planned, which put 
into  question  the  crawling  peg  and  the  pre-
arranged and gradually widening exchange rate 
path.  In  addition,  foreign  investors  withdrew 
from  the Turkish  market  due  to  the  political 
uncertainty  and  fears  that  the  stabilisation 
policies may be reversed. On 22 February 2001, 
the authorities floated the Turkish lira to avoid 
further reserve losses. Bank runs were avoided 
thanks  to  the  announcement  of  a  blanket 
guarantee  protecting  depositors  and  other 
creditors in banks (except shareholders’ equity 
and subordinated debt).
New beginnings: the structure of the Turkish 
banking sector after 2001
Following  the  crisis,  a  costly  but  successful 
bank restructuring process was launched with 
the support of the IMF and the World Bank. This 
substantial restructuring process consisted of 
four pillars: (i) the restructuring of the state-
owned banks; (ii) the resolution of the banks 
transferred  to  the  Savings  Deposit  Insurance 
Fund  (SDIF);  (iii)  the  strengthening  of  the 
privately owned banks; and (iv) reforming the 
regulatory  and  supervisory  environment  to 
enhance surveillance of the sector. All in all, 
the process cost slightly over USD 47 billion, 
or over 30% of GDP (2003). 
Given  the  limited  level  of  financial 
intermediation, there is considerable potential 
for the development of core banking activities. 
The total size of Turkish banking sector assets 
over GDP only stood at 69% at the end of 2003, 
and  72%  at  the  end  of  2004,  which  is  low 
compared  with  the  EU-15  and  the  new  EU 
Member States. By the end of 2004, liquidations, 
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mergers  and  acquisitions  had  reduced  the 
number of banks in the Turkish banking sector 
from 81 at the end of 1999 to 48, representing 
91.4% of total financial sector assets (or 85% 
of  assets  including  financial  investment 
companies and mutual funds). At the same time, 
the share of the five largest banks represented 
60% of total banking sector assets compared 
with 48% at the end of 2000.
The Turkish banking sector still has a significant 
presence of state-owned banks (see Table 5.1), 
which  make  up  31%  of  total  banking  sector 
assets. Privately owned commercial banks have 
increased their share to 59% (as of September 
2005), largely at the expense of banks managed 
by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). 
Out of a total of 21 banks that had been taken 
over by the SDIF because they had become a 
risk for banking system stability, 20 have been 
either merged, sold or in one case liquidated. 
Foreign interest in the Turkish banking sector 
has  increased  and  may  lead  to  further 
consolidation  in  the  sector.  Mergers  and 
acquisitions may continue in the near future, 
partly  due  to  increased  interest  from  foreign 
banks,  which  have  already  acquired  majority 
stakes in some Turkish banks. This interest has 
long been subdued because of the vulnerabilities 
and  risks  in  the  sector,  coupled  with  the 
particular ownership structure of Turkish banks. 
Privately owned banks are predominantly owned 
by  family  conglomerates,  which  have 
traditionally been more interested in extending 
credit  to  related  enterprises  and  holding 
Table 5.1 The structure of the Turkish banking sector in 2005 1) 
  Number of   Share of total  Share of total  Share of total 
  institutions    assets in %   loans in %   deposits in %
State-owned commercial banks  3  31.4  20.0  37.7
Privately owned commercial banks  17  59.0  67.0  57.0
Foreign-owned commercial banks  13  5.7  7.5  5.3
SDIF banks  1  0.5  0.0  0.0
Non-depository banks  13  3.4  5.5  0.0
Total  47  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Banks Association of Turkey. 
1) As of September.
Treasury  bills,  rather  than  developing  core 
banking activities. However, as the restructuring 
of  the  sector  proceeds,  foreign  interest  has 
gathered momentum. 
Consolidation has also taken place in the state-
owned banks. Following the crises in 2000 and 
2001, two state-owned banks (Emlak and Ziraat) 
were  merged,  and  all  state-owned  banking 
activities were rationalised. State-owned banks 
nevertheless continue to play an important part 
in the Turkish banking sector.
Asset structure
The asset structure of the banking sector has 
changed significantly since the financial crisis. 
Increased macroeconomic stability, more stable 
sources of funding and easier access to working 
capital  have  contributed  to  a  gradual 
restructuring  of  the  banking  sector’s  asset 
structure. One of the main elements of change 
has been the shift to core banking activities, 
which resulted in credit growth  to the private 
sector of around 50% in 2004 and 40% in 2005. 
Consequently, the share of loans in total assets 
increased from 26.5% at the end of 2001, their 
lowest  level  since  2000,  to  37.5%,  as  of 
September 2005 (see Table 5.2).
Government securities still dominate the asset 
side of state-owned banks but not any more in 
the case of private banks. While government 
securities still dominate the asset side of the 
banking sector as a whole, this largely reflects 
the  banking  restructuring  process  and  the 
reimbursement  of  ‘duty  losses’  incurred  by 47
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Table 5.2 Asset structure of the Turkish banking sector in 2005 1) 
  Turkish banking sector  State-owned banks  Privately owned banks
  in % of total assets  in % of total assets  in % of total assets
Cash and central bank balances  2.8  2.7  3.2
Due from banks  6.2  5.5  5.1
Securities  39.9  57.7  33.4
Loans  37.5  23.8  42.6
Other assets  13.6  10.3  15.7
  Reserve deposits  3.9  3.5  4.3
  Accrued interest and income receivable  2.6  2.5  2.8
  Property and equipment  2.5  2.1  2.9
  Subsidiaries (net)  2.7  0.7  4.0
  Investment and associates  0.4  0.1  0.7
  Other  1.5  1.4  1.0
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Banks Association of Turkey. 
1) As of September.
state-owned  banks  through  government 
securities. In contrast, the asset side of privately 
owned banks is dominated by loans, and not by 
securities.
As banks shift to core banking activities, the 
maturity of assets has increased. Owing to the 
increased  macroeconomic  stability  and  more 
stable sources of funding banks have felt more 
comfortable  investing  in  longer-term  assets, 
sparking  a  decline  in  liquidity.  Other  assets 
consist  mainly  of  reserve  deposits,  accrued 
interest  and  income  receivable,  and  property 
and equipment. 
In addition, there has been a shift in the currency 
structure of assets away from foreign currencies. 
Owing to high inflation rates, and especially 
during times of distress, Turkish banks preferred 
foreign-exchange-denominated  assets. 
Following  the  restructuring  of  the  banking 
sector,  the  Turkish  lira/foreign  exchange 
composition  has  altered  in  favour  of  assets 
denominated  in  local  currency. The  share  of 
Turkish lira-denominated assets grew from 51% 
at the end of 2001 to 66% by September 2005.  
Liability structure
The liability structure of the banking sector has 
also undergone significant changes in the past 
few years. Increased confidence in the banking 
sector has led to an overall rise in the volume of 
deposits.  There  is,  however,  a  distinction 
between the state-owned and privately owned 
banks:  while  the  share  of  deposits  in  total 
liabilities  of  the  privately  owned  banks  has 
declined, it has increased in total liabilities of 
the state-owned banks.
However, deposits still have predominantly a 
short-term  maturity.  As  of  September  2005, 
deposits of up to one month constituted 44% of 
total deposits, while deposits of one to three 
months represented 39%. A notable development 
is the reduction in the share of foreign exchange 
deposits, which had declined to 39% of total 
deposits by September 2005, down from 60% at 
the end of 2001.
Interbank funding has decreased for the banking 
sector as a whole, though it has increased for 
private  banks,  reflecting  their  shift  to  core 
banking activities. Interbank funding consists 
predominantly of funds borrowed from foreign 
banks  and  funds  provided  under  repurchase 
agreements. Funds borrowed from the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey were negligible 
by the end of 2005. For the banking sector as a 
whole, interbank funding decreased considerably 
after  the  2000  and  2001  crises,  from  around 
25% of total assets in 2000 to around 15% in 
September 2005 (see Table 5.3). For the state-
owned banks, the share of interbank funding is 
substantially lower, but for the privately-owned 
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banks it has in fact risen to close to 20% of total 
assets,  as  increased  macroeconomic  stability 
has  also  made  it  easier  for  them  to  obtain 
interbank  funding  through  syndication  and 
securitisation  loans  in  the  international 
market.23
The  restructuring  process  has  also  led  to 
increases  in  the  capitalisation  of  banks. 
Shareholders’  equity  has  more  than  doubled 
since the 2000 and 2001 crises, growing from 
7% of total assets at the end of 2000 to 13% as 
of September 2005 (see Table 5.3). Both the 
state-owned  banks  and  the  privately  owned 
banks have been recapitalised, with the latter 
being  asked  to  increase  equity  by  a  total  of 
USD 2.7 billion between 2001 and 2003. This 
helps to explain why the privately owned banks 
are  significantly  better  capitalised  than  the 
state-owned banks. 
There  has  been  a  move  away  from  foreign 
currencies  in  the  currency  composition  of 
liabilities. In line with the dedollarisation of the 
asset  side,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the 
share  of  liabilities  denominated  in  local 
currency, from 44% at the end of 2001 to 63% 
as of September 2005. 
Banking sector profitability
Following  the  crisis,  the  banking  sector  has 
returned to profit since 2002. The crisis years 
saw  very  large  losses  in  the  banking  sector. 
Since  then,  profitability  has  picked  up,  with 
Table 5.3 Liability structure of the Turkish banking sector in 2005 1) 
  Turkish banking sector  State-owned banks  Privately owned banks
  in % of total assets  in % of total assets  in % of total assets
Deposits  63.4  76.0  61.3
Due from banks  15.3  5.1  19.7
Shareholders’ equity  13.0  9.4  12.2
Other liabilities  8.3  9.5  6.8
  Miscellaneous payables  2.2  1.1  2.5
  Funds  1.5  4.5  0.0
  Provisions  2.0  2.2  1.8
  Other external resources  1.2  0.6  1.3
  Other    1.4  1.1  1.2
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Banks Association of Turkey. 
1) As of September.
return on equity and return on assets standing 
at 9% and 1% for the banking sector as a whole, 
as of September 2005 (see Table 5.4). State-
owned banks outperformed the privately owned 
banks in 2003 and 2004, in terms of both return 
on assets and return on equity, due to their lower 
levels of capital and their dominant position in 
the  sector,  which  gives  them  easy  access  to 
relatively cheap funding (deposits).
Profitability has been helped by the maturity 
structure  of  the  banking  sector’s  assets  and 
liabilities. As interest expenses decreased more 
rapidly than interest income, net interest income 
increased for the sector as a whole. This is due 
to the fact that short-term deposits (0-3 months) 
are  the  main  source  of  funding  for  Turkish 
banks. Hence, the average maturity of interest 
rate sensitive liabilities is shorter than that of 
interest rate sensitive assets. Consequently, any 
decrease in interest rates has a positive effect on 
the sector’s profitability.
23  Interbank funding played its part during the November 2000 
crisis, as one of the main triggers was the emergence of liquidity 
problems in Demirbank, which, at the time, was the sixth largest 
privately  owned  bank.  Banks  like  Demirbank  invested 
increasingly  in  longer-term  investments  to  compensate  for 
falling interest rates, and hence falling interest rate income. 
These longer-term investments, however, were financed through 
short-term funding. When (short-term) interest rates rose, and 
funding became increasingly expensive, Demirbank was forced 
to sell government securities at a loss to maintain liquidity. 
When the main banks realised this, they cut interbank credit 
lines, and overnight interest rates soared. In December 2000, the 
Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) took over 
Demirbank and transferred it to the Savings Deposit Insurance 
Fund (SDIF).49
ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 48
July 2006
Interest earned on securities remains the largest 
source of banks’ income, but interest income 
from loans and other sources have nevertheless 
increased.  Net  interest  income  is  the  main 
source of income in the Turkish banking sector, 
mainly reflecting interest income from banks’ 
securities portfolios and interest income from 
loans.  Interest  expenses  are  dominated  by 
interests  paid  on  deposits.  Interest  income 
increased slightly in nominal terms from 2003 
to 2005, while interest expenses declined. As a 
result,  net  interest  income  increased  both  in 
nominal and relative terms. At the same time, 
the  share  of  non-interest  income  in  total 
operating income increased from around 20% at 
the end of 1999 to more than 30% in September 
2005  mainly  due  to  the  rise  in  fees  and 
commissions  income  linked  inter  alia  to  the 
development  of  the  credit  card  business, 
particularly for privately owned banks.
The restructuring of the banking sector has also 
led  to  lower  operating  costs. Total  operating 
expenses  over  total  assets  have  decreased 
significantly  since  2001  due,  among  other 
things,  to  decreasing  provisioning  needs  for 
non-performing  loans  (NPLs).  Especially 
during 2001, provisions for NPLs ballooned to 
76.7% of total operating income (see Table 5.4) 
as a result of the crisis. 
Table 5.4 Profitability of the Turkish banking sector 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 1)
Total operating income in %  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
of which in % of total operating income:
  net interest income  76.9  158.3  64.3  48.1  67.2  65.5
  net fees and commissions income  15.1  14.8  11.1  11.5  15.1  17.1
  net trading income  -29.4  -90.1  4.5  28.5  8.8  7.9
  other operating income  37.4  17.0  20.1  12.0  9.0  9.5
Total operating expenses as % of total operating income  141.4  148.8  73.5  60.1  55.8  70.1
of which in % of total operating income:
  provisions for NPLs and other receivables  25.0  76.7  24.7  14.6  14.0  19.9
  personnel expenses  36.5  n.a.  18.0  17.1  17.7  n.a.
  other operating expenses  80.0  72.1  30.8  28.5  24.2  50.2
Return on assets  -3.0  -5.7  1.1  2.2  2.1  1.1
Return on equity  -62.4  -58.4  9.2  15.8  14.0  8.6
Source: Banks Association of Turkey. 
1) As of September.
Following the 2000 and 2001 crises, the state-
owned  banks  closed  branches  and  made 
significant cuts in personnel. While both their 
number  of  branches  and  personnel  have 
increased again, they are still far below their 
pre-crisis  levels. The  privately  owned  banks, 
however, have continued opening new branches 
and have substantially increased their number 
of personnel, in line with the growth in core 
banking  activities,  and  especially  consumer 
lending.
RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITIES
Credit risk
In  line  with  the  recent  shift  to  core  banking 
activities, the credit risk linked to the private 
sector has risen. The increase in the share of 
loans in total assets has added another dimension 
to the credit risk borne by the banking sector, 
which  was  traditionally  overly  dependent  on 
government securities for revenue generation. 
Credit demand stems from large corporations, 
SMEs and consumers, as around 95% of loans 
are extended to the private sector. The latter two 
categories,  however,  have  historically  played 
only a marginal role in banks’ loan portfolios. 
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This rapid increase in consumer lending may 
potentially  impact  the  quality  of  the  loan 
portfolio. Credit cards and consumer loans have 
accounted  for  31.9%  of  total  lending  as  of 
September 2005, higher than loans for working 
capital (14.5%), and export loans (12.1%). This 
is not surprising given the marketing of credit 
cards over the past few years. The number of 
credit cards issued was slightly under 27 million 
at the end of 2004. With a population of around 
70 million, this amounts to around 386 credit 
cards  per  1,000  persons.  Such  high  growth 
Table 5.5 Turkey: Selected banking sector stability indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005/Q3
Risks
Credit risk
Domestic credit growth (annual percentage change) 1)  63.9  100.6  29.0  18.3  21.2  16.1
Real domestic credit growth (annual percentage change) 2)  24.9  32.0  -0.8  2.2  11.8  8.1
Credit growth to the private sector (annual percentage change) 3)  72.1  22.7  10.2  44.6  52.8  41.3
Real credit growth to the private sector (annual percentage change) 2)  33.1  -45.8  -19.6  28.5  43.4  33.3
Credit growth to households (annual percentage change) 4)  208.4  -27.9  34.4  95.8  103.4  69.0
Growth of consumer housing loans (annual percentage change)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  90.2  297.0
Non-performing loans (in % of total loans)  11.1  25.2  17.6  11.5  6.0  5.4
Past due loans (in % of total assets)  3.8  4.3  4.9  3.5  2.1
Share of foreign currency loans in total loans  (in %)  43.4  58.7  57.6  46.3  36.5  30.9
Share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits (in %)  46.1  59.7  57.9  49.3  44.8  39.3
Growth of foreign liabilities (annual percentage change)  58.0  -7.0  9.7  20.7  37.3  51.7
Share of foreign liabilities in total liabilities  26.5  20.7  18.5  15.3  15.0  17.8
Market risk
Interest rate risk
  Net interest income in % of average assets    11.0  6.4  4.5  6.2
  Net non-interest income in % of average assets    4.0  4.0  3.2  2.9
Forex risk
  FX assets (as a percentage of FX liabilities)  75.9  88.2  91.9  90.7  91.7  90.7
  FX assets (as a percentage of total assets)  35.3  49.2  46.4  39.3  36.8  33.7
  FX liabilities (as a percentage of total liabilities)  46.5  55.8  50.4  43.3  40.1  37.2
  Open FX position in % of total balance sheet assets  -3.6  -0.1  -0.4  0.0  -0.1
Liquidity risk
  Liquid assets (as a percentage of total assets)  32.2  31.0  34.3  38.8  37.4  39.1
  Ratio of loans to deposits 4)      35.5  42.6  52.0  61.7
  Liquid assets (as a percentage of short-term liabilities)  n.a.  81.1  75.1  80.5  84.3  82.7
Shock-absorbing factors
Net interest margin between loans and deposits (percentage points)  4.8  10.5  2.1  0.8  5.7
Loan loss provisions (as a percentage of non-performing loans)  63.1  49.0  64.2  88.5  88.1  89.6
Capital adequacy ratio     21.0  25.6  31.0  28.8  23.3
Memo
Number of banks (foreign-owned)  79  61 (15)  54 (15)  50 (13)  48 (13)  47 (13)
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (in %)  3  3  3  3  3  6
Sources: CBRT, BRSA, Banks Association of Turkey and IMF.
1) Domestic credit from banking survey. 
2) Deflated using CPI. 
3) Claims on private sector by deposit money banks. 
4) Latest value: 2005/H1
figures, however, are not sustainable and the 
credit  card  segment  seems  to  have  become 
saturated. 
New areas of lending, such as mortgages, may 
also see fast growth in the future. With the rapid 
decline in inflation and a decrease in interest 
rates, mortgage lending has now become a real 
option. The Turkish  mortgage  market  is  still 
very small, and represented only 0.2% of GDP 
in 2003 and 0.6% in 2004. Commercial banks 
expect this to have increased to 6% by the end 51
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of 2008. In response to these developments, a 
new  law  on  mortgage  lending  is  under 
consideration.
Historically, NPLs have been a key problem for 
the Turkish banking sector. In the past, it faced 
three kinds of problem with NPLs, namely those 
linked to related party lending, those of state-
owned  banks  and  those  of  privately-owned 
banks due to the economic downturn following 
the  2000  and  2001  crises.  The  restructuring 
programme that followed the crises addressed 
these issues. Related party lending was restricted 
by a new regulation, and the state-owned banks 
were recapitalised to improve the provisioning 
of  NPLs.  The  NPLs  of  the  privately  owned 
banks were addressed as part of the “Istanbul 
Approach”,  a  voluntary  framework  aimed  at 
facilitating  the  debt  restructuring  of  mainly 
large  corporate  borrowers.  As  a  result,  the 
overall ratio of NPLs decreased substantially to 
around  5%  of  gross  loans  in  2005  (as  of 
September) compared with 25% of total loans 
in 2001. At the same time, loan loss provisions 
increased over the same period from 49% to 
almost 90% of non-performing loans.
The development of NPL ratios on new lending 
signals some potential for a future deterioration 
in credit quality. The NPL ratio for consumer 
loans remained stable at less than 1% at the end 
of 2004, but that ratio for credit cards increased 
rapidly in early 2005. This is not insignificant 
given  that  NPLs  linked  to  credit  cards 
represented 93% of total NPLs in consumer and 
credit card loans at the end of 2004.While the 
overall picture in terms of NPLs seems to be 
giving no direct cause for concern, given the 
relatively low levels of NPLs and the adequate 
provision coverage, they could increase again in 
the  future  if  the  indebtedness  of  households 
increases.
Market and liquidity risk
Interest  rate  risk  is  the  dominant  factor  in 
market  risk,  followed  by  exchange  rate  risk. 
Owing  to  the  continuing  decline  in  interest 
rates, Turkish banks prefer short-term funding. 
Indeed,  since  2003,  the  cost  of  funding  has 
decreased substantially, and banks expect this 
trend to continue. At the same time, as discussed 
above,  the  maturity  of  loans  is  increasing. 
Consequently,  there  is  a  maturity  mismatch 
which is still rising. Fixed interest rate loans 
have also increased in the past few years to 86% 
of  total  loans  at  the  end  of  2004.  Moreover, 
interest income has been declining relative to 
non-interest income (see Table 5.4). This leaves 
the  Turkish  banking  sector  vulnerable  to  an 
adverse interest rate shock, especially when the 
spread  between  average  lending  and  funding 
rates becomes smaller. 
Since the losses after the floating of the Turkish 
lira, banks’ exposure to exchange rate risk has 
been  greatly  reduced.  Prior  to  the  2000-01 
crisis, the banking sector viewed the exchange 
rate risk as limited, as the lira was pegged and 
the  Central  Bank  of  the  Republic  of Turkey 
intervened  to  stabilise  the  exchange  rate. 
Consequently, many banks borrowed in foreign 
exchange and lent in domestic currency at high 
rates  (including  to  the  Treasury),  leading  to 
large open positions. When the lira was floated, 
the sector incurred significant foreign exchange 
losses. The subsequent gradual restructuring of 
the banking sector has led to a decrease in the 
exchange rate risk borne by the sector and, by 
the end of 2004, the exchange rate positions in 
the  banking  sector  were  broadly  in 
equilibrium.
Liquidity is ample and liquidity ratios appear 
to  be  improving.  Liquid  assets  have  been 
increasing both as a percentage of total assets 
and  as  a  percentage  of  short-term  liabilities. 
Cash and cash equivalent assets stood at around 
8% of total assets in September 2005. The ratio 
of  assets  to  liabilities  based  on  remaining 
maturities, however, has declined, due to banks’ 
preference for short-term funding in the light of 
declining interest rates and increasing longer-
term  lending  because  of  macroeconomic 
stability.
Shock-absorbing factors
The Turkish banking sector has increased its 
shock absorption capacity since the 2000 and 
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2001 crises. Profitability levels appear to be 
adequate and more sustainable in the long run, 
in contrast to the profits of the 1990s that 
stemmed from the government’s unsustainable 
financing needs. The capital adequacy ratio 
stood at 23% as of September 2005. 
Stress tests suggest that banks would be able to 
cope with a deterioration in the quality of their 
loan portfolio. Calculations by the Central Bank 
of the Republic of Turkey suggest that an 
increase in the NPL ratio from its current level 
of around 5% to 21% of total loans would 
reduce the capital adequacy ratio to 18.8%, still 
comfortably above the minimum level required. 
Under this scenario, all new NPLs are deemed 
to fall in the 100% risk weight group. Hence, 
the scenario analysis shows that the sector’s 
shareholders’ equity levels are sufficient to 
cover credit risk.
Progress has been made in strengthening the 
regulatory and supervisory framework. The 
authorities responsible for supervising and 
regulating the financial sector are the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), 
the Under-Secretariat of the Treasury under the 
Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey and 
the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB). 
Following the 2000 and 2001 crises, the BRSA 
overhauled the regulatory and supervisory 
framework, bringing it more up to date with 
best practices. As a result, supervision has 
improved considerably, so that some of the main 
problems leading to the 2000 and 2001 crises 
should be able to be avoided in the future.
5.3   SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
A key challenge for Turkey is to reduce the 
current account deficit that has resulted from 
strong domestic demand, capital inflows and 
the (real) appreciation of the lira. This is 
particularly important given the unfavourable 
maturity structure of external debt. In addition, 
the level and the structure of public debt still 
constitute a source of vulnerability, highlighting 
the importance of continued strict adherence to 
sound fiscal policies.
The Turkish financial sector is showing signs of 
increasing confidence: the portion of assets and 
liabilities in local currency is rising and there 
is growing foreign interest in Turkish banks, 
although the share of assets held by foreign-
owned banks is still comparatively small. In 
addition, banks are increasingly shifting from 
simply transforming deposits into government 
security holdings to core banking activities, i.e. 
lending to the corporate and household sectors. 
Consequently, credit has been growing rapidly 
and the maturity of assets has been 
lengthening. 
Credit risk is rising due to strong credit growth, 
particularly in consumer lending and credit 
cards.  Moreover, new products are being 
introduced and hence creating potential for a 
build-up of non-performing loans. Interest rate 
risk is also rising, as declining interest rates are 
giving banks an incentive to continue to borrow 
short-term, exacerbating maturity mismatches. 
In addition, market risk related to Treasury bill 
holdings is still significant. At the same time, 
the sector has increased its shock absorption 
capacity in terms of profitability and 
capitalisation.53
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Table SF1.1 Assets of financial institutions at the end of 2005 
  Bulgaria  Croatia 1)  Romania  Turkey
Share of total assets (in %)
Banks   85.8  81.6  84.2  86.8
Investment funds    -  2.2  0.3  6.3 3)
Financial investment companies   -  -  3.3 2)  0.5
Insurance companies   3.3  5.2  3.5  2.8
Pension funds   2.9  2.9  -  0.3
Leasing companies    4.3  5.7  6.8  1.2
Other  3.7  2.4  1.8  2.1
Total    100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Total assets (EUR billions)   19.6  36.2  42.1  294.9
Memo: GDP (EUR billions)     21.4  27.7  79.3  286.7
  Total  assets’ share of GDP (in %)   91.3  130.7  53.2  102.7
  Bank assets’ share of GDP (in %)   78.3  106.6  44.8  89.0
Sources: IMF, Bulgarian National Bank, National Bank of Romania, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Pre-Accession Economic 
Program, Croatia, December 2005, ECB.
1) Data is for end-2004.
2) Investment funds‘ assets, including the funds administrated by Assets Management Company which are not members of “The National 
Union for Collective Investment”. 
3) Mutual funds.
SPECIAL FEATURE 1: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Financial  markets  and  non-bank  financial 
institutions are still relatively underdeveloped 
in  the  acceding  and  candidate  countries. 
Although the banking sector remains the main 
pillar  for  financial  intermediation  in  these 
countries, in recent years, non-bank financial 
intermediation has increased substantially, via 
non-bank  financial  institutions  and  financial 
markets.  This  increase,  which  started  from 
initially low levels, can be attributed to, among 
other  things,  macroeconomic  stabilisation,  a 
favourable external environment and structural 
changes within the sectors themselves. Over the 
next few years, the strengthening of candidate 
countries’  convergence  efforts  with  the  EU 
economies is likely to have a positive effect on 
the non-bank financial sectors in the acceding 
and candidate countries.
1  NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS PLAY 
A SMALL BUT GROWING ROLE
Although the non-bank financial sectors of the 
acceding  and  candidate  countries  are  still 
smaller  than  those  of  Western  European 
countries, they have developed rapidly in recent 
years.  In  2005  the  assets  of  the  non-bank 
financial  institutions  in  the  acceding  and 
candidate countries was about 10-15% of total 
financial  sector  assets  (see  Table  SF1.1), 
compared with only 7-10% in 2001/02. Given 
the growth of the banking sector, this increase 
is particularly noteworthy. Efforts by regulators 
to curb banking sector credit growth may have 
shifted  some  lending  to  non-bank  financial 
institutions, particularly leasing companies.
Given the limited size of the non-bank financial 
sector, it is unlikely to have a determinant effect 
on the stability of the financial system. This is 
particularly the case for Bulgaria, which has the 
smallest  non-bank  financial  sector.  However, 
the non-bank financial sector in these countries 
is  generally  less  regulated  than  the  banking 
sector, and policy-makers should therefore be 
vigilant. To  prevent  regulatory  arbitrage,  the 
standards  for  supervision  and  regulation  of 
non-bank financial institutions should be kept 
in line with those of the banking sector.24
24  In Romania, a new law has become effective in January 2006, 
establishing  reporting  requirements  for  non-bank  financial 
institutions. While most of the application norms have been 
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2  DEVELOPMENTS IN BOND MARKETS
There has been a large flow of foreign capital 
into emerging markets in recent years, including 
into the acceding and candidate countries (see 
Chart  SF1.1).  The  Institute  of  International 
Finance (IIF) estimates that net bond inflows 
accounted for around one-quarter of total net 
inflows into Romania in 2005 and around one-
third of inflows into Turkey and Bulgaria. This 
partly  reflects  low  nominal  interest  rates  in 
mature markets and an associated reduction in 
risk aversion by investors. The increase in non-
resident holdings of Turkish government bonds 
is  notable,  particularly  in  the  domestic  bond 
market, where the share of non-resident holdings 
increased from 7% at the end of 2003 to around 
13% by the third quarter of 2005.
Debt markets in candidate countries have also 
benefited  from  a  series  of  sovereign  ratings 
upgrades and a favourable interest rate climate. 
Bulgaria  and Romania were granted investment-
grade status by Standard & Poor’s in 2005 (see 
Chart SF1.2), which has broadened their foreign 
investor base significantly. Together with the 
growing role of institutional investors within 
the acceding and candidate countries, this has 
enhanced  the  growth  potential  of  the  bond 
markets. Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Croatia 
have  taken  advantage  of  the  favourable 




1) Remaining emerging Europe consists of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia. Capital flows consist of 
direct  equity  investment,  portfolio  equity  investment, 
commercial banks, bonds and other financial securities.













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006




Chart SF1.2 Sovereign credit ratings 
 
Source: S&P.
1) S&P Long-term foreign currency credit ratings.






















Chart SF1.3 Euro EMBIG government bond 
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Chart SF1.4 Gross cumulative external 





















Chart SF1.5 Stock of outstanding 
government debt securities, 2005 
(in % of GDP)
Sources:  Dealogic,  BIS,  WEO,  national  treasuries,  central 
banks and Eurostat.
Note:  International  debt  securities  use  data  up  to  2005  Q3,   
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environment and declining interest rates (see 
Chart  SF1.3)  to  increase  their  external  bond 
issuance  (see  Chart  SF1.4).  However,  gross 
external issuance in Romania and Bulgaria has 
remained flat, despite ratings upgrades and a 
broadening of the investor base. Since 2004 the 
private sector has also increased its borrowing 
from abroad through bond finance, particularly 
in Turkey and Bulgaria, albeit from a very low 
base.
The relative sizes of the external sovereign bond 
markets in the acceding and candidate countries 
are comparable with those of the new Member 
States (around 5-15% of GDP, see Chart SF1.5). 
By  contrast,  domestic  bond  markets  in  the 
Table SF1.2  Total trading volume of 
domestic bonds 
(in USD millions)
  Bulgaria  Croatia   Romania 1)  Turkey
2001  0.5  85.2  0.0  37,297.0
2002  10.1  616.6  0.2  67,256.4
2003  41.1  1,617.8  5.1  144,421.6
2004  49.8  2,308.5  28.0  136,742.6
Mid-2005   89.3  1,973.4  35.7  201,028.8
Source: Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges.
1) Romania consists of municipal and corporate bonds. 
acceding  and  candidate  countries  (except 
Turkey)  are  smaller  and  less  developed  than 
those of the new Member States. Although the 
size  of  the  domestic  bond  markets  remains 
relatively  small  in  Romania,  Croatia  and 
Bulgaria, the significant increase in secondary 
market  activity  over  the  past  few  years  is 
indicative  of  financial  deepening  (see  Table 
SF1.2).  Since  2001  total  trading  volume  of 
domestic  bonds  has  increased  five-fold  in 
Turkey, 23-fold in Croatia, 179-fold in Bulgaria. 
Convergence with the EU should support further 
growth of domestic bond markets. The demand 
side also has growth potential as institutional 
investors are expected to play a greater role, as 
with the further development of the non-bank 
financial sector.
3  DEVELOPMENTS IN STOCK MARKETS
Stock  markets  have  benefited  from 
macroeconomic stabilisation and improvements 
in terms of regulation and structure. Relatively 
strong GDP growth rates and better prospects 
for EU accession have sustained stock market 
performance  in  the  acceding  and  candidate 
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prices were particularly strong in Bulgaria and 
Romania  during  2003-04,  with  stock  market 
indices  doubling,  whereas  in  2005  their 
Chart SF1.6 Development in stock indices 
 




























Chart SF1.7 Stock markets in selected new 
Member States 
















performance  was  more  mixed.  The  Turkish 
stock market has also exhibited strong index 
growth in recent years. Valuation effects have 
Table SF1.3 Selected stock market indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 3)
Bulgaria           
  Number of companies   503  399  354  338  371  331
  Market capitalisation (in USD millions)  573  507  713  1,734  2,801  5,912
  Market capitalisation (in % of GDP)  4.6  3.7  4.6  8.7  11.7  22.9
  Total volume (in USD millions)  58  70  155  154  466  …
Croatia 1)           
  Number of companies   61  45  71  175  180  …
  Market capitalisation (in USD millions)  2,712  3,068  3,805  6,069  10,952  12,837
  Market capitalisation (in % of GDP)  14.7  15.5  16.7  21.1  31.9  33.9
  Total volume (in USD millions)  185  116  145  224  294  …
Romania 2)           
  Number of companies   114  65  65  62  60  64
  Market capitalisation (in USD millions)  416  1,229  2,718  3,710  11,938  18,185
  Market capitalisation (in % of GDP)  1.3  3.3  6  6.2  13.9  19.5
  Total volume (in USD millions)  87  132  214  302  748  2673
Turkey           
  Number of companies   315  310  288  285  …  …
  Market capitalisation (in USD millions)  69,507  47,689  34,402  69,002  98,073  161,537
  Market capitalisation (in % of GDP)  35.1  33.3  18.8  28.6  32.4  45.7
  Total volume (in USD millions)  181,934  80,400  70,756  100,165  148,506  …
Sources: Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IMF and national central 
banks.
1) Zagreb Stock Exchange only. The market capitalisation of the stock exchange in Varazdin, which is not included, is around 35%  of 
Zagreb’s.
2) Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) only. The market capitalisation of the RASDAQ stock exchange, which is not included, is around 
20% of BSE’s. In November 2005 the two stock exchanges decided to merge, and accordingly the RASDAQ dissolves into BSE. 
3) Data is for 2005 Q2 only.57
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led to higher stock market capitalisation, which 
in  the  second  quarter  of  2005  accounted  for 
between 19.5% of GDP in Romania and 45.7% 
of GDP in Turkey (see Table SF1.3). In Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania, market capitalisation has 
risen steadily, more than doubling since 2000. 
In Turkey stock market capitalisation has now 
returned  to  levels  not  seen  since  the  2001 
financial  crisis.  In  all  four  countries,  stock 
market capitalisation is catching up with the 
new  Member  States,  which  have  an  average 
stock market capitalisation of just above 40% of 
GDP, but remains below the euro area average 
of 70% of GDP.
As  well  as  being  small,  stock  markets  in  the 
acceding and candidate countries have limited 
trading. This relatively minimal participation 
hinders substantial increases in market activity, 
and consequently a significant part of the stocks 
are not actively traded. Although the volume of 
annual  trading  has  more  than  doubled  in 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania since 2002, it is 
still significantly lower (about 1-2% of GDP in 
2004) than in other European stock exchanges. 
In  Turkey  the  volume  of  annual  trading  is 
significantly higher, accounting for almost 50% 
of GDP. 
Developments  in  Bulgaria  and  Romania  are 
closely  linked  to  the  privatisation  of  state-
owned  companies,  as  their  listing  has  led  to 
increased liquidity and market capitalisation. 
Stock markets still play a relatively small role 
because  of  their  comparatively  short  history 
and the role of foreign direct investment. Stock 
exchanges  were  not  established  in  Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania until the 1990s. Moreover, 
the inflow of FDI, which is often an alternative 
to  domestic  financing,  may  account  for  the 
relatively limited role of stock markets in these 
countries.  This  is  especially  the  case  for 
Bulgaria and Romania, where the annual inflow 
of FDI was around 8-10% of GDP in 2004. FDI 
is much less significant in Turkey and accounted 
for only 1% of GDP in 2004.
SPECIAL FEATURE 2: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN 
BANKS
Foreign  banks  play  a  key  role  in  providing 
finance to the acceding and candidate countries. 
As  Chart  SF2.1  indicates,  the  foreign  bank 
penetration in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, 
as measured by the amount of foreign claims 
held  by  major  international  banks  on  these 
countries, was rather low during 1990s, but has 
increased substantially over the last five years. 
This development is similar to that of the eight 
new  Member  States  of  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  (NMS-8),  albeit  with  some  lag.25  In 
absolute  terms,  the  involvement  of  foreign 
banks has traditionally been somewhat higher 
in Turkey, where the recent upward trend has 
also been notable.
Foreign  credit  provision  plays  an  important 
role  in  all  four  countries  but  the  pattern  of 
Chart SF2.1 Foreign claims held on the 
acceding and candidate countries and the 
NMS-8
(in USD billions)
Source: BIS International Banking Statistics.
Note:  NMS-8  refers  to  the  unweighted  average  of  new  EU 

























25  Foreign claims cover financial claims reported to the BIS by 
domestic  bank  head  offices  in  27  major  banking  centres, 
including  the  exposures  of  their  foreign  affiliates,  and  are 
collected on a worldwide consolidated basis with inter-office 
positions being netted out. The claims include deposits with and 
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credit provision by internationally active banks 
differs. In absolute terms, foreign claims have 
risen rapidly in the four countries (see Table 
SF2.1). Total foreign claims as a percentage of 
GDP has also risen substantially in all the four 
countries, but (with the exception of Croatia) 
still remains below the levels seen in the NMS-
8 (see Table SF2.2). Croatia stands out in terms 
of  the  level  of  foreign  involvement,  but,  in 
terms of the channels of foreign involvement, 
Turkey is the exception. 
Banks  can  provide  credit  to  other  countries 
directly  via  the  cross-border  channel  or 
indirectly  through  subsidiaries  or  branches.   
The  decomposition  of  foreign  claims  into 
international claims and local claims by foreign 
affiliates (see Table SF2.1) gives an indication 
of the relative importance of these channels. As 
local claims only include local currency loans 
made  by  foreign  subsidiaries  and  branches,   
it  underestimates  the  importance  of  this   
channel.  Conversely,  international  claims 
include foreign currency loans made through 
Table SF2.1 Composition of foreign claims  
(in USD billions)
  Total foreign claims  International claims  Local claims
  1996  2004  1996  2004  1996  2004
Bulgaria  2.4  8.3  2.4  5.6  0.0  2.6
Romania  3.1  17.2  3.0  13.2  0.1  4.0
Croatia  1.5  30.1  1.5  19.3  0.0  10.8
Turkey  23.3  54.1  22.6  50.2  0.6  3.9
NMS-8  5.4  41.0  4.2  19.9  1.1  21.1
Source: BIS International Banking Statistics.
Table SF2.2 Foreign claims 
  Total foreign claims   Local claims by foreign banks  
  as % of GDP  as % of total foreign claims
  1996  2004  1996  2004
Bulgaria  24.8  34.4  0.6  31.8
Romania  8.8  23.4  2.4  23.1
Croatia  7.6  87.8  0.0  35.8
Turkey  12.6  18.2  2.7  7.1
NMS-8  11.2  65.2  10.1  38.3
Sources: BIS International Banking Statistics and IMF International Financial Statistics.
foreign subsidiaries and branches, which means 
that the statistics overestimate this channel. 
In Turkey most foreign claims go through the 
cross-border channel. This reflects the different 
post-crisis  strategies  that  the  countries  have 
chosen  with  respect  to  privatisation.  One 
possible implication may be that, because of 
less  local  involvement,  foreign  lending  in 
Turkey may be more volatile than in the other 
countries. 
In Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, the increase 
in foreign claims has been mainly due to the 
entry of foreign banks into the domestic markets. 
Table SF 2.3 shows that while the number of all 
banks has declined somewhat over the last five 
years in the acceding and candidate countries 
and the NMS-8, the number of foreign-owned 
banks  has  increased,  except  in  Turkey.  This 
reflects  the  ongoing  new  entries  of  foreign 
entities into the domestic banking sector and 
the subsequent consolidation of the sector. 59
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Table SF2.3 Foreign ownership of banks 
  Number of banks   Asset share of foreign-owned  Asset share of state-owned 
  (of which foreign-owned)   banks (in %)   banks (in %)
  1999  2004  1999  2004  1999  2004
Bulgaria  34 (22)  35 (24)  42.8  81.6  50.5  2.3
Romania  34 (19)  32 (23)  43.6  58.5  50.3  7.5
Croatia  53 (13)  37 (15)  39.9  91.3  39.8  3.3
Turkey  81 (22)  48 (13)  5.4 1)  3.4  34.2 1)  35
NMS-8 2)  33 (16)  27 (18)  47.4  71.7  27.4  5.9
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2005, national regulatory authorities, Walko (2004) and Walko and Reininger (2005).
1) As of end-2000 
2) Unweighted average.
In  the  first  half  of  the  1990s,  foreign  banks 
usually entered Central and Eastern European 
banking markets via greenfield investment, e.g. 
by establishing a branch or subsidiary. Towards 
the end of the 1990s, and especially over the 
last five years, the most usual way of entry has 
been to acquire local banks through privatisation. 
Moreover,  some  of  the  greenfield-based 
subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks later 
participated in state bank privatisations. As a 
result, the share of foreign ownership of banks 
has increased considerably, reaching values of 
around 80-90%.26 Table SF2.3 shows this trend, 
with the increase in privatisations corresponding 
to  the  decrease  in  the  share  of  state-owned 
banks. By contrast, Turkey’s banking sector is 
largely  domestic-owned,  with  a  significant 
share of state-owned banks of around 35%.27
Both academic literature and practical experience 
have  highlighted  the  significant  benefits  of 
foreign  banks’  involvement  in  transition 
countries.  These  benefits  include  increased 
competition in the banking sector, better access 
of  corporations  and  households  to  external 
finance,  risk  management,  greater  efficiency, 
corporate  governance,  and  overall  stability  of 
the sector.28 Given the typically high capitalisation 
of foreign banks and access to liquidity from the 
parent office, credit supplied to the economy by 
banks with international owners may be more 
stable. Chart SF2.2 shows how increasing foreign  Chart SF2.2 Foreign ownership of banks 
versus loan portfolio quality 
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2005 and national regulatory 
authorities.































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Asset share of foreign-owned banks (in %)
Non-performing loans (in % of total loans)
26  The lower share of foreign-owned banks in Romania as of 2004 
will increase to around 75-80% in early 2006 due to finished 
privatisation of the biggest Romanian bank Banca Comerciala 
Romana to the Austrian Erste Bank. 
27  A detailed analysis of five biggest banks in the acceding and 
candidate countries reveals additional interesting features: in 
Bulgaria and Croatia, the five biggest banks, accounting for 
around 50% and 80%, respectively, are all foreign-owned. In 
both countries, only one of the top-five banks got the share only 
via greenfield investment, while the other via privatisation. In 
Romania, with the privatisation of the biggest bank in early 
2006, all of the top five banks (around 60% of the market) will 
be foreign-owned, with one of them having obtained the share 
via greenfield investment. In Turkey, the biggest bank and the 
fifth biggest bank are still state-owned, while the three other 
banks of the top five (around 60% of the market) are domestic-
owned, private banks.
28  Among others, see for example Clarke, George et al. (2001): 
Foreign bank entry. WB Policy Research Working Paper; Weill, 
Laurent  (2003):  Banking  efficiency  in  transition  economies. 
Economics  of Transition  11  (3);  Haas  and  Lelyveld  (2002): 
Foreign bank penetration and private sector credit in Central and 
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ownership can lead to a decrease in the share of 
bad loans in banks’ portfolios. 
There  may,  however,  be  also  risks  stemming 
from  foreign  bank  penetration  for  financial 
stability. For example, foreign owners may push 
local managers into riskier business ventures 
with the promise of ambitious returns, especially 
if  profit  from  local  subsidiaries  in  the  host 
countries  is  used  to  finance  less  profitable 
businesses in the home country. The repatriation 
of local banks’ profit may then also put pressure 
on the current account. Foreign-owned banks 
may  prefer  to  provide  local  loans  in  foreign 
currency, especially in the currency of the home 
country  if  they  refinance  themselves  in  the 
home market via the parent bank. This could 
make borrowers more vulnerable to exchange 
rate  movements  and  increase  credit  risk  for 
banks. Other risks may occur if decision-making 
and risk management activities are transferred 
to  the  foreign  headquarters  or  if  rules  are 
standardised across the whole banking group 
without taking account of local interests, thus 
making  it  more  difficult  for  local  small  and 
medium-sized enterprises to access finance.29 
Two financial stability potential issues deserve 
further  analysis:  sudden  capital  withdrawals 
and  contagion.  These  two  issues  have  been 
analysed  using  data  on  international  bank 
lending. However, due to data limitations and 
rapid developments within the banking sector, 
this analysis can only be seen as a snapshot. To 
analyse  the  potential  for  sudden  capital 
withdrawals, we look at the maturity structure 
of cross-border claims. 
Table SF2.4 Maturity structure of international claims 
(in % of total international claims; end-2004)
  Up to and   Over one year and 
  including one year   up to two years  Over two years  Unallocated by maturity
Bulgaria  44.1  4.1  44.8  7.1
Romania  47.9  5.9  40.9  5.3
Croatia  35.6  9.2  48.3  7.0
Turkey  58.3  5.1  29.7  7.0
NMS-8  30.6  6.5  46.8  16.1
Source: BIS International Banking Statistics.
Table SF2.4 shows the maturity breakdown of 
international  claims  on  the  acceding  and 
candidate countries and the NMS-8.30 In Turkey, 
a considerable part of international claims are 
short-term claims with a maturity of up to two 
years;  in  the  other  acceding  and  candidate 
countries,  the  share  of  short-term  claims  is 
higher than in the NMS-8. However, international 
claims  unallocated  by  maturity,  i.e.  mainly 
shares and other participations, are lower in the 
acceding and candidate countries than in the 
NMS-8. In so far as holdings of shares represent 
portfolio  investments,  the  risk  of  a  sudden 
outflow might be comparable across countries 
with the exception of Turkey. 
To analyse the potential for contagion, we look 
at  the  participation  of  a  large  international 
banks  in  several  acceding  and  candidate 
countries or new Member States. Host countries 
with  a  common  creditor  may  be  sensitive  to 
shocks hitting the home country of the bank.31 
Furthermore, if a shock occurs in a host country 
where an international bank has its stakes, the 
bank may be forced to reduce its lending or sell 
29  For a discussion of the link between foreign bank presence and 
access to credit of small and medium-sized firms see Clarke   
et al. (2001): Does foreign bank penetration reduce access to 
credit in developing countries? WB Policy Research Working 
Paper 2716.
30  Unfortunately, maturity breakdown of total foreign claims is not 
available.
31  See, for example, the seminal works by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000):  On  crisis,  contagion  and  confusion.  Journal  of 
International Economics 51; and Peek and Rosengren (2000): 
Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real 
Activity in the United States. American Economic Review 90 
(1), or Sbracia and Zaghini (2001): The Role of the Banking 
System  in  the  International Transmission  of  Shocks.  Banca 
D’Italia Discussion Paper No. 409.61
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assets in another host country in order to restore 
balance sheet health. The risk of transmitting 
shocks from the home country to a host country 
depends on many factors, including the form   
of  the  foreign  presence  (subsidiary,  branch   
or  cross-border  credit)  and  the  degree  of 
diversification  of  the  foreign  owners.  Table 
SF2.5 shows the breakdown of foreign claims 
by geographic origin of the creditor and reveals 
that  foreign  claims  on  the  acceding  and 
candidate  countries  and  on  the  NMS-8  are 
rather concentrated, coming from only a few, 
mainly  EU  countries.32  In  Croatia,  foreign 
claims from Austria account for almost 50% of 
all  foreign  claims,  which  suggests  that  the 
Croatian  banking  sector  may  be  relatively 
sensitive to economic conditions in Austria.
There is some evidence of potential contagion 
from one host country to another via common 
creditor  effect  because  the  acceding  and 
candidate  countries  share  some  of  the  same 
creditors.  To  capture  the  “similarity”  of  the 
structure  of  claims  by  geographic  origin,  we 
calculate common creditor indices.33 The index 
measures the similarity in patterns of creditors 
between  any  two  countries  and  is  bounded 
between  0  and  1  (1  indicates  the  same 
composition of creditors, while 0 indicates no 
common  creditor).  Table  SF2.6  presents  the 
results  for  the  four  acceding  and  candidate 
countries.
As the table shows, the four countries indeed 
share some common creditors with each other 
and with the NMS-8. This reflects the expansion 
strategies of several (mainly EU-based) banking 
groups which have acquired significant shares 
in  domestic  banking  sectors  in  a  number  of 
Central  and  Eastern  European  countries. 
However,  other  conditions  would  have  to  be 
fulfilled (the common creditor bank would have 
to be rather weak and the adverse shock rather 
large)  before  the  common  creditor  effect 
materialised  and  posed  a  risk  to  financial 
stability. Nevertheless, a strong foreign presence 
in  the  banking  sectors  of  Bulgaria,  Romania 
Table SF2.5 Foreign bank claims by geographic origin 
(claims by banks from selected countries in % of total foreign claims, as of Q3 2005)
  Austria  Belgium  Germany  France  Greece  Japan  Netherlands  Sweden  United States  Total
Bulgaria  16.7  0.8  23.4  5.0  17.7  0.5  3.0  0.0  2.6  69.7
Romania  24.0  0.3  15.7  13.5  8.8  0.5  13.3  0.2  3.8  80.2
Croatia  49.2  0.4  13.6  1.0  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.0  0.5  66.2
Turkey  1.0  10.5  18.8  10.4  0.5  2.6  6.1  0.5  9.0  59.2
NMS-8  26.3  11.2  20.8  7.1  0.0  1.2  5.1  6.4  3.0  81.0
Source: BIS International Banking Statistics.
Table SF2.6 Common creditor indices 
(as of Q3 2005)
          Czech 
  Bulgaria  Romania  Croatia  Turkey  Rep.  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Slovakia  Slovenia
Bulgaria  1.00  0.71  0.55  0.57  0.46  0.11  0.74  0.32  0.31  0.63  0.54  0.61
Romania  0.71  1.00  0.55  0.56  0.59  0.14  0.65  0.25  0.24  0.57  0.55  0.61
Croatia  0.55  0.55  1.00  0.53  0.53  0.15  0.61  0.23  0.20  0.51  0.81  0.70
Turkey  0.57  0.56  0.53  1.00  0.43  0.16  0.61  0.26  0.25  0.73  0.48  0.53
Sources: BIS International Banking Statistics and author’s calculations.
32  Unfortunately, the BIS data did not include claims by Italian 
banks, which are very active in the region.
33  The common creditor index is computed using the methodology 
of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001): Sources of Contagion: 
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and Croatia may present a challenge from the 
financial  stability  perspective  and  calls  for 
further detailed analyses of potential contagion 
effects. 
SPECIAL FEATURE 3: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN  
CURRENCIES
Extensive  foreign  currency  transactions  can 
have implications for financial stability as they 
can give rise to significant currency mismatches, 
whereby the income or net worth of an economic 
entity is exposed to changes in the exchange 
rate. This can imply major vulnerability in the 
event  of  a  financial  crisis.  Experience  has 
shown  that,  while  currency  mismatches  tend 
not to precipitate financial crises, they can play 
a major role in exacerbating them and making 
them  very  costly  to  resolve,  with  taxpayers 
often  bearing  most  of  the  clean-up  costs. A 
financial  crisis  usually  precipitates  sharp 
currency depreciation, which inflates the value 
of debt and interest payments denominated in 
foreign  currency,  in  so  far  as  borrowers  are   
not  hedged  against  adverse  exchange  rate 
fluctuations (either through natural or financial 
hedging), which is often the case for households 
and smaller enterprises. This can, at a stroke, 
make economic entities insolvent and deteriorate 
banks’ asset quality, which can lead to further 
economic disruption and currency depreciation. 
A vicious cycle of this kind was a key factor 
behind the severity of the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997-98.    
Banks transfer currency risk to their customers 
by lending in foreign currency and financing 
this  abroad.  In  such  a  situation,  which  has 
become increasingly characteristic for acceding 
and candidate countries in recent years, currency 
mismatching tends not to be significant on bank 
balance  sheets,  particularly  as  banks  are 
relatively adept at hedging residual balances. 
However,  given  that  this  leads  to  currency 
mismatches among households and non-bank 
corporations  (on  top  of  increased  direct 
borrowing from abroad, either from financial 
intermediaries, parent companies or via trade 
credit),  this  translates  into  credit  risks  for 
banks. In practice, the data are rarely available 
beyond aggregates at the sectoral level, and this 
is also the case for the four countries examined 
in this report. For households, which usually do 
not have substantial foreign currency income, 
currency mismatch problems on the individual 
level are likely to be significant, even if there 
may be no significant currency mismatch on the 
aggregate level. For non-bank corporations, at 
least  in  the  tradable  sector,  there  may  be  a 
smaller probability of a currency mismatch if 
total loans and deposits in foreign currency are 
close  in  the  aggregate  since  export  revenues 
may hedge the residual exchange rate risk. At 
the same time, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
significant foreign currency borrowing in non-
exporting sectors may be an issue in some of the 
four countries under review. 
Foreign currencies play a significant role in the 
banking sectors of the acceding and candidate 
countries. This role originates to some extent 
from  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  domestic 
currency (and the domestic banking sector) on 
the part of households at the beginning of the 
transformation process. Later on, when foreign 
currency  holdings  were  moved  from  under 
mattresses  to  domestic  bank  accounts, 
households preferred foreign currency deposits. 
Even  following  successful  economic  and 
financial stabilisation over the past few years, 
the  high  share  of  deposits  denominated  in 
foreign  currency  has  been  fairly  persistent, 
while  borrowing  in  foreign  currencies  has 
become attractive due to lower interest rates, in 
the apparent expectation that the interest rate 
differential  would  not  be  compensated  by 
depreciation  of  the  domestic  currency. 
Moreover, for some borrowers, foreign currency 
debt payments may smooth earnings fluctuations 
arising from export revenues in foreign currency. 
On the lending side, the large share of foreign 
currencies can be seen as a natural hedge of 
banks’ foreign currency liabilities (from taking 
foreign currency deposits and loans abroad, or 
from the payment of equity capital by foreign 
owners). Furthermore, growth opportunities are 
seen as considerable in the banking sectors of 63
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Table SF3.1 Foreign currency deposits, 2005 
(shares in % of the total deposits from the respective sectors)
  Bulgaria  Croatia  Romania  Turkey
Share of foreign currency deposits of households 
and non-bank corporations 1)  46.8  71.0  34.5  41.3 
of which: 
  share of foreign currency deposits of households 2)  54.2  80.6  37.0  42.0
  share of foreign currency deposits of non-bank corporations  35.0  44.2  53.9  38.9
Source: national central banks.
1) Croatia: Before 2004 including deposits by non-residents and deposits by the general government.
2) Croatia: Before 2004 without non-profit institutions.
these countries, especially as credit is taking off 
from a low base, encouraging banks to expand 
credit  beyond  what  can  be  funded  by  the 
domestic  deposit  base.  Foreign  ownership  of 
domestic  banking  sectors  also  facilitates 
funding from abroad.
Tables  SF3.1  and  SF3.2  report  data  on  the 
shares of foreign currency deposits and loans in 
all four countries at the end of 2005. It is worth 
noting  that  these  figures  may  underestimate   
the  full  significance  of  foreign  currency-
denominated deposits and loans, as they exclude 
deposits and loans indexed to foreign currencies. 
Indexed instruments are particularly important 
in Croatia, where they accounted for 12.8% of 
total  deposits  and  66.6%  of  total  loans  of 
households and non-bank corporations at the 
end of 2005, while there are indications that 
foreign-currency  indexation  of  loans  is  also 
significant in Turkey.
Table SF3.2 Foreign currency loans, 2005 
(shares in % of the total loans to the respective sectors)
  Bulgaria  Croatia  Romania1)  Turkey
Share of foreign currency loans to households and non-bank corporations 2)  47,3  10,2  54,0  15,9
of which:       
  share of foreign currency loans to households  15,4  0,5  44,1  n.a.
  share of foreign currency loans to non-bank corporations  66,9  21,7  59,4  n.a.
Source: National central banks.
1) Claims. 
2) Data do not include loans indexed to foreign currencies, which are significant in Croatia. 
In the run-up to the euro cash changeover of 
January 2002, the share of foreign currency-
denominated deposits was boosted in Bulgaria, 
Romania  and  Turkey,  as  residents  deposited 
holdings  of  euro  legacy  currencies  for 
conversion. In Croatia, the volume of both total 
and  foreign  currency-denominated  deposits 
increased  but  the  share  of  foreign  currency-
denominated deposits did not rise further, as it 
had already accounted for 87% and some of the 
foreign currency holdings were converted into 
domestic currency. After the introduction of the 
euro banknotes and coins, the share of foreign 
currency  deposits  began  to  erode  in  all  four 
countries and this has continued since, reaching 
levels below those observed prior to the boost 
in all of the countries except Turkey. In Croatia, 
however, most of the decline in the share of 
foreign  currency-denominated  deposits  was 
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On  the  lending  side,  the  share  of  foreign 
currency loans increased significantly in 2002 
in all four acceding and candidate countries, as 
a result of additional foreign currency funding 
from  domestic  deposits  or  bank  borrowing 
abroad. Thereafter, the share of foreign currency 
loans  in  total  loans  continued  to  increase 
strongly  in  Bulgaria,  reflecting  the  ongoing 
domestic lending boom, while it fell markedly 
in  Turkey,  where  decreasing  interest  rate 
differentials vis-à-vis the euro and the US dollar 
appear to have played a determining role. After 
increasing up to 2004, there has also been a 
decline in the share of foreign currency loans in 
Romania in 2005 apparently reflecting specific 
measures introduced by the National Bank of 
Romania to discourage such lending. Increased 
exchange rate flexibility may also have acted as 
a  disincentive  more  recently,  by  making 
borrowers more aware of the risks. The share of 
foreign  currency  loans  declined  modestly  in 
Croatia  though  this  is  likely  to  reflect 
substitution  in  favour  of  domestic  currency 
loans indexed to foreign currencies. In countries 
with sizeable exchange rate volatility, such as 
Turkey and Romania, developments in the share 
of foreign currencies have also been significantly 
influenced by the statistical effect of exchange 
rate  changes.  Furthermore,  the  structure  of 
domestic  lending  has  been  affected  more 
generally  by  the  bank  consolidation  process 
(e.g. by writing off loans).
Significant foreign currency lending to domestic 
households and enterprises raises the question 
of the size of commercial banks’ open foreign 
currency position on the balance sheet and their 
coverage  by  off-balance-sheet  positions. 
According to published data, banks’ net overall 
foreign currency positions are small in all four 
acceding and candidate countries. In the middle 
of 2005, Croatian banks had a small positive 
(long open) position of around 0.2% of their 
(on-balance-sheet)  assets.  At  the  same  time, 
Bulgarian  banks  had  a  small  negative  (short 
open) position of 0.4% (excluding exposure to 
the euro, in line with central bank regulations). 
Romanian  and  Turkish  banks  had  nearly 
balanced positions by the end of 2005 (+0.1% 
and -0.1% of total assets, respectively). These 
net overall positions are in line with or even 
smaller than those observed for most NMS.
At the same time, banks face substantial indirect 
foreign  exchange  risks  as  a  result  of  foreign 
currency-related  positions  on  the  asset  side, 
through  a  possible  deterioration  in  their 
(unhedged) borrowers’ debt servicing capacity 
following  a  depreciation  of  the  domestic 
currency. This situation may be accentuated by 
the  fact  that  the  non-bank  corporate  sector’s 
foreign indebtedness has increased significantly 
over the past few years in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Romania,  thereby  increasing  the  exposure  to 
exchange rate risk. 
Some trends have tended to mitigate risks from 
large foreign currency exposure in the acceding 
and  candidate  countries.  First,  the  currency 
structure of domestic foreign currency loans to 
households and corporations has improved over 
the past few years, at least in so far as evidence 
is available. At the end of 2004 foreign currency 
loans denominated in euro accounted for nearly 
90%  of  total  foreign  currency  loans  to 
households and corporations in Bulgaria and 
for  70%  in  Romania.  Anecdotal  evidence 
suggests that the euro also accounts for a high 
share  of  foreign  currency  lending  in  Croatia 
(although lending in other foreign currencies, 
notably  Swiss  francs,  seems  to  be  gaining 
momentum). A currency breakdown of foreign 
currency  loans  is  not  available  for  Turkey. 
Second,  foreign  exchange  reserves  are 
accumulating steadily (particularly in Romania, 
Bulgaria and Turkey), increasing the ability of 
central banks to stem exchange rate depreciation 
pressures at times of tension. Finally, domestic 
bond  markets  are  developing  well  in  the 
candidate countries, with turnover and maturities 
increasing,  which  should  eventually  provide 
more domestic alternatives for debt. However, 
developing  a  corporate  bond  market  should 
only  be  seen  as  a  long-term  process,  and, 
furthermore, a domestic bond market would do 
little  to  reduce  exchange  rate  risks  among 
households.  65
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Monetary and exchange rate policies can play 
a role in containing foreign exchange lending. 
Ideally,  the  monetary  framework  should  not 
provide  unintended  incentives  for  the  use  of 
foreign  currencies  in  banks’  transactions. 
However, the scope of monetary policy is often 
limited  by  exchange  rate  commitments  or 
considerations. Mandatory reserve regulations, 
which  are  at  the  disposal  of  policy-makers 
under  any  exchange  rate  regime,  may  offer 
some  room  for  affecting  the  currency 
composition of bank liabilities, and some of the 
acceding  and  candidate  countries  have  made 
use of this instrument. Under flexible exchange 
rate  regimes,  higher  exchange  rate  volatility 
can make borrowers more aware of the exchange 
rate  risks  connected  to  foreign  currency 
borrowing.  In  this  respect,  it  is  notable  that 
Romania has introduced more flexibility into 
its exchange rate since late 2004.
Apart from monetary and exchange rate policy, 
moral  suasion  and  prudential  measures  can 
also help keep foreign currency lending under 
control.  Prudential  measures  are  particularly 
appropriate  if  and  when  foreign  currency 
lending implies financial stability risks. These 
measures  can  be  targeted  either  at  creditors 
(e.g.  limits  on  banks’  foreign  liabilities, 
prescribed  ratios  between  foreign  currency 
assets and liabilities or between foreign currency 
lending  and  bank  capital,  differentiated 
classification and provisioning rules, collateral 
requirements,  capital  requirements  and  risk 
weights  for  foreign  currency  loans),  or  at 
borrowers (prescribed maximum ratio between 
foreign  currency  debt  servicing  and  the 
borrower’s income). Authorities in the acceding 
and candidate countries have already applied 
several such measures, but there still appears to 
be scope for further utilisation of some of these 
instruments. It should be noted, however, that 
prudential  measures  may  lose  some  of  their 
effectiveness  over  time  as  customers  bypass 
regulations, for example by obtaining foreign 
currency  loans  from  leasing  companies,  or 
directly  borrow  from  abroad.  Finally,  fiscal 
restraint  –  if  leading  to  an  increase  in  the 
domestic savings ratio – would serve to curtail 
credit growth in general, including the foreign 
currency element. 
SPECIAL FEATURE 4: THE SUPERVISORY  
FRAMEWORK
1  STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATORY AND 
  SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORKS
Banking regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
have been substantially reformed in the acceding 
and candidate countries. As a consequence of 
the banking crises of the late 1990s and early 
2000s,  all  of  the  acceding  and  candidate 
countries have improved their supervisory and 
regulatory frameworks for banking activities. 
In  all  four  countries,  banking  supervision  is 
now exercised by autonomous institutions: in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia by the respective 
central banks; and in Turkey by the BRSA.
Progress was reported in the IMF’s Financial 
Sector  Assessments  conducted  for  Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia. According to the reports, 
the banking supervisory framework was deemed 
to be fully compliant or largely compliant with 
almost  all  of  the  Basel  Core  Principles  for 
Effective  Banking  Supervision  in  Bulgaria, 
compliant or largely compliant in Romania, and 
largely compliant in Croatia. The FSAP update 
conducted for Bulgaria in 2004 noted that the 
banking  sector  continued  to  operate  in  an 
environment of sound supervision and welcomed 
the  implementation  of  several  FSAP 
recommendations, including the creation of a 
financial  sector  supervisory  committee,  a 
Council  for  Financial  Stability  and  a  more 
effective bank insolvency regime. Many FSAP 
recommendations have also been implemented 
in  Romania,  including  the  introduction  of 
consolidated supervision, improved information 
exchanges  with  foreign  banking  supervisors 
and a clarification of the rules on acquisitions 
and investment in the banking sector.
In Turkey, a new banking law was passed in 
2005. The 2001 banking crisis – as well as the 
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number  of  serious  shortcomings  in  Turkey’s 
institutional framework. The new banking law, 
which was adopted in October 2005, provides 
for  increased  transparency  and  disclosure 
requirements for banks. It also (i) clarifies the 
division of responsibilities between the BRSA 
and the other entities dealing with supervision 
(i.e.  the  Savings  Deposits  Insurance  Fund 
(SDIF),  the  Sworn  Bank  auditors  and  the 
Treasury); (ii) establishes a liquidity ratio; and 
(iii) widens the range of business operations 
that  require  a  banking  license. The  new  law 
brings the legal framework more into line with 
EU standards and international best practices. 
However,  the  provisions  related  to  the 
supervision  of  financial  conglomerates  and 
consumer protection are not compliant with EU 
rules. 
The regulatory and supervisory frameworks are 
also  being  transformed  to  comply  with  the 
“acquis communautaire”. In its autumn 2005 
reports, the European Commission concluded 
that  the  transposition  of  legislation  in  the 
banking sector was almost complete in Romania 
and  that  good  progress  had  been  made  in 
Bulgaria. In Croatia, the legislation was found 
to be only partially aligned with the body of EU 
law, while in Turkey the level of alignment was 
deemed to be moderate regarding the banking 
area  but  limited  in  terms  of  aligning  the 
regulatory  framework  of  non-bank  financial 
institutions.
As the regulatory framework has been improved, 
supervisory capacity has also been increased. 
In  its  autumn  2005  monitoring  reports  the 
Commission  noted  how  the  capacity  and 
expertise of the supervision had been constantly 
upgraded in Bulgaria, while the administrative 
structures in place in Romania were deemed to 
function  adequately.  Improvements  in  the 
capacity  of  Banca  Naţională  a  României  to 
assess  overall  financial  system  stability  had 
been noted by a recent IMF mission. Progress 
has  also  been  made  in  Croatia,  where  since 
2004 the Croatian National Bank has been able 
to conduct on-site supervision and its Banking 
Supervisory Department has been reorganised. 
The  Central  Bank  of  the  Republic  of Turkey 
issued its first financial stability report in the 
summer of 2005, whereas Banca Naţională a 
României’s  published  its  first  such  report  in 
spring 2006.
Further  improvements  to  the  supervisory 
frameworks are still necessary in a number of 
areas.  In  Bulgaria,  progress  needs  to  be 
completed  as  regards  the  single  passport 
principle,  the  differentiation  between  foreign 
and EU credit institutions and the definition of 
branches. In Romania, the members of the peer 
advisory  mission  on  financial  services 
supervision,  which  took  place  in  July  2005 
under the auspices of the European Commission, 
concluded that more attention should be paid to 
the issue of financial conglomerates and to the 
preparation  of  International  Accounting 
Standards.
Cooperation with foreign supervisors can also 
be  further  improved.  For  Romania,  the  IMF 
recommended that Banca Naţională a României 
be required to consult with the home supervisor 
before  licensing  foreign  subsidiaries  or 
authorising  foreigners  to  acquire  Romanian 
banks. The amendment to the banking law was 
limited to a consultation with EU countries. In 
Croatia, cooperation with foreign supervisors, 
which received a legal underpinning in 2002, 
needs to be implemented more effectively.
Supervision of non-bank financial activities is 
less  developed  than  banking  supervision. 
Following the FSAP recommendations, Bulgaria 
introduced a single supervisory agency for non-
bank financial institutions. The FSAP update 
noted,  however,  that  Bulgaria’s  supervisory 
capacity, regulatory framework and enforcement 
powers still needed to be further strengthened. 
Romania has recently extended supervision to 
cover non-bank credit institutions in an attempt 
to control the growth of leasing and other non-
banking activities. In 2004 Croatia merged the 
supervisory authorities for the insurance sector, 
the pension funds and the securities markets. 
However,  the  European  Commission’s  latest 
monitoring  report  found  that  Croatia’s  new 67
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Financial  Services Authority  still  lacked  the 
necessary  legal  basis  to  become  the  single 
supervisory authority for the non-bank financial 
system.  In  Turkey,  the  fragmented  nature  of 
supervision  and  regulation  is  a  significant 
problem:  while  banks  are  regulated  by  the 
BRSA, leasing, factoring and consumer finance 
companies and the insurance sector are regulated 
and  supervised  by  four  different  General 
Directorates  of  the  Under-Secretariat  of  the 
Treasury.
2  MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Progress has been made with regard to minimum 
capital requirements. At the time of the FSSA 
missions, the minimum capital adequacy ratios 
were found to be not fully consistent with the 
Basel I Capital Accord in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Croatia. The IMF noted that the calculation 
of the ratio was based on credit risk alone, and 
recommended  that  the  ratio  be  calculated  by 
including market and market-related risks and 
on a consolidated basis. These recommendations 
were implemented in Croatia and Romania in 
2004 and in Bulgaria in 2005.
The shift to the Basel II framework will require 
further changes. By the time of accession, the 
new capital requirement framework (known as 
“Basel  II”)  needs  to  be  incorporated  in  the 
respective national legislation of Bulgaria and 
Romania. In Romania, a “Basel II project” has 
been launched to achieve this goal. The main 
objectives of this project refer to the alignment 
of  the  national  legislative  framework  to  the   
new provisions and to the preparation of the 
supervisory  authority  and  of  the  credit 
institutions for implementing the new prudential 
requirements. In Turkey the BRSA has adopted 
Table SF4.1 Minimum capital adequacy ratios in international comparison 
(in %)
  International standards (Basel)  Bulgaria  Croatia  Romania  Turkey
  8  12  10  12  8
Source: World Bank.
a  detailed  road  map  for  implementing  the   
Basel  II  framework  of  capital  requirements 
from  January  2008,  with  the  less  advanced 
approaches,  and  from  January  2009  for  the 
advanced ones. Training efforts to develop the 
administrative capacity of moving towards risk-
based supervision should continue.
3  DEPOSIT INSURANCE
An explicit and compulsory deposit insurance 
system is in place in the four countries under 
review.  Schemes  are  funded  by  banks  in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, and jointly by 
the  government  and  banks  in  Turkey.  The 
guarantee covers domestic currency as well as 
foreign exchange account holders in the four 
countries. With regard to the specifics of these 
deposit insurance schemes, it is worth noting 
that  Romanian  scheme  covers  individuals  as 
well as small and medium-sized companies. In 
Bulgaria,  foreign  branches  covered  by  the 
schemes applicable to their head offices are not 
obliged to participate in the domestic scheme. 
The body of EU law requires in this case that at 
least  an  equivalent  level  of  protection  be 
offered.
Only in Turkey is the guarantee per depositor in 
accordance  with  the  level  prescribed  by  EU 
rules. In Bulgaria and Romania, the guarantee 
has already been gradually raised and will reach 
the equivalent of €20,000 by the time they join 
the EU, foreseen on 1 January 2007, in order to 
be in line with the body of EU law. There is no 
limit per account in any of these countries, with 
the exception of Bulgaria, where it is set at the 
same level as the limit per depositor. Moreover, 
formal co-insurance only exists in Croatia (i.e. 
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Table SF4.2 Guarantee ceiling per depositor 
(in euro)
  Directive 94/19/EC  Bulgaria  Croatia  Romania  Turkey
  20,000  12,782  13,000  15,000  30,000
Sources: World Bank and BNB.
their deposits even if the deposit is worth less 
than the established limit).
Deposit guarantee schemes need, however, to 
be strengthened. In Romania, the FSAP mission 
concluded  that  the  resources  of  the  deposit 
guarantee  fund  needed  to  be  considerably 
strengthened.  In  Croatia,  the  division  of 
responsibilities and coordination between the 
Croatian National Bank and the State Agency 
for Deposit Insurance and Bank Rehabilitation 
could be clarified and improved to avoid conflict 
of interests and ensure a “least-cost resolution” 
mechanism. In Turkey, the IMF has voiced its 
concern that the balance sheet of the SDIF was 
extremely  weak  as  most  of  its  resources  are 
made up of a loan from the Treasury, which thus 
bears  the  final  financial  burden  in  case  of 
failures.
4  LOAN CLASSIFICATION 
Loan  classification  and  provisioning 
requirements  have  been  progressively 
strengthened in the four countries. The primary 
system of loan classification in Bulgaria and 
Croatia is based on both the number of days of 
arrears and a forward-looking estimate of the 
probability of default, whereas in Romania and 
Turkey  it  is  based  only  on  the  number  of   
days  in  arrears.  In  Romania,  the  regulations 
provide  for  three  classification  criteria:  debt 
service (number of days of arrears), financial 
performance of the borrower and initiation of 
judicial proceedings. In all countries, specific 
minimum provisioning ratios are required for 
each category of loans.
5  MEASURES TO COMBAT MONEY  
LAUNDERING
Acceding countries are also required to meet 
the EU’s anti-money laundering legislation. EU 
directives  and  regulations  to  combat  money 
laundering  and  the  financing  of  terrorism, 
especially the Third Directive that entered into 
force  on  15  December  2005,  incorporate  the   
40 + 9 revised Recommendations of the FATF 
into Community law. The legislation establishes 
money  laundering  as  a  criminal  offence  and 
requires financial institutions to identify and 
know  their  customers,  to  keep  appropriate 
records and to report any suspicious transactions. 
These  provisions  also  apply  to  auditors’ 
activities,  external  accountants,  notaries  and 
lawyers,  casinos  and  real  estate  agents. 
Moreover, they require adequate enforcement 
capacity and include specific provisions related 
to  the  financing  of  terrorism  and  to  money 
laundering.
Further progress in complying with the “acquis” 
is required by Bulgaria and Romania. According 
to the European Commission’s 2005 monitoring 
reports  on  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  national 
legislations were in line with the Second Anti-
Money  Laundering  Directive  but  should  be 
aligned with the Financial Action Task Force’s 
revised  recommendations  and  with  the Third 
EU  Directive.  Moreover,  in  Romania,  the 
members of the above-mentioned peer advisory 
mission in July 2005 found that there were still 
loopholes  in  the  legislation.  In  particular, 
money transmitters are not subject to any form 
of supervision. 
In  Croatia  and  Turkey,  both  legislation  and 
enforcement  need  to  be  considerably 
strengthened. In its assessments of anti-money 69
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Table SF4.3 Loan classification     
Bulgaria Croatia Romania Turkey
Number of days after which a loan in arrears is classiﬁed as:
Standard 0-30 0-60
(category A: fully 
recoverable placements)
0-15 for category A 
(classiﬁcation of the 
ﬁnancial performance of 
the borrower)
0-89
Watch 31-60 From 0-15 for category 
B,  from 16-30 days for 
category A
Sub-standard 61-901) 61-180 (category B: 
partly recoverable 
placements)
From 0-15 days for 
category C, 16-30 days for 





From 0-15 days for 
category D, 16-30 days for 
category C, 31-60 days for 
category B and 61-90 days 
for category A
180
Loss (NPL category)3) 181
(category C : 
irrecoverable placements)
Debt service minimum 
91 days and  ﬁnancial 
performance category A, B, 
C, D and E;5)  
Over 1 year
Minimum provisioning required as loans become:
Standard 0% From 0.85 % to 1.20 % 
for category A
0% 5%
Watch 10% for corporate 
loans /
na4) 5% 5%
20% for individual 
loans
Substandard 50% for corporate 
loans / 75% for 
individual loans
na4) 20% 20%
Doubtful na4) 50% 50%
Loss 100% for every 
type of loans 3)
na4) 100% 100%
Sources: World Bank and BNR.
1) Or the debtor’s financial state has deteriorated.
2) Or the debtor suffers a permanent shortage of funds, is in bankruptcy or liquidation, or the claim is subject to court proceedings.
3) The doubtful and loss exposures were amalgamated into the non-performing loan category as of 1 April 2004. 
4) Not applicable. 
5) Or debt service 61-90 days and financial performance category B, C, D and E or debt service 31-60 days and financial performance 
category C, D and E or debt service 16-30 days and financial performance category D and E or debt service 0-15 days and financial 
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laundering  legislation  and  practices,  the 
European Commission concluded that the scope 
of  transactions,  activities  requiring  client 
identification and reporting had to be broadened, 
especially with regard to professions such as 
lawyers, external accountants and tax advisors, 
as  well  as  government  transactions.  The 
obligation of due diligence in non-face-to-face 
transactions has to be introduced. Moreover, in 
Turkey,  there  is  no  provision  on  terrorist 
financing.
In the four countries under review, increased 
efforts  are  needed  with  regard  to  the 
implementation of legislation. The Commission 
has asked the authorities to further strengthen 
administrative and enforcement capacities, to 
reinforce controls on reporting entities and to 
ensure  more  effective  cooperation  between 
relevant  authorities,  especially  the  Financial 
Intelligence  Unit  (FIU)  and  the  Prosecution 
Office. In all four countries, it emphasises that 
the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering 
framework is seriously hampered by corruption, 
organised crime and the large informal economy. 
Moreover,  the  track  record  on  enforcement 
remains weak, as the number of indictments has 
been  low  up  to  now  (see  Table  SF4.4).  In 
Romania,  further  secondary  legislation  and 
professional regulations have to be elaborated: 
although  exchange  bureaux  are  licensed  by 
Banca  Naţională  a  României,  they  are  not 
Table SF4.4  Suspicious transactions 
(2004 Figures, unless otherwise stated)
Bulgaria Croatia Romania Turkey (2005)
Number of reported suspicious 
transactions
432 na1) 2,054 352
Number of cases prosecuted 21 30-40 each year 304 cases 
submitted to the 
General Prosecutor 
in the ﬁrst six 
months of 2005
33
Indictments 7 na1) 3 15
(2001-04)
Convictions na1) 2 
(2001-2004)
na1) na1) 
Sources: National FIUs and European Commission.
1) Not available.
effectively  supervised.  Therefore,  the 
Commission  considered  that  enforcement 
needed substantial improvement. In both Croatia 
and Turkey, cooperation between the FIU and 
foreign counterparts remains limited. In both 
countries,  awareness  of  the  members  of  the 
banking community and other reporting entities 
with regard to the money laundering offence 
needs to be enhanced. Furthermore, in Turkey, 
the availability of statistical information needs 
to be enhanced. The attribution of tasks to these 
various entities has to be clarified. There is a 
lack of provisions protecting institutions and 
their employees from liability when reporting 
suspicious  transactions.  Finally,  it  should  be 
noted  that  Turkey’s  implementation  of  the 
framework  for  combating  money  laundering 
and the financing of terrorism will be reviewed 
by the FATF for the third time in early 2006.72
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COUNTRY SHEETS 1)
1)  The country sheets have been compiled for comparison purposes between countries. Thus, some of the data may differ slightly from 
the tables provided in the main text, which mainly rely on national sources. 
Bulgaria: Selected macroeconomic indicators 1 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
External environment    
Openness   116.1   115.0   110.4   116.9   127.1  139.9
  Exports and imports of goods and services (as a % of GDP)    
Geographical composition of trade   
  EU-25 (as a % of total trade)   48.9   53.6   54.6   54.3   55.8   52.3 
  Euro area (as a % of total trade)   40.8   44.8   45.7   45.5   53.3   52.2 
Product composition of trade    
Exports   
  Machinery and transport equipment (as a % of total exports)   9.6   11.0   12.4   13.0   12.4   … 
  Chemicals and intermediate goods (as a % of total exports)   10.1   9.1   7.7   7.5   6.6   …
  Mineral fules, lubricants and related materials (as a % of total exports)   11.7   9.0   6.0   5.8   8.0   …
  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (as a % of total exports)   5.9   5.3   5.9   5.9   5.9   …
  Foodstuffs and agricultural products (as a % of total exports)   6.0   6.3   8.3   6.7   6.8   …
  Consumer manufactures (as a % of total exports)   21.4   25.7   27.2   28.6   25.6   … 
  memo: Textiles (as a % of total exports)   17.0   20.6   22.1   23.1   20.8   … 
Imports    
  Machinery and transport equipment (as a % of total imports)   24.9   27.5   27.6   28.7   29.3   … 
  Chemicals and intermediate goods (as a % of total imports)   9.4   10.1   10.3   10.0   10.4   …
  Mineral fules, lubricants and related materials (as a % of total imports)   25.8   5.0   3.4   3.9   4.0   …
  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (as a % of total imports)   5.5   5.5   4.5   5.5   6.0   …
  Foodstuffs and agricultural products (as a % of total imports)   4.1   4.3   4.5   4.4   4.4   …
  Consumer manufactures (as a % of total imports)   7.5   8.8   9.8   10.0   9.0   … 
  memo: oil and gas (as a % of total imports)   23.7   20.6   19.6   17.4   16.4   … 
Financing    
  Rating History (Moody’s foreign currency long term debt, end of year)   B1   Ba2   Ba2   Ba2   Ba1   Ba1 
  Bond spreads (basis points, end of year values)   772   433   291   177   77   90 
  International bonds issuance (in USD million, end of year values)   0   223   1,248   62   10   260 
  Claims by BIS reporting banks    
  Claims by euro area BIS reporting banks (in USD million, end of year values)   1,107   1,154   2,388   5,241   7,221   … 
Domestic macroeconomic developments    
Real activity   
  Real GDP   5.4   4.1   4.9   4.3   5.7   5.5
  Real domestic demand   7.2   7.3   4.5   7.9   6.6   9.1 
  Real private consumption   4.4   5.2   3.5   6.4   5.5   7.6
  Real public consumption   11.7   1.4   4.1   7.6   3.8   3.8
  Real gross ﬁxed capital formation   15.4   23.3   8.5   13.9   13.5   19.0
  Real exports of goods and services   16.6   10.0   7.0   8.0   13.0   7.2
  Real imports of goods and services   18.6   14.8   4.9   15.3   14.1   14.6
  Change in inventories   2.6   2.4   1.5   2.4   2.6   4.2 
  Industrial production   ...   2.2   4.6   14.0   17.7   ... 
  Employment   -4.7   -0.1   0.3   48.7   3.1   ... 
  Unemployment   18.1   17.5   17.4   14.3   12.2   10.7 
  Wages   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ... 
Prices, exchange rate, interest rate and monetary developments    
  Consumer price inﬂation (%, y-o-y, period average)   10.4   7.5   5.8   2.3   6.1   5.0
  Producer price inﬂation (%, y-o-y, period average)   17.5   3.7   1.3   4.9   6.0   ...
  Exchange rate (domestic currency/EUR, index, period average, 1999 = 100)   100.0   99.9   99.9   100.0   100.0   ...
  Nominal effective exchange rate (index, period average, 1999 = 100)   101.0   106.1   110.8   119.9   124.3   ... 
  Real effective exchange rate (index, period average, 1999 = 100)   102.0   106.9   111.7   117.7   124.0   ... 
  Narrow money (%, y-o-y), M1   18.8   25.8   11.0   19.9   28.2   20.8
  Broad money (%, y-o-y), M3   30.8   25.8   11.7   19.6   23.1   23.9
  Total international reserves (excl. gold, in USD million, end of year value)   3,155   3,291   4,407   6,291   8,776   …
  Money market rate   3.0   3.7   2.5   2.0   2.0   2.1
  Treasury bill rate   4.2   4.6   4.3   2.8   2.6   ... 
    Stock market (end of year values)   107   119   183   454   625   826 73
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Bulgaria: Selected macroeconomic indicators II  
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
Government sector 
  Central government balance   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ... 
  Central government expenditure and net lending   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ... 
  General government primary balance   3.4   3.1   1.6   2.1   3.6   4.0 
  General government balance   -0.6   -0.6   -0.6   0.0   1.7   2.4 
  General government expenditure and net lending   39.7   38.4   37.1   38.2   37.3   36.9 
  General government gross debt   77.1   69.9   56.2   48.2   40.9   32.4 
  General government net debt   66.0   63.5   58.5   51.3   40.1   36.9 
  External sector    
  Current account balance   -5.6   -5.6   -2.4   -5.5   -5.8   -11.8 
  Trade balance   -9.4   -11.7   -11.4   -13.7   -15.1   -20.4 
  Services balance   4.0   2.2   3.1   3.1   3.5   3.1 
  Net factor income   -3.2   -2.2   -1.7   -3.0   0.0   0.0 
  Net current transfers   2.3   3.7   3.5   3.4   4.6   4.4 
Capital account balance   0.2   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Financial account balance   6.6   5.0   11.1   13.2   14.9   13.4 
  Net foreign direct investment   8.0   5.9   5.8   10.3   11.5   8.7 
  Net portfolio investment   -1.4   0.6   -0.6   -1.1   -2.9   -3.5
  Net other investment   -0.1   -1.5   6.0   3.9   6.3   8.3
  Change in reserve assets   3.6   2.1   3.5   4.6   7.6   1.5 
Convertible currency external debt    
as % of GDP   86.9   78.6   65.1   60.3   63.0   67.5 
y-o-y rate of change   9.6   0.4   -9.8   -1.2   15.1   17.0 
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services and income)   15.9   19.7   15.8   13.7   22.4   41.8 
By debtor:    
  Public sector*    
  as % of GDP   68.4   60.7   45.2   37.5   30.0   20.7 
  y-o-y rate of change   5.5   -1.5   -19.0   -11.3   -12.1   -24.5 
  Private sector* (including DMB)    
  as % of GDP   18.5   17.9   19.9   22.8   33.0   46.8 
  y-o-y rate of change   27.5   7.7   21.5   21.6   59.9   54.6 
  Deposit money banks    
  as % of GDP   2.5   1.9   2.9   4.5   8.8   11.9 
  y-o-y rate of change   11.8   -13.1   42.2   90.0   116.7   47.3 
Short-term debt    
as % of reserves excluding gold   43.4   35.9   41.5   45.5   38.5   53.9 
as % of total convertible currency external debt   12.9   11.5   16.4   21.1   19.8   25.6 
as % of GDP   11.5   9.0   11.8   14.3   12.7   17.3 
y-o-y rate of change   14.4   -16.0   50.9   55.5   62.5   48.3 
Sources: IMF, Comtrade, BIS, Bondware, Loanware, IIF, BNB.   74
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Romania: Selected macroeconomic indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 1)
External environment  
Openness  
  Exports and imports of goods and services (as a % of GDP)   70.7   74.5   76.5   76.9   81.0   76.5
Geographical composition of trade 
  EU-25 (as a % of total trade)   67.2   69.5   67.5   70.2   68.4   64.5  
  Euro area (as a % of total trade)   53.7   56.5   54.8   56.3   54.0   49.9  
Product composition of trade  
Exports  
  Machinery and transport equipment (as a % of total exports)   18.8   19.9   21.3   21.8   23.9   25.6  
  Chemicals and intermediate goods (as a % of total exports)   5.8   5.2   4.7   4.8   5.5   5.7 
  Mineral fules, lubricants and related materials (as a % of total exports)   7.2   6.2   7.9   6.5   6.8   10.7  
  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (as a % of total exports)   9.0   6.1   5.4   6.2   6.0   4.8  
  Foodstuffs and agricultural products (as a % of total exports)   2.4   2.8   2.5   2.2   2.1   2.2 
  Consumer manufactures (as a % of total exports)   36.5   40.1   39.1   38.9   34.0   29.7  
  memo: Textiles (as a % of total exports)   24.1   26.2   25.4   25.4   22.3   19.0  
Imports  
  Machinery and transport equipment (as a % of total imports)   29.2   28.0   28.5   30.1   33.0   33.7  
  Chemicals and intermediate goods (as a % of total imports)   10.0   9.9   10.7   10.3   10.4   10.2 
  Mineral fules, lubricants and related materials (as a % of total imports)   12.1   12.7   11.1   10.9   11.8   14.0  
  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (as a % of total imports)   4.3   3.3   3.1   3.0   3.0   2.8  
  Foodstuffs and agricultural products (as a % of total imports)   5.4   6.1   4.8   5.7   4.9   4.7 
  Consumer manufactures (as a % of total imports)   10.5   10.8   11.5   11.4   9.8   9.5  
  memo: oil and gas (as a % of total imports)   10.4   10.7   9.6   9.2   9.3   11.9 
Financing  
  Rating History (Moody‘s foreign currency long term debt, end of year)   B3   B2   WR   Ba3   Ba3   Ba1  
  Bond spreads (basis points, end of year values)   n.a.   400   286   161   58   49  
  International bonds issuance (in USD million, end of year values)   260   794   1,062   814   0   1,199  
  Claims by BIS reporting banks  
  Claims by euro area BIS reporting banks (in USD million)   3,047   3,975   5,309   8,868   15,669   …  
Domestic macroeconomic developments  
Real activity  
  Real GDP   2.1   5.7   5.1   5.2   8.4   4.1  
  Real domestic demand   4.3   8.4   3.8   8.4   12.1   8.3  
  Real private consumption   0.2   6.8   4.8   8.3   12.9   9.0  
  Real public consumption   20.4   -0.2   6.0   8.5   4.6   4.9  
  Real gross ﬁxed capital formation   5.5   10.1   8.2   8.6   10.8   13.0  
  Real exports of goods and services   23.4   12.1   17.5   8.4   13.9   7.6  
  Real imports of goods and services   27.1   18.4   12.0   16.0   22.1   17.2 
Industrial production   7.1   8.3   4.3   3.1   5.3   2.0  
Number of employees economy-wide (average percentage change)   …   1.1   -2.9   0.3   0.8   2.6  
Unemployment rate (end of year)   10.5   8.8   8.4   7.4   6.3   5.9  
Net wages economy-wide (average percentage change)   49.1   40.5   27.1   25.4   22.5   23.7  
Prices, exchange rate, interest rate and monetary developments  
  Consumer price inﬂation (%, y-o-y, period average)   45.7   34.5   22.5   15.3   11.9   9.0  
  Producer price inﬂation (%, y-o-y, period average)   53.4   40.3   24.5   19.6   18.6   12.4  
  Exchange rate (domestic currency/EUR, index, period average, 1999 = 100)  122.4  155.2  190.4  209.4  248.1  222.4
  Nominal effective exchange rate (index, period average, 1999 = 100)   77.1   60.0   51.7   45.4   44.6   ... 75
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Romania: Selected macroeconomic indicators (cont’d) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 1)
Real effective exchange rate (index, period average, 1999 = 100)   109.3   111.0   113.9   115.1   120.1   …  
Narrow money (%, y-o-y)   56.2   39.0   37.3   28.3   35.0   60.6  
Broad money (%, y-o-y)   38.0   46.2   38.2   23.3   39.9   33.9
Total international reserves (excl. gold, in EUR million, end of year value)   2,655   4,445   5,877   6,374   10,848   16,796  
Money market rate (ON)   45.5   41.5   26.9   19.6   19.8   7.2 
Treasury bill rate(12-month)   70.7   41.3   28.6   15.8   17.6   9.14 2) 
Stock market (end of year values)   545   755   1659   2172   4365   6586  
Government sector  
  Central government balance   -3.6   -3.1   -3.1   -1.5   -0.8   -0.8  
  Central government expenditure and net lending   19.4   15.8   15.0   14.2   13.8   13.5  
  General government primary balance   0.7   0.6   0.4   -0.2   0.2   0.2  
  General government balance   -4.0   -3.3   -2.6   -2.2   -1.1   -0.8  
  General government expenditure and net lending   35.2   33.4   32.3   30.9   29.7   29.9  
  General government gross debt   31.3   28.7   28.9   25.9   22.3   20.2  
  General government net debt   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...  
External sector (as % of GDP)  
Current account balance   -3.7   -5.5   -3.3   -5.8   -8.4   -8.7  
  Trade balance   -4.6   -7.4   -5.6   -7.5   -8.8   -9.8  
  Services balance   -0.6   -0.3   0.0   0.1   -0.3   -0.6  
  Net factor income   -0.8   -0.7   -1.0   -2.3   -4.2   -2.9  
  Net current transfers   2.3   2.9   3.3   3.9   4.9   4.6  
Capital account balance   0.1   0.2   0.2   0.4   0.8   0.7  
Financial account balance   3.4   3.5   5.0   6.2   6.1   6.0  
  Net foreign direct investment   2.9   2.9   2.5   3.6   8.5   6.6  
  Net portfolio investment   0.3   1.5   0.8   1.0   -0.7   0.9  
  Net other investment   2.7   2.8   5.6   3.5   6.3   5.4  
  Change in reserve assets   -2.5   -3.7   -3.9   -1.9   -8.0   -6.9  
Convertible currency external debt  
as % of GDP   29.7   32.7   33.4   33.9   36.0   38.5  
y-o-y rate of change   25.8   22.7   10.3   10.1   22.8   39.4  
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services and income)   20.5   23.3   23.6   20.5   22.4   43.8  
By debtor:  
    Public sector 3)  
    as % of GDP   18.8   19.8   19.0   18.4   16.7   14.3  
    y-o-y rate of change   20.9   17.2   3.4   5.3   4.9   11.8  
    Private sector3)  
    as % of GDP   9.5   11.3   12.5   12.2   13.5   14.5  
    y-o-y rate of change   44.6   31.7   19.2   6.3   27.7   40.6  
    Deposit money banks  
    as % of GDP   1.3   1.6   2.0   3.3   5.8   9.6  
    y-o-y rate of change   -7.0   36.2   32.0   78.8   103.7   115.3
    Short-term debt  
as % of reserves excluding gold   30.4   25.0   20.9   31.0   33.2   36.3  
as % of total convertible currency external debt   6.7   7.6   7.6   11.1   16.4   20.0  
as % of GDP   2.0   2.5   2.5   3.8   5.9   7.7  
y-o-y rate of change   6.9   37.6   10.8   60.6   82.1   69.6  
Sources: IMF, Comtrade, BIS, Bondware, Loanware, IIF, NBR.  
1) Provisional data.  
2) Two-year maturity bonds.  
3) Excluding debt owed by deposit money banks.  76
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Croatia: Selected macroeconomic indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
External environment 
Openness
  Exports and imports of goods and services (as a % of GDP)   99.4   103.3   102.9   110.9   110.4   108.6
Geographical composition of trade
  EU-25 (as a % of total trade)   69.9   70.3   69.5   70.7   67.9   70.7
  Euro area (as a % of total trade)   51.2   52.4   51.4   52.4   49.5   46.3 
Product composition of trade 
Exports
  Machinery and transport equipment (as a % of total exports)   27.0   29.4   28.4   29.5   32.3   29.6
  Chemicals and intermediate goods (as a % of total exports)   12.5   10.6   10.3   9.6   9.4   9.9
  Mineral fules, lubricants and related materials (as a % of total exports)   11.0   10.2   9.3   9.6   11.3   13.6
  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (as a % of total exports)   5.7   5.2   5.6   5.7   5.6   5.5
  Foodstuffs and agricultural products (as a % of total exports)   6.2   6.9   8.0   9.1   6.3   7.7
  Consumer manufactures (as a % of total exports)   20.0   20.7   20.6   19.6   17.8   16.6 
  memo: Textiles (as a % of total exports)   12.6   12.3   12.1   11.4   9.3   7.7 
Imports 
  Machinery and transport equipment (as a % of total imports)   32.6   33.2   34.3   37.1   34.9   32.9
  Chemicals and intermediate goods (as a % of total imports)   12.7   11.5   11.3   11.0   11.2   11.1
  Mineral fules, lubricants and related materials (as a % of total imports)   14.5   13.0   12.2   10.9   12.0   15.1
  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (as a % of total imports)   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.3   2.1   2.0
  Foodstuffs and agricultural products (as a % of total imports)   7.1   7.7   7.4   7.0   7.2   7.2
  Consumer manufactures (as a % of total imports)   12.0   11.5   11.6   11.6   11.9   11.6 
  memo: oil and gas (as a % of total imports)   12.9   11.4   10.8   9.6   10.4   13.0 
Financing 
Rating History (Moody‘s foreign currency long term debt, end of year)   Baa3   Baa3   Baa3   Baa3   Baa3   Baa3 
Bond spreads (basis points, end of year values)     179   124   114   42   37 
International bonds issuance (in USD million, end of year values)   482   718   647   541   1,098   0 
Claims by BIS reporting banks   …   …   …   …   …   … 
Claims by euro area BIS reporting banks (in USD million)   7,307   8,781   17,235   23,762   28,166   … 
Domestic macroeconomic developments 
Real activity 1)
  Real GDP   2.9   4.4   5.2   4.3   3.8   4.1
  Real domestic demand   -0.3   5.5   8.8   5.2   2.9   3.7
  Real private consumption   4.2   4.5   7.5   4.1   3.9   3.5
  Real public consumption   -1.5   -6.2   -1.8   -0.3   -0.3   0.7
  Real gross ﬁxed capital formation   -3.8   7.1   12.0   16.8   4.4   3.4
  Real exports of goods and services   12.0   8.1   1.3   10.1   5.4   4.8
  Real imports of goods and services   3.7   9.8   8.8   10.9   3.5   3.8
  Change in inventories   413.8   -180.7   194.0   -18.0   -6.2   30.9
Industrial production 2)   1.7   6.0   5.5   4.0   3.6   5.1
Employment3)   -1.7   0.5   0.8   2.5   1.2   -0.3
Unemployment4)   16.1   15.8   14.8   14.3   13.8   13.1
Wages   9.1   6.9   4.6   6.1   5.8   5.1 
Prices, exchange rate, interest rate and monetary developments
Consumer price inﬂation (%, y-o-y, period average)   4.6   3.8   1.7   1.8   2.1   3.3
Producer price inﬂation (%, y-o-y, period average)   9.7   3.6   -0.4   1.9   3.5   3.0
Exchange rate (domestic currency/EUR, index, period average, 1999 = 100)   100.7   98.5   97.7   99.8   98.9   97.6
Nominal effective exchange rate (index, period average, 1999 = 100)   104.8   103.4   101.2   98.2   94.8   93.5
Sources: CNB, MoF and CBS. 
1)  According to official CBS data for the first three quarters and latest official CNB projection for the last quarter of 2005. 
2)  Non-seasonally adjusted data. 
3)  Preliminary data for 2005. 
4)  The 2005 data are for the first half of the year. 77
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Croatia: Selected macroeconomic indicators (cont’d) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
  Real effective exchange rate (index, period average,   
  PPI deﬂated, 1999 = 100)   101.5   98.7   96.3   94.2   90.7   91.1
  Real effective exchange rate (index, period average,   
  CPI deﬂated, 1999 = 100)   102.9   100.4   98.6   96.1   93.0   91.0
  Narrow money (%, y-o-y)   30.1   31.5   30.2   9.8   2.0   12.3
  Broad money (%, y-o-y)   29.1   45.7   9.6   10.7   8.2   10.7
Total international reserves (excl. gold, in USD million, end of year value)   3,525   4,704   5,886   8,191   8,759   8,801 
  Money market rate   6.8   3.4   1.7   3.3   5.1   ...
  Treasury bill rate   n.a.   n.a.   2.6   5.6   5.7   4.2 
  Stock market (end of year values)   n.a.   n.a.   1,173   1,185   1,565   1,998 
Government sector
  Central government balance 5)   -7.1   -5.4   -5.0   -4.9   -4.5   -3.8
  Central government expenditure and net lending   48.8   46.8   44.8   45.1   45.4   43.4 
  General government primary balance   -5.6   -4.6   -2.3   -3.1   -3.0   -1.5 
  General government balance 6)   -6.5   -6.7   -5.0   -6.3   -4.9   -4.2 
  General government expenditure and net lending   54.0   50.8   48.8   49.5   49.8   48.3 
  General government gross debt 7)   39.7   40.6   40.4   42.0   44.9   45.5 
  General government net debt   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ... 
External sector 
Current account balance 8)   -2.6   -3.7   -8.4   -7.3   -5.2   -5.9
  Trade balance   -17.5   -20.8   -24.6   -27.3   -24.4   -24.6
  Services balance   12.4   14.9   13.6   19.3   17.1   17.8
  Net factor income   -2.1   -2.8   -2.4   -4.2   -2.3   -3.2
  Net current transfers   4.8   5.0   4.8   4.9   4.3   4.0 
Capital account balance 8)   0.1   0.7   2.1   0.3   0.1   0.0 
Financial account balance 8)   6.1   4.0   9.2   11.5   8.4   9.8
  Net foreign direct investment   5.7   6.0   2.5   6.6   2.6   6.2
  Net portfolio investment   3.6   3.0   -1.8   3.4   0.9   -1.7
  Net other investment   0.2   2.0   11.6   6.2   5.1   5.3
  Change in reserve assets   -3.4   -7.0   -3.1   -4.8   -0.2   -0.1 
External debt
  as % of GDP9)   60.6   60.7   62.2   77.6   82.5   84.7
  y-o-y rate of change   19.9   11.1   11.9   31.6   15.0   12.0
  Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services and income)   22.7   25.1   26.3   19.4   19.7   22.7 
By debtor: 
  Public secto 10) 
  as % of GDP9)   34.8   33.8   29.8   32.6   31.0   27.9 
  y-o-y rate of change   26.7   7.7   -3.6   15.5   2.7   -1.8 
  Private sector* 
  as % of GD 9)   25.8   26.9   32.4   45.0   51.5   56.8 
  y-o-y rate of change   15.6   15.8   31.3   46.4   23.9   20.2 
  Deposit money banks 
  as % of GDP9)   11.0   11.5   15.6   24.0   27.9   29.8 
  y-o-y rate of change   2.8   16.0   48.8   61.5   25.8   16.7
Short-term debt
  as % of reserves excluding gold   25.5   10.8   10.1   24.8   40.7   48.5
  as % of total external debt   8.0   4.3   3.8   8.2   11.5   14.2
  as % of GDP 9)   4.8   2.6   2.4   6.4   9.5   12.0
  y-o-y rate of change   49.2   -40.1   -1.2   185.4   60.8   37.9 
5) On a cash basis. 
6) On a modified accrual basis. 
7) Includes debt of the Republic of Croatia, central government funds debt and local government debt. 
8) According to preliminary CNB data for the first three quarters and latest official CNB projection for the last quarter of 2005. 
9) For 2005 GDP is calculated as the sum of GDP realizations in the first, second and third quarter of 2005 and the latest official CNB projection for 
the last quarter of 2005. 78
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Turkey: Selected macroeconomic indicators  
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
           
External environment    
Openness    
  Exports and imports of goods and services 
  (as a % of GDP)   56.9   66.7   59.7   59.9   63.9   … 
Geographical composition of trade    
  EU-25 (as a % of total trade)   51.6   49.2   50.1   50.9   49.8   …
  Euro area (as a % of total trade)   41.7   40.0   39.7   40.2   38.9   … 
Product composition of trade    
Exports    
  Machinery and transport equipment  
  (as a % of total exports)   20.8   22.9   24.3   26.6   29.0    
  Chemicals and intermediate goods  
  (as a % of total exports)   4.5   4.4   4.3   4.0   4.1    
  Mineral fules, lubricants and related materials  
  (as a % of total exports)   1.1   1.4   1.9   2.1   2.3    
  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels  
  (as a % of total exports)   2.8   2.5   2.3   2.4   2.3    
  Foodstuffs and agricultural products  
  (as a % of total exports)   10.4   10.6   8.6   8.3   8.0    
  Consumer manufactures  
  (as a % of total exports)   28.5   25.8   27.6   26.8   23.4    
  memo: Textiles  
  (as a % of total exports)   37.2   33.9   34.4   32.2   27.9    
Imports    
  Machinery and transport equipment  
  (as a % of total imports)   39.1   32.4   31.6   32.4   35.8    
  Chemicals and intermediate goods  
  (as a % of total imports)   14.1   15.9   16.0   15.7   15.1    
  Mineral fules, lubricants and related materials  
  (as a % of total imports)   14.4   15.7   14.5   12.9   11.8    
  Crude materials, inedible, except fuels  
  (as a % of total imports)   6.3   6.2   7.4   7.8   7.4    
  Foodstuffs and agricultural products  
  (as a % of total imports)   2.2   1.9   2.1   2.4   1.9    
  Consumer manufactures  
  (as a % of total imports)   6.3   6.5   6.0   5.7   5.7    
  memo: oil and gas  
  (as a % of total imports)   12.9   14.3   12.7   11.4   10.4    
Financing    
  Rating History (Moody‘s foreign currency  
  long term debt, end of year)   B1   B1   B1   B1   B1   Ba3 
  Bond spreads (basis points, end of year values)   803   702   696   309   264   223 
  International bonds issuance (in USD million,  
  end of year values)   7,330   2,159   3,560   5,454   6,477   9,947 
  Claims by BIS reporting banks    
  Claims by euro area BIS reporting banks  
  (in USD million)   24,993   20,366   20,313   22,530   26,207    
Domestic macroeconomic developments    
Real activity    
  Real GDP   7.4   -7.5   7.9   5.8   8.9   5.0 
  Real domestic demand   10.0   -18.6   9.4   9.4   14.1   4.2 
  Real private consumption   6.3   -9.3   2.2   6.7   9.9   4.5 
  Real public consumption   7.1   -8.5   5.4   -2.4   0.5   2.0 
  Real gross ﬁxed capital formation   17.3   -31.5   -1.1   10.0   32.4   7.8 
  Real exports of goods and services   19.2   7.4   11.1   16.0   12.5   8.7 
  Real imports of goods and services   25.4   -24.8   15.8   27.1   24.7   6.8 
  Change in inventories   2.2   -1.4   4.7   7.3   7.9   6.8
  Industrial production   6.1   -8.7   9.5   8.7   9.9   ...
  Employment   -0.1   -2.3   -0.8   -0.3   2.0   ...
  Unemployment   6.6   8.5   10.3   10.5   10.0   9.8
  Wages 
Sources: IMF, Comtrade, BIS, Bondware, Loanware, IIF.  79
ECB 




Turkey: Selected macroeconomic indicators (cont’d) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
           
  ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ... 
Prices, exchange rate, interest rate and  
monetary developments    
  Consumer price inﬂation (%, y-o-y, period average)   54.3   53.9   44.8   25.2   10.3   8.4 
  Producer price inﬂation (%, y-o-y, period average)   ...   ...   ...   ...   14.6   ...
  Exchange rate (domestic currency/EUR,  
  index, period average, 1999 = 100)   129.1   245.8   317.9   379.7   396.7   ... 
  Nominal effective exchange rate  
  (index, period average, 1999 = 100)   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ... 
  Real effective exchange rate  
  (index, period average, 1999 = 100)   ...   ...   ...   ...   ...   ... 
  Narrow money (%, y-o-y)   57.3   46.3   36.7   43.1   26.4   ... 
  Broad money (%, y-o-y)   40.5   86.2   29.1   14.6   22.1   ...
Total international reserves  
(excl. gold, in USD million, end of year value)   22,488   18,879   27,069   33,991   35,669   … 
  Money market rate   56.7   92.0   49.5   36.2   21.6   ... 
  Treasury bill rate   25.2   85.3   59.5   34.9   21.9   ...
  Stock market   9,437   13,783   10,370   18,625   24,972   39,778 
Government sector    
  Central government balance   -11.2   -17.4   -14.9   -11.0   -7.2   -5.4 
  Central government expenditure and net lending   37.5   45.2   41.7   39.0   32.9   31.1 
  General government primary balance   1.5   4.9   -2.5   1.6   4.0   3.7 
  General government balance   -14.5   -21.4   -18.6   -14.4   -9.0   -7.5 
  General government expenditure and net lending   41.3   49.8   45.9   43.0   36.8   36.3 
  General government gross debt   69.2   106.8   92.8   82.7   74.6   71.6 
  General government net debt   62.4   99.1   85.6   77.2   69.6   66.9 
External sector    
Current account balance   -5.0   2.4   -0.8   -3.3   -5.1   -5.6 
  Trade balance   -11.1   -2.6   -4.0   -5.8   -7.9   -8.8
  Services balance   3.7   2.9   1.8   2.1   2.4   2.9
  Net factor income   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
  Net current transfers   2.4   2.1   1.3   0.4   0.4   0.3 
Capital account balance   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0
Financial account balance   8.0   5.9   4.2   1.2   3.0   2.7
  Net foreign direct investment   0.1   1.9   0.5   0.5   0.6   1.1
  Net portfolio investment   0.5   -3.2   -0.3   1.1   2.7   2.3
  Net other investment   6.0   -1.9   4.0   1.4   1.2   2.3
  Change in reserve assets   1.5   9.0   0.1   -1.7   -1.4   -3.1
Convertible currency external debt    
as % of GDP   61.5   77.9   69.1   59.6   53.4   …
y-o-y rate of change   16.5   -5.8   9.8   11.1   14.6   …
Total debt service  
(% of exports of goods and services and income)   45.6   45.7   66.9   60.0   43.5   …
  By debtor:    
  Public sector*    
  as % of GDP   31.8   47.6   44.7   37.3   31.4   …
  y-o-y rate of change   11.7   11.3   16.1   7.5   7.6   …
  Private sector*    
  as % of GDP   18.2   21.2   18.0   16.9   15.7   …
  y-o-y rate of change   19.5   -13.3   4.8   21.4   18.8   …
  Deposit money banks   
  as % of GDP   11.5   9.1   6.5   5.4   6.3   …
  y-o-y rate of change   26.6   -41.3   -11.8   7.5   50.1   …
Short-term debt    
as % of reserves excluding gold   154.3   105.3   77.9   87.1   121.1   …
as % of total convertible currency external debt   29.0   17.1   16.5   20.8   27.0   … 
as % of GDP   17.8   13.3   11.4   12.4   14.4   … 
y-o-y rate of change   31.0   -44.3   5.8   40.3   48.8   … 80
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